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Preface
The Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conference was held in 
Bangkok between 16 and 19 July 2019 with the theme ‘New dimensions 
of connectivity in the Asia Pacific’. The conference was hosted by the 
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) in conjunction 
with the International Institute for Trade and Development and the 
Mekong Institute. The papers presented at the conference are collected 
in this volume.
The 40th PAFTAD conference met to consider the policy and capacity 
gaps impeding greater connectivity in Asia and how to alleviate them. 
Significant economic gains are available from better connectivity. 
Regional connectivity is a key driver of trade integration and investment 
facilitation. Investment in the capacity to provide connectivity frees up 
the movement of goods and services, as well as the complementary flows 
of people and data. Improved access to and the provision of better quality 
infrastructure leads to falling trade costs and the creation of more efficient 
regional value chains. Second-round effects of enhanced connectivity 
include higher productivity and poverty reduction. Still, funding gaps 
persist that preclude the improvements in connectivity infrastructure 
offers, despite the benefits. 
The chapters in this volume look at regional connectivity performance, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the impacts of connectivity—
both physical and digital—and questions around investment in facilities 
to support connectivity. Close attention is paid to the impediments  to 
infrastructure investment and how to overcome them. Preparing 
a commonly shared vision for infrastructure development in the region 
and developing a set of principles for the good governance of infrastructure 
projects could be the first steps to improving connectivity. The process 
emerging from sharing experiences in implementing these steps would 
benefit from consideration of how it links to other forms of regional 
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cooperation. This can complement the role of multilateral development 
banks in deepening connectivity and actions to foster interactions between 
government and private sector investors.
A distinguished group of economists from East Asia and the Pacific 
met to discuss how regional cooperation and national government 
action can break the deadlocks related to policy and capacity gaps on 
connectivity. PAFTAD conferences have made an important contribution 
to policy thinking and policy development in the Asia-Pacific region for 
over 40  years. PAFTAD is famous for extensive discussion and debate 
around each chapter at the conference, followed by extensive revision 
for publication.
The PAFTAD team is grateful for the contributors to the book who 
collaborated enthusiastically to bring this research to publication. Our 
debt to the authors in the volume is obvious. Further, we are grateful 
for the invaluable and substantive contributions made by Peter Drysdale, 
Hugh Patrick, Mari Pangestu, Adam Triggs, Akira Kohsaka, Anna Strutt, 
Celia Reyes, Chia Siow Yue, Chul Chung, David Dollar, Edward Chen, 
Erik van der Marel, Francis Hutchinson, Gilberto Llanto, Il-Houng Lee, 
Jayant Menon, Jonathan Tsuen Yip Wong, Joseph Yap, Juan Palacios, 
Khalil Hamdani, Lin Chen, Lin Chien-Fu, Mia Mikic, Muhamad 
Chatib Basri, Narongchai Akrasanee, Robert Scollay, Shekhar Shah, 
Shiro Armstrong, Shujiro Urata, Siwage Dharma Negara, Somkiat 
Tangkitvanich, Souknilanh Keola, Stephen Howes, Tomoo Kikuchi, 
Vo Tri Thanh, Watcharas Leelawath, Wendy Dobson, Yiping Huang, Yves 
Tiberghien, Zaw Oo and Zhang Monan. They helped refine arguments 
and ideas at the conference and engage in thinking on connectivity issues 
facing Asian economies.
Narongchai Akrasanee, Twarath Sutabutr and Shujiro Urata participated 
in a stimulating panel discussion at the forum, which focused on how to 
connect the ASEAN Smart Cities Network. This was also Mari Pangestu’s 
last conference as PAFTAD chair after many years of engagement with 
the group. Mari departed PAFTAD to take on a directorship at the World 
Bank. We are deeply grateful for her leadership of PAFTAD and regular 
presence at the conferences.
We are indebted to Sam Hardwick of ANU, and Wisarn Pupphavesa, 
Nuchanart Phumphruk and Jirakorn Yingpaiboonwong of the TDRI 
team, for all stages of the management of the PAFTAD conference 
xxi
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that made it such a success. The book would not exist if it were not for 
the hard work of Dorothy Mason and later Brandon Harrington for 
managing PAFTAD, the publication process and the editors through to 
the finalisation of the book in 2021.
The PAFTAD International Steering Committee and the PAFTAD 
International Secretariat are grateful for the generous support of the 
donors whose continuing support make this important work possible. 
They include the Ford Foundation, the Canadian International 
Development Research Centre, the Korean Institute of International 
Economic Policy, the Asia Foundation of Toronto University, the National 
University of Singapore, the Taiwan Institute of International Economic 
Research, Colombia University, Sanaree Holdings and, last but not least, 
The Australian National University.
May we extend our sincere thanks to Emily Tinker, Teresa Prowse and 
ANU  Press for working so patiently with us through the production 
process. We express our gratitude to Jan Borrie for her excellent 
copyediting work.
This is an important collection of essays at a critical point in time for the 
global economy where Asia can lead an effort to improve physical and 
digital connectivity. Infrastructure gaps threaten to prolong any recovery 
and perpetuate regional trade bottlenecks and stall deeper regional 
integration.





Christopher Findlay and Somkiat Tangkitvanich
Introduction
A large body of research reports that significant gains are available from 
better connectivity. The consequences of investment in capacity to provide 
connectivity lead to significant changes in the full cost of movements 
of goods and services, as well as of the complementary flows of people 
and data.
With respect to goods, better connectivity has the most immediate effects 
in terms of trade flows, and thereby growth and equity (De 2006, 2009). 
In goods, infrastructure quality affects trade and port efficiency has the 
largest impact among all indicators (Nordås and Piermartini 2004). 
On the other hand, a deterioration in infrastructure raises trade costs 
(Limão and Venables 2001). Falls in trade costs facilitate the unbundling 
of production processes and the construction of value chains (Baldwin 
2012). With respect to services, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
has concluded that trade costs are higher than those for goods, but they 
have also fallen in the past two decades—one driver of which has been 
investment in infrastructure (WTO 2019b: Part D1). 
There are second-round effects of these immediate consequences on 
productivity and growth. Work on the effects of participation in trade, 
at the firm level, highlights important effects of falling costs of engaging 
in trade (Bernard et al. 2018; Shu and Steinwender 2018). Participating 
in trade across borders involves significant setup costs and, if these costs 
are lowered (due to falling full costs of connectivity), more firms will 
participate. Those who do participate are likely to be the more productive 
firms, since they are the ones able to cover these setup costs. Falling costs 
of connectivity allow these firms to grow, likely also crowding out the 
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less efficient, so productivity at an industry level improves. Furthermore, 
participation in trade can be a driver of productivity growth and 
innovation at the firm level.
Connectivity investments are linked to poverty reduction. They reduce 
the costs of participating in markets, which can have a substantial 
contribution to reductions in poverty. The incidence of transport costs is 
borne by farmers who sell into large markets where they are price-takers. 
Reductions in those costs can have a substantial impact on their labour 
income. With poverty concentrated in rural areas in developing countries, 
the consequences for its reduction can be important. For example, Menon 
and Warr (2008) model the effects of road investments in the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (PDR), where they find interesting differences 
between types of road investment: far greater poverty reductions occur 
when areas with no roads are provided with dry-season access, compared 
with the extension to year-round access in areas with dry-weather roads. 
This volume includes chapters on the consequences of changes in 
both physical and digital connectivity1 for trade, for the location of 
economic activity, for forms of doing business (the growth of ecommerce 
in particular) and for the delivery of new services (especially in the 
financial sector). A study of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also 
included. These studies are preceded by an assessment of the connectivity 
performance in the Asia-Pacific region and followed by a discussion of 
impediments to investment in projects that contribute to productivity. 
The collection as a whole provides the basis for a series of recommendations 
for regional cooperation, which are presented at the conclusion of this 
overview chapter.
Connectivity performance
In Chapter 1, Cyn-Young Park and Racquel Claveria provide a set 
of indicators of connectivity performance in the region, which they 
also combine into an overall index. They begin with an examination 
of recent indicators of infrastructure quality, which is relevant to 
1  Other dimensions of connectivity regularly considered include those between people and 
between institutions. These, for example, are referred to along with physical connectivity in the master 
plans of ASEAN connectivity. The former are not included here (for a comprehensive discussion of 
migration, see World Bank 2018) and aspects of institutional connectivity are referred to in this 
collection in relation to regulatory alignment. 
3
INTRODUCTION
connectivity, including road infrastructure and the provision of rail, air 
and sea transport. They find that, compared with the world as a whole, 
performance indicators in Asia are generally higher, but there remains 
considerable variation within the region. South and Central Asia tend to 
perform less well than East and Southeast Asia. 
The authors then link this performance in infrastructure to various 
indicators relevant to trade in goods. One of these is the trend in trade 
costs and another is a set of indicators of logistics performance. Generally, 
trade costs have fallen in the region and are now lowest in East Asia. What 
is alarming, however, are the relatively high costs of trade among Pacific 
Island economies. A similar pattern applies to logistics performance. 
The authors also provide a measure of the regulatory environment that 
affects those movements. They find that, in 2019, Asia and the Pacific 
scored 15 percentage points below world’s best practice in this respect. East 
and Southeast Asia are the best performers in the region. The European 
Union is taken as the benchmark for this assessment; however, there 
remains an interesting question, and a topic for further work, about the 
importance of the choice of institutions for integration (formal structures, 
as in the European Union, or market-led arrangements, as in East Asia) to 
create improvements in connectivity performance. 
The authors extend their coverage of performance indicators of 
connectivity by considering the costs and time of moving goods across 
borders. They note the reduction in these items since 2014, especially in 
Central and South Asia, and also East and Southeast Asia. Gaps remain, 
however. Average border compliance time in South Asia is now about 
three days (down from five), but in East Asia, the time to complete export 
requirements is 18 hours (and 31 hours for imports). The consequences 
are significant: Hummels and Schaur (2013) find that the daily ad valorem 
tariff equivalent of time in transit is between 0.6 and 2.1 per cent. The 
assessment of Park and Claveria is that further reductions in these costs 
are possible, involving building more efficient infrastructure and changes 
in regulatory and other policy, including compliance with standards. 
Park and Claveria examine linkages between infrastructure quality, regional 
integration and growth. They apply the Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation 
and Integration Index (ARCII) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
which refers to trade and investment, financial flows, regional value 
chains, infrastructure connectivity, movement of people and institutional 
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integration. They observe that connectivity carries considerable weight 
in this measure and its contribution has increased over time. They also 
report the results of a study of the sources of growth in 156 countries 
over the decade to 2016 (noting that this period is relatively short for 
such studies). They find that changes in infrastructure connectivity make 
a significant contribution both to growth and to reductions in inequality, 
as well as to the extent of poverty in an economy. They stress, however, 
the important interactions, and two-way relationships, of infrastructure 
connectivity with other dimensions of the ARCII. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
The BRI is an important contributor to connectivity in the region. Pelagia 
Karpathiotaki, Yunhua Tian, Yanping Zhou and Xiaohao Huang examine 
in Chapter 2 the origins and consequences of the BRI, which consists of 
both land and sea corridors linking Europe and Asia. They present key 
elements of the BRI concept and their consistency with various elements 
of Chinese ways of thinking about development and the role of China 
in the world economy and with models of geopolitics. The governance 
model is also discussed, and forces leading to a more multilateral approach 
than originally proposed are identified. 
This chapter also examines the contribution of the BRI to connectivity—
first, in terms of reduced shipping times and the potential contribution 
to greater digital connectivity. The value of policy coordination across 
countries to improve performance is also noted. The conversion of these 
physical dimensions to economic effects is then explained, referring to 
significant falls in trade costs and also the positive consequences for trade 
flows, among the BRI members as well as between members and the rest 
of the world. In addition, there are positive spillovers from the BRI to 
trade costs among non-members. Other impacts examined include the 
shape of the trade network (showing China in a more central role), an 
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows among, and from the 
rest of the world to, BRI members, and the reconstruction of global value 
chains among members with a greater focus on China.
Commentary on the BRI has identified a number of risks related to 
political and legal changes, the consequences for debt and environmental 
impacts. Efforts by China to respond to these issues are noted, including 
the application of frameworks for the assessment of debt sustainability 
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and changes in governance arrangements. On procurement questions, the 
authors note three channels: national action, leadership by China in 
the design of processes and participation in multilateral structures such as 
those provided by the WTO.2
Impacts of connectivity: Physical
In Chapter 3, Wichsinee Wibulpolpresert, Winit Theanvanichpant and 
Somkiat Tangkitvanich provide a study of the consequences of investments 
in physical connectivity—in particular, the second (opened in 2011) and 
third (2013) Thai–Laos Friendship bridges across the Mekong River. They 
assess the three-way interaction of the infrastructure investment, local 
economic activity and urbanisation. The authors provide context for their 
case by reviewing studies of the consequences of improved connectivity. 
They refer to studies of the manner in which infrastructure investment 
reduces trade costs and to a number of studies of the situation in China, 
where high-speed rail connectivity improved dramatically. Common 
results in that work are that peripheral cities can decline as employment 
agglomerates in transport hubs. They stress, therefore, the chance that 
outcomes from improved connectivity will be uneven across localities. 
These distributional consequences are a factor in community responses to 
proposals for and the operation of new infrastructure facilities. 
Wibulpolpresert et al. explain the differences in the context of the two 
bridges. The second bridge is linked to an existing special economic 
zone on the Laos side of the river, which had attracted FDI from Japan. 
The sequence of events they suggest was that industrialisation (via the zone) 
drove local urbanisation and the demand for connective infrastructure. 
The third bridge was built in the absence of local industrialisation and 
was designed to add to regional connectivity in general. In that case, the 
bridge might drive industrialisation and then, perhaps, urbanisation. 
The sequence of events is different in that case. 
The authors explore these relationships using data on various economic 
variables measured at the regional level. Of special interest, however, is 
their use of satellite imagery, primarily to assess changes in urbanisation. 
The authors discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this novel data source.
2  China has provided a new proposal to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
(see WTO 2019a). 
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONNECTIVITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
6
Findings of the chapter include, first, evidence of the growth of cross-
border trade as a result of the construction of the bridges. However, 
the authors find less-significant impacts in the local area of the bridges. 
Urbanisation did expand in the region, but the opening of the bridges 
did not shift its patterns significantly, which continued to be linked to 
existing highways and urban areas. There are echoes here of the outcomes 
of the studies of better connectivity in China, where direct proximity 
to new infrastructure has uneven effects.
The authors also stress that the consequences of connectivity depend 
on the context. They find that, in the case of the second bridge, where 
a special economic zone already existed, industrialisation was the driver 
of demand for connectivity. In the case of the third bridge, a special 
economic zone was built following its construction, so connectivity led 
rather than followed.
Impacts of connectivity: Digital
Moving from physical connectivity, the following three chapters of the 
collection examine the impacts of and issues with digital connectivity.
Natasha Beschorner begins, in Chapter 4, with a review of the growth of 
the application of digital technology and its implications, including the 
growth of e-commerce and digital services trade. However, the author 
observes the relatively low application (to 2018) of digital technology 
by individuals, business and government in the region, relative to world 
experience and according to a range of indicators relevant to each group. 
She also notes the prospects offered by further technological change, 
moving beyond the use of cloud computing to the application of 
5G mobile networks and artificial intelligence. 
Beschorner then seeks to understand the origins of the position of the 
region on the application of digital technology by reviewing the status 
of five elements—namely, connectivity, payments systems, skills in the 
workforce, complementary logistics, and digital policy and regulation. 
A number of indicators are compiled for each item. The policy measures 
include those relating to privacy, cybersecurity, consumer protection, 
digital entrepreneurship, and digital government and identification 
(ID). The author reports the variable performance across the region in 
all elements. She finds issues of commission and omission: some areas 
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have excessive regulation or intervention but in others there are gaps to 
be filled. The author provides a list of priorities for action at the country 
level for each of the five elements.
The author notes that there are perceptions of new risks associated with 
the growth of the digital economy (such as the abuse of personal data or 
cyberattacks, as well as changes in labour markets) and calls for further 
work on the choice of the appropriate responses. The author also stresses 
the new opportunities for greater inclusiveness following the development 
of the digital economy. 
Noting the interactions involved in the digital economy, the author 
makes the case for regional cooperation to support progress on raising the 
levels of performance in each of the five elements of its foundation, and 
provides examples of priorities for such cooperation—a theme of which is 
the focus on interoperability and regulatory alignment. 
The focus in this chapter is generally on Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) members. There is scope in further work to add to the 
analysis here by benchmarking ASEAN policy against others in the rest of 
the world including China. This work is facilitated by the release of new 
measures assessing policy applying to digital transactions (see, for example, 
Ferracane et al. 2018) and the consequences of the policy environment for 
various performance measures, such as the growth of digital transactions 
domestically and across borders, as well as the association between them. 
It is interesting to check, for example, whether regimes that are locally 
competitive but closed to cross-border transactions, and in which domestic 
transactions have also grown rapidly (see Chapter 6 by Huang and Wang 
for example), lead to the growth of international competitiveness. 
There follow two chapters on specific elements of the digital economy: 
one on the consequences of the growth of e-commerce and the other on 
the payments systems in China. 
Santitarn Sathirathai and Voraprapa Nakavachara review the impact of 
the growth of e-commerce on firms selling on the relevant platforms in 
Thailand in Chapter 5. They note the presence of many studies of the 
impacts on buyers who operate on e-commerce platforms but the lesser 
amount of work on the effects on sellers. They also note that much of the 
research literature examines the case of China, with less attention given to 
Southeast Asia. They then work with a relevant platform in Thailand 
to collect a large dataset of the experiences of nearly 7,000 merchants. 
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Sathirathai and Nakavachara begin by examining the effect of 
participation in e-commerce on the income of the participants’ 
household, for participants who both did and did not previously operate 
a business offline. Both groups reported growth in household income, 
but the channels of effect differed. For new participants, the effect, not 
surprisingly, came via the additional or supplementary source of income. 
Of more interest are the results for the established firms, where the effects 
are more complex. These both lifted sales and improved efficiency. They 
were able to reach larger markets by lowering the effective cost of distance, 
which increased their extensive (number of clients) margin. They also 
increased sales outside their own region, adding to trade connectivity 
across the country. Of interest also is that the largest effects were found to 
be in the poorest regions. 
Given these positive results, especially for inclusiveness, the authors 
propose a series of government actions to ameliorate impediments to 
participation in e-commerce, including infrastructure that provides access 
to the internet, building digital skills and regulatory reform to remove 
impediments to the growth of logistics and electronic payments.
In Chapter 6, Yiping Huang and Xun Wang discuss the development 
of mobile payment systems in China. They note the constraints on the 
development of and disincentives for the use of online payment systems 
that are common in other countries (card-reader machines and processing 
fees, respectively, as well as lack of trust among both buyers and sellers) and 
then, given the role of cash as a dominant medium of exchange, the scope 
for new payment systems to emerge. These were prompted in this context 
by the development of smartphone and QR-code technology. They report 
the rapid growth of mobile payment users since 2013 and provide a case 
study of the development of the largest provider, AliPay. The authors also 
outline the domestic regulatory reform that facilitated the growth of the 
system, including the recognition of electronic systems and the ability of 
nonfinancial institutions to participate in payment systems. 
The authors note a number of additional consequences of the 
development of mobile payment systems, other than effects on the volume 
of transactions. One is that these systems lowered the cost of transfers, 
allowing families to share risk (migrant workers remitting income to their 
families, for instance, which previously might have been sent via travelling 
friends or bus drivers). The costs of entry into payment systems were 
reduced, which also facilitated the growth of new businesses or new areas 
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of activity for existing business (as in the previous chapter on e-commerce 
in Thailand), which had the effect of supporting entrepreneurship 
development in China.
Huang and Wang discuss the internationalisation of the Chinese 
mobile payment system, given its domestic growth. A driver of its 
extension offshore  was the rapid growth in tourists from China to 
international destinations. Another element of internationalisation is 
that the experience  of development of the mobile payment systems 
supported the development of other capabilities related to financial 
transactions (or fintech, in other words), which added to the international 
competitiveness of the providers. There was an extension of mobile 
payments to loans, for example. In contrast, the authors note that 
members of the fintech sector in Southeast Asia remain focused on 
payment systems, and both regulatory and technological factors constrain 
their extension into new areas. 
Other limiting factors to the growth of this sector are infrastructure and 
financial literacy. In response to these constraints, some countries have 
developed ‘sandboxes’ in which to experiment, while managing the risks 
involved, with new regulatory regimes. 
Huang and Wang conclude by noting other issues that deserve attention, 
including the ownership and privacy of the data being collected. The 
application of artificial intelligence to the transaction data on file is in 
principle highly valuable, but its application leads to questions about 
who owns the relevant data and whether customers have made or are 
willing to make their data available. Another is the divide between 
communities with access to relevant infrastructure and those without. 
Rapid growth of this system then risks exacerbating inequalities. A third 
issue is a  set of regulatory challenges as companies managing payment 
systems extend into wider sets of financial transactions and compete with 
banks, rather than, as originally occurred, being complementary to them. 
This potentially also leads to risks associated with contagion and when 
these businesses are internationally connected to balance-of-payments 
issues. The authors propose attention to options for both prudential 
supervision and consumer protection in this sector. A further issue could 
be the implications for competition of the ‘winner takes all’ aspect of these 
services, driven by the value of the network effects. This is a challenge 
for regional cooperation when market power gained in a large domestic 
market can be projected into performance in markets of trading partners.
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Investment in connectivity
The final chapter, by Christopher Findlay, returns to the question of 
investment in facilities to support connectivity, either physical or digital. 
He observes that such projects are generally assessed as being highly 
prospective. He also points out that the benefits of infrastructure projects 
are even greater when the complementarity between projects is taken 
into account (for example, facilitating the capability of data flows to 
complement the movement of goods or service transactions) and when 
the benefits of networking across projects in different countries are 
realised. Governments have been the major funders of infrastructure, but 
constraints remain—both financial and human resources. Consideration 
is drawn, therefore, to private-sector engagement in funding, where 
significant pools of investible funds are evident.
Constraints arise, however, to private participation, including barriers 
to investment flows; but of more immediate interest in the context of 
the topics in this collection is the management of risks associated with 
infrastructure projects: their scale, longevity and specificity. Findlay notes 
bundles of issues associated with each of these elements, including those 
related to the recovery of costs sunk into projects that do not proceed, 
the impact of technological change that undermines business cases after 
project inception or political processes that shift over time and change 
government attitudes to projects. 
Findlay observes that, given this set of issues and their significance, it 
is not surprising there are generally large gaps between estimates of the 
value of projects expected to be worthwhile from a social point of view 
(also considering the social view of the cost of funds) and those that are 
actually funded. In other words, the risk-adjusted rates of return fail to 
meet the hurdle rates of investors. 
Findlay notes there is a global conversation under way with a focus on 
investment facilitation in general, but he proposes 10 ‘plus’ measures 
that could cause the facilitation work to add greater value in the context 
of infrastructure projects. These include a focus on various aspects of 
good governance—for example, the application of cost-benefit analysis, 




As Findlay also illustrates, issues of infrastructure have attracted 
considerable attention over time, and estimates of the ‘gap’ in investment 
are regularly reported, including by the multilateral agencies whose 
responsibilities sit in this field. Tools for assessing the sorts of risks he 
identifies have also been developed by multilateral agencies. Yet progress 
to narrow the gap is apparently difficult. There is plenty of ‘talk’ about 
the significance of the issue and the importance of resolving it, yet the 
problem remains.
Conclusion: A way forward
The editors’ conclusion from these papers is that, if the economies of 
the region are serious about connectivity—that is, they have a genuine 
concern about infrastructure investment and are convinced of its benefits 
as laid out in the chapters here—then an action plan is valuable to resolve 
the matter of the insufficiency of investment. 
At the national level, the main suggestion is to draw on the tools developed 
by multilateral agencies to identify serious impediments to infrastructure 
investment. This would be done in each economy so as to identify the two 
(or possibly three) most important items. A commitment would then be 
made to deal with those impediments.
This effort can be supported by regional cooperation in a number of ways.
First, a commonly shared vision for infrastructure development in the 
region could be prepared. This vision would not only refer to national 
ambitions, but also seek to capture the value of the spillovers between 
national plans—the additional value that can be captured by coordination. 
The specification of a vision supports the motivation to participate in the 
reform process just outlined and provides a reference point to set priorities. 
This vision should have a clear set of owners, such as a set of relevant 
ministers of East Asian economies. Some guidance could be taken from 
existing visions, such as that of the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity 
(MPAC), which seeks to achieve a ‘seamlessly and comprehensively 
connected and integrated region’. However, while MPAC shows a high 
level of ambition, its implementation could be improved (see Box 1). 
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Box 1 Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity
The Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) was established in 
2010 . It began with 19 projects designed to contribute to narrowing the 
development gap among members and to ASEAN community-building . 
The original plan involved 125 initiatives . Evaluated by the World Bank 
(2016), 39 were completed, 34 removed and 52 remain uncompleted . 
The bank noted the lack of progress on a number of physical connectivity 
initiatives . In a study of the links to growth in the first three years of the 
original MPAC, Abeysinghe et al . (2019) find little impact (although the 
period of study is relatively short), as well as little potential consequence 
so far of the transmission of shocks from one economy to others in the 
group; the latter, however, is a consequence of connectivity, which is worthy 
of continuing attention . The World Bank (2016) examined issues in the 
design of the next phase of MPAC . It stressed the complementarity between 
strategies—for example, how institutional reform complements investment 
in physical capacity, how reform of cross-border processes adds value to 
infrastructure investments and how quality and efficiency improvements in 
existing infrastructure can be as important as investment in new facilities . 
It also stresses the possibility of divergent implications of projects at local 
and national levels . Following these observations, the latest version of the 
plan is MPAC 2025, which adopts the goal quoted above of a ‘seamlessly 
and comprehensively connected and integrated region’, places less focus on 
projects and more on programs and adopts better strategies for monitoring 
and review . Some of the uncompleted 2010 projects were also rolled into the 
latest plan . MPAC 2025 also includes a focus on digital innovation, regulatory 
cooperation and people movement . It stresses the importance of progress 
on infrastructure financing but does not offer a specific response . It highlights 
the role of logistics but does not specify an agenda for making progress . 
Sources: Abeysinghe et al . (2019); Damuri (2019); World Bank (2016) .
A parallel step to the work on a vision for connectivity is to develop 
a  set of  principles for the good governance of infrastructure projects. 
These might be developed in the context of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, for instance, to facilitate wider application 
and to also involve more investor economies. These principles can then 
become a reference point for national economic action, helping to 
identify not just constraints but also how to proceed. Managing this work 
in a multilateral setting also helps ameliorate concerns that a host country 
might have about dealing with a large investor country on bilateral terms. 
This includes arrangements for financial flows. 
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Following these two elements of the development of a shared vision and 
an action plan for reform, the next step is to record the plans and share 
the experiences of their implementation. There is already a long history 
of mutual-interest capacity-building in the region on which to draw for 
this step in the process. The design of this step could be informed by the 
MPAC experience to date (see Box 1). 
Findlay also explains that the process emerging from these actions would 
benefit from consideration of how it links to other forms of cooperation, 
such as the BRI, MPAC and work by China and Japan to promote their 
cooperation in third countries and the Blue Dot Network. 
Another element to consider is the role of multilateral banks. The purpose 
is certainly not to replace their role but to complement them. Findlay 
identifies a number of tasks. One is to assist with the perspective on 
the design of cross-country regional networks of linked infrastructure 
projects. Another is to support the process of fostering interactions 
between governments and private-sector investors, in the context of the 
vision, the commitments to reform and the network approach. A further 
contribution is an effort to introduce a degree of standardisation to 
projects in ways that facilitate the application of securitisation methods 
for funding. 
To conclude, the gap in investment funding has been persistent, despite 
the apparent benefits from the improvements in connectivity that 
infrastructure offers. The risks that impede that investment can be traced 
to a series of policy and capacity gaps. National government action 
can break the deadlocks but is more likely to succeed in the context of 
regional cooperation. A ministerial-led process is valuable, involving 
the development of a vision for connectivity, principles for project 
governance, action plans for reform and reporting, capacity-building, 
collaboration with other regional initiatives and clarity around the roles 
of multilateral agencies. 
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and regional integration 
in Asia and the Pacific: 
Evidence from a new index 
of economic integration
Cyn-Young Park and Racquel Claveria
Introduction
Regional integration, especially through open trade and investment 
regimes, has been a prominent driver of economic growth that has lifted 
more than a billion people out of poverty in Asia and the Pacific. During 
the period 1990–2018, Asia’s trade volume growth averaged 7.3 per cent 
annually—higher than the world average of 4.7 per cent. With that 
robust economic expansion, real per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) (in constant 2010 dollar terms) more than doubled, from $2,807 
to $6,557 over the same period. 
In this process, the development of an export-oriented manufacturing 
industry helped attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and contributed 
to the creation and expansion of regional value chains across many 
economies in the region. Along with acceleration of trade and investment 
liberalisation, the private-sector-driven vertical integration of production 
systems across these economies has provided considerable impetus to 
deepen regional economic integration (ADB 2006). The intraregional 
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share of Asia’s total trade steadily increased from just under 50 per cent 
in 1990 to nearly 60 per cent in 2018. In addition, the intraregional 
share of total inward FDI to Asia increased from 41 per cent in 2001 to 
48 per cent in 2018. 
The remarkable success of the region’s high-performing economies over 
the past several decades demonstrates how trade and participation in global 
value chains can drive industrialisation and economic growth. However, 
the level of regional integration varies widely across Asian economies, 
with geographically remote and low-income developing economies often 
struggling to access international markets and participate in global and 
regional value chains. 
Many studies have investigated the trade openness and economic growth 
nexus for the economic benefits of regional integration. Earlier literature 
shows that cross-border trade and investment promote information flows 
and technology transfers, increasing the stock of knowledge capital and 
lifting both levels and growth rates of long-run outputs (Romer 1990; 
Grossman and Helpman 1990, 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). Later 
studies further extend the endogenous growth models to embody the scale 
economies and spillover effects of economic integration on productivity 
and growth through better competition, financial intermediation, labour 
mobility and human capital development, among others.
Recent research has highlighted the importance of infrastructure and 
seamless connectivity in promoting regional economic integration 
(UNESCAP 2017). This study suggested that regional economic 
cooperation and integration can support the attainment of the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), by ensuring that infrastructure 
projects have favourable social and environmental, as well as economic, 
impacts. Ensuring infrastructure projects connect small, low-income and 
geographically distant countries with the main markets of the region and 
placing a high priority on dealing with transboundary vulnerabilities and 
risks can help achieve the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
An earlier ADB – Asian Development Bank Institute (2009) study 
estimated that the expected benefits of regional infrastructure projects for 
pan-Asian connectivity could be worth as much as US$13 trillion for 
developing countries in Asia during 2010–20 and beyond if the required 
investment was made.
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1. INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
In this context, many regional and subregional integration initiatives 
have placed strong emphasis on building and strengthening infrastructure 
connectivity to boost regional trade and economic integration 
(ADB 2017b). Indeed, it is often noted that geographic and institutional 
barriers significantly constrain the expansion of regional trade and access 
to international markets (ADB 2017a). Having extensive and efficient 
transportation networks can therefore help connect businesses and people 
and create business opportunities and jobs. Better transport and energy 
connectivity will also reduce the costs of doing business. Countries 
with geographical disadvantages, particularly those landlocked or 
sea-locked, have often found it difficult to engage in international trade 
due to poor connectivity. Moreover, small economies facing significant 
capacity constraints may not be able to design and implement the public 
investments and policy reforms that support regional trade and economic 
integration without support from neighbouring economies and donor 
communities. 
This chapter aims to establish the link between various elements of regional 
integration—including infrastructure and connectivity—and economic 
growth, using rigorous empirical methodologies to show how different 
elements of regional integration contribute to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. In particular, the chapter looks at how infrastructure 
and connectivity, among other elements, can catalyse regional integration 
by facilitating regional trade and investment, strengthening regional value 
chains and promoting the movement of people. 
Section two surveys the link between infrastructure connectivity and 
regional integration in Asia using both hard and soft infrastructure 
indicators. Section three employs a composite indicator approach, 
through the Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index 
(ARCII), to gauge the contribution of infrastructure connectivity 
to  regional integration. Section four empirically explores the impact of 
regional integration (as well as its components, including infrastructure 
connectivity) on economic growth, inequality and poverty reduction. 
Section five concludes and offers policy prescriptions.
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Infrastructure connectivity and 
regional integration
Infrastructure connectivity is the backbone of trade and cross-border 
economic activities. Economic integration depends critically on the 
development of infrastructure that will strengthen connectivity both 
within and between countries and regions, freeing up the flow of goods 
and services, investment, people and ideas, as well as contributing to more 
efficient usage across borders of resources such as labour, land and energy 
(UNESCAP 2012). 
Infrastructure covers a wide range of facilities and systems serving economic 
areas and functions, including both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure. Soft 
infrastructure includes legal, regulatory, procedural and other supporting 
policy frameworks, as well as human and institutional capacities; hard 
infrastructure relates to physical networks, such as roads, railways and 
ports. The extensiveness and quality of such hard infrastructure are essential 
for physical connectivity and reducing transport and trade costs. But its 
effective contribution to regional integration depends crucially on the 
efficiency of the associated soft infrastructure such as laws, policies, taxes 
and governance. For example, lengthy customs clearance times, inefficient 
administrative systems, high logistics costs and other barriers continue to 
hamper the free flow of goods and services in many developing countries 
in the region. The availability of information and communication 
technology and internet access has also emerged as an important enabling 
factor for digital connectivity, which has been particularly important for 
international businesses and trade in recent years. 
Adequate quality infrastructure remains critical for regional economic 
integration. Despite many regional and subregional initiatives aimed at 
promoting seamless connectivity in Asia, the gap between supply and 
demand for high-quality infrastructure is significant and continues to 
widen. For example, between 2016 and 2030, Asia will need to invest 
more than US$1.7 trillion per year to maintain its strong growth 
momentum, continue to fight poverty and address climate change 
impacts, according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2017c). The 
ADB report also estimated the infrastructure financing gap would reach 
US$459 billion per year in 2016–20 (about 2.4 per cent of projected 
GDP for 25 developing countries). 
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Reliability of water supply
Figure 1.1 Quality of infrastructure in Asia, 2019
Notes: Scores range from 1 (extremely poor, inefficient and unreliable, among the worst 
in the world) to 7 (extremely good, efficient and reliable, among the best in the world) . 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2019 covered 141 economies .
Source: WEF (2019) .
Despite rapid overall growth and significant improvements in 
transportation networks, electricity-generation capacity and water supply, 
the quality of infrastructure varies widely across countries and subregions 
in Asia (Figure 1.1). Remote, landlocked and mountainous countries are 
often at great disadvantage due to high trade and transport costs, with 
likely significant impacts on socioeconomic development.
The provision of a broad range of infrastructure services is also important 
for strengthening connectivity. Basic infrastructure services include 
business, financial and freight services, along with information and 
communication technology. These services indirectly benefit other 
economic sectors by making transactions more efficient. 
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%
Figure 1.2 Trade costs of Asia and Pacific subregions with large 
developed economies, 1995–2017
Note: Trade costs shown are tariff equivalents, calculated as trade-weighted average trade 
costs of countries in each subregion compared with the three largest developed economies 
(Germany, Japan and the United States) .
Source: UNESCAP (2019) .
Strong regional infrastructure and seamless connectivity are essential 
for reducing trade costs, which is the key to accelerating the economic 
integration of developing countries into the global economy. While 
Asian and Pacific economies have made progress in reducing trade costs, 
significant room for improvement remains (ADB 2017a). Figure 1.2 
presents the trend of trade costs across the Asia and Pacific subregions. 
While the levels have generally come down, they vary significantly by 
region. Trade costs are lowest in East Asia and highest among the Pacific 
Island developing economies, followed by the Central, West and South 
Asian economies.
Figure 1.3 shows the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) scores across 
subregions in Asia and the Pacific between 2007 and 2018. Across the 
subregions, LPI scores have climbed, and East Asia performs comparatively 
better than the other regions. Among the LPI subdimensions, timeliness 
is relatively higher (Figure 1.4). 
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Figure 1.3 Logistics Performance Index, Asia’s subregions, 2007, 
2012, 2018
Notes: LPI scores are measured from 1 to 5, where 1 is rated as ‘poorest performance’ and 
5 is ‘best performance’ . Countries are analysed in the following dimensions: efficiency of 
customs and border management clearance, quality of trade and transport infrastructure, 
ease of arranging competitively priced shipments, competence and quality of logistics 
services, ability to track and trace consignments, and frequency with which shipments 
reach consignees within scheduled or expected delivery times .
















Figure 1.4 Logistics Performance Index dimensions: Asia, 2007, 
2012, 2018
Notes: LPI scores are measured from 1 to 5, where 1 is rated as ‘poorest performance’ and 
5 is ‘best performance’ . Countries are analysed in the following dimensions: efficiency of 
customs and border management clearance, quality of trade and transport infrastructure, 
ease of arranging competitively priced shipments, competence and quality of logistics 
services, ability to track and trace consignments, and frequency with which shipments 
reach consignees within scheduled or expected delivery times . 
Source: World Bank (2015) .
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Asia and the Pacific
North America
EU-28
Figure 1.5 Distance to ‘best-performer frontier’ in trading across 
borders by region, 2019
EU-28 = European Union member countries
Notes: 100 represents the ‘best-practice’ frontier . For example, a score of 75 means an 
economy is 25 percentage points away from the frontier constructed from the global best 
performance . The figure may change from year to year .
Source: ADB calculations using data from World Bank (2020) .
Figure 1.5 presents the distance to best-performer frontier in trading 
across borders. The distance-to-frontier scores show improved regulatory 
environments for cross-border trade, especially by reducing the overall 
cost and complexity of compliance with border and documentary 
requirements. In 2019, Asia and the Pacific were 15 per cent of the way to 
the global ‘best-practice frontier’ and surpassed the performance of Latin 
America and the Middle East.1 The European Union (EU) and North 
America remain the best performance ‘frontiers’ in trading across borders. 
East and Southeast Asia are the best regional performers. 
The time and cost associated with exporting and importing goods 
(that is, the trading across borders indicators) have generally improved 
over time (Figure 1.6). The time to trade decreased across Asia and the 
Pacific—most notably, in South Asia—through improvements in border 
and documentary compliance time, but it was still more than 20 times 
as long as in North America in 2019. The average border compliance 
time in South Asia remains about three days for exports and imports, but 
this subregion improved the most, with an average reduction of almost 
1  The distance-to-frontier score measures how far, on average, an economy is at a point in time 
from the best performance (the ‘frontier’) and assesses the absolute change in the economy’s regulatory 
environment over time (World Bank 2020).
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five days from 2014 to 2019. East Asia recorded the shortest border 
compliance time to trade among subregions, at 18 hours to export and 
31 hours to import (Figure 1.6). 
The cost to trade fell from US$355 in 2014 to US$258 in 2019, as 
measured by the average cost for border compliance to export. The average 
cost was highest in the Pacific economies (US$657), followed by Central 
Asia (US$365), Southeast Asia (US$275), South Asia (US$240) and East 
Asia (US$224). The highest export cost was in Samoa, at US$1,400. The 
cost associated with border compliance to import rose in the Pacific, from 
US$574 in 2014 to US$622 in 2019—the highest among the subregions. 
The cost declined substantially both in East Asia (from US$508 to 
US$273) and in South Asia (from US$565 to US$333) and remained 






























































































Cost to Import—Border Compliance (US$)
2019 2014
Figure 1.6 Time and cost to export and import, Asia’s subregions, 
2014 and 2019
Note: Aggregates are weighted averages based on total exports or imports .
Source: ADB calculations using data from World Bank (2020) .
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Reforms for better regulatory and institutional systems have been key to 
reducing the complexities of cross-border trade and related trade costs. 
Innovations in trade facilitation such as electronic submission and processing 
of documentation play a crucial role in reducing trade costs. In Georgia, 
for example, the introduction of electronic submission and processing in 
2005 has since reduced the processing time for export documents from 
48 hours to two hours. A customs union or trade agreement among major 
trading partners can also cut time and costs to trade. For instance, the 
Kyrgyz Republic reduced export time by 10 hours and cost by $85 after 
joining the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. Domestic reforms to reduce 
trade documentation requirements also reduce administrative burdens and 
trade costs. In Kazakhstan, for example, the time for export documentation 
compliance fell substantially when the country removed two documentation 
requirements for customs clearance.
However, room still exists to lower trade costs. For example, policy measures 
can support the building of more efficient trade infrastructure, enhance 
trade facilitation, lower or streamline nontariff barriers, accelerate regulatory 
reforms to meet international standards and harmonisation, open up 
services trade and expand trade capacity. Improving the business climate to 
enhance competition and maximising the complementarity between trade 
and investment can also boost trade and trade integration in the region. 
A multidimensional index of regional 
economic integration
Empirical evidence of the growth impact of regional integration has been 
elusive (Park and Claveria 2018b). Some studies look at participation 
in trading blocs, the share of intraregional trade in total trade and the 
reduction or elimination of tariffs as measures of regional integration 
to establish the statistical link between regional integration and growth. 
Yet,  while some findings point to significantly positive relationships, 
others are inconclusive. 
In addition, past studies often employed trade-focused measures of regional 
integration, which were often criticised for their limited scope of regional 
integration. Indeed, regional integration is a multidimensional process 
extending beyond efforts to liberalise trade. Appropriate measures should 
cover various facets, such as promoting trade and investment, facilitating 
the movement of capital across borders, building and developing regional 
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value chains, enhancing infrastructure and connectivity, improving 
people’s mobility, and providing the legal and institutional bases for 
international policy cooperation. In this context, the ADB (2017b) 
introduced the Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index 
(ARCII) as a  comprehensive measure of regional integration, which 
departs from  the typical trade-focused metrics. This chapter uses the 
ARCII to gauge the progress of regional integration, assess its main drivers 
and determine its impact on economic growth and poverty reduction.
The ARCII combines 26 indicators, categorised into six regional 
cooperation and integration dimensions: 1) trade and investment, 
2)  money and finance, 3) regional value chains, 4) infrastructure 
connectivity, 5) movement of people, and 6) institutional and social 
integration.2 The latest ARCII estimates indicate that the pace of regional 
integration in Asia was broadly steady during 2006–17 (Figure 1.7).
Key regional integration trends
Across subregions, East and Southeast Asia appear to be the most 
integrated with Asia. Central and South Asia scored below the average for 











2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Central Asia East Asia Southeast Asia South Asia Asia
Figure 1.7 Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index: 
Asia and Asia’s subregions, 2006–17
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the methodologies of Huh and Park (2018) and Park 
and Claveria (2018a) .
2  Appendix Table 1.1 lists the ARCII dimensions and indicators. See Huh and Park (2018) and 
Park and Claveria (2018a) for detailed discussion of ARCII, and Asia Regional Integration Center 
(2015) for the ARCII database, methodology and other related resources.
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Across dimensions, the performance of Asian subregions varies 
(Figure 1.8). For example, East Asia scored highest in the dimensions of 
money and finance, infrastructure and connectivity, regional value chains, 
and institutional and social integration. Southeast Asia outperformed 
other subregions in trade and investment and the movement of people. 
















Central Asia East Asia Southeast Asia South Asia
Figure 1.8 Dimensional subindexes to the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Cooperation and Integration Index: Asia’s subregions, 2017
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the methodologies of Huh and Park (2018) and Park 








2006 2017 2006 2017 2006 2017 2006 2017 2006 2017
Asia Central Asia East Asia Southeast Asia South Asia
Trade and Investment Money and Finance
Regional Value Chain Infrastructure Connectivity
Movement of People Institutional and Social Integration
Figure 1.9 Dimensional contributions to the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Cooperation and Integration Index: Asia and Asia’s subregions, 2006 
versus 2017
Source: Authors’ calculations .
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Meanwhile, among the six dimensions, infrastructure connectivity 
contributes the most to the overall integration index (Figure 1.9). 
Hence, it appears to be the most forceful and stable foundation for 
regional integration in Asia. Moreover, the contribution of infrastructure 
connectivity to regional integration has increased over the years across 
Asia’s subregions.
Regional integration and inclusive 
growth: An empirical exercise
From the perspective of multilateral organisations (such as the ADB and 
the United Nations), regional integration is not only an end in itself, but 
also a means to achieve the overarching objectives of economic growth 
and poverty reduction. To gauge the impact of regional integration and 
its components in promoting growth and reducing poverty, Park and 
Claveria (2018b) utilised the ARCII to estimate the growth, inequality 
and poverty impacts of regional integration. 
Park and Claveria (2018b) constructed an unbalanced panel dataset 
for 156 countries for 2006–16 to run separate regressions for growth, 
inequality and poverty that included the regional integration index as 
another explanatory variable, in addition to other control variables.3 
In all regressions, indicators for both trade and financial openness were 
included  to control the country-specific economic openness regardless 
of regional preference.4 
3  Corresponding regional integration indexes (similar to the composition of ARCII) were 
constructed for the European Union, Latin America and Africa. Meanwhile, Appendix Table 1.2 
presents the variables employed in the growth, inequality and poverty regressions. The control 
variables are listed in Appendix Table 1.3.
4  It is important to recall that ARCII measures a regional bias in economic integration relative to 
integration with the world. That is, the index may be higher for some countries that have just begun 
regional rather than global economic integration, while it may be lower for some countries that are 
very open and integrated with the world but not necessarily inclined towards integration—that is, 
only regionally oriented. Hence, to control for such an open-integration component in the regional 
integration index, financial and trade openness variables are included in all the equations. See Park 
and Claveria (2018b) for full discussion of the theoretical bases and specifications of the regression 
equations.
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Correlation analysis for the full sample indicates significantly positive 
associations among the dimensional indexes (Table 1.1). Indeed, this 
reaffirms mutually reinforcing and interrelated components of regional 
integration across dimensional indexes. For instance, infrastructure helps 
to link markets and resources. This sets the stage for corresponding benefits 
in terms of economies of scale and greater competition. However, benefits 
from improved physical connectivity may be constrained if the volume 
of trade and investment flow is small. Therefore, integration of trade 
and investment is important in maximising the benefits of cross-border 
and physical connectivity. Moreover, as more economies are physically 
connected, there is greater cross-border trade and investment. Labour 
mobility across borders grows. Monetary and financial transactions 
increase through formal and informal channels. However, stronger 
monetary and financial links mean that a country’s financial instability 
may be transmitted to its neighbours. Greater monetary and financial 
cooperation and integration are therefore essential in maintaining 
macroeconomic and financial stability and preventing financial crises 
(ADB 2006).
Park and Claveria (2018b) employed the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimation and found that infrastructure connectivity was 
significantly and robustly associated with higher growth and lower 
inequality and poverty.5 In particular, infrastructure connectivity—along 
with dimensions of the regional value chain and institutional and social 
integration—is a significant driver of economic growth (Table 1.2). 
Throughout a series of robustness tests, infrastructure and connectivity 
and institutional and social integration continue to show significant and 
positive impacts on growth. The results also indicate that infrastructure 
and connectivity lead to improved income distribution through an 
inequality-reducing effect that is stronger at low-income levels (Table 1.3). 
5  As is typical in the empirical literature, GMM was utilised as the estimation procedure to address 
the econometric issues inherent in growth, inequality and poverty regressions. These include the 
observed heterogeneity across countries, persistence of the dependent variable, potential endogeneity 
and long lagged effects of the regressors on the dependent variable (particularly in the case of 
economic growth). Full GMM estimation results are available on request.
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Log(infrastructure connectivity) –3 .230** –2 .567* –2 .763**
(0 .943) (1 .422) (1 .361)
Log(infrastructure connectivity) 
x log(real GDP per capita)
0 .348*** 0 .272* 0 .294*
(0 .103) (0 .159) (0 .151)
Log(real GDP per capita) 2 .095*** 2 .024** 2 .019**
(0 .638) (0 .837) (0 .866)
Log2(real GDP per capita) –0 .0999*** –0 .0989** –0 .0981**
(0 .0328) (0 .0415) (0 .0440)
With control variables Yes Yes Yes
*** significant at the 1 per cent level
** significant at the 5 per cent level
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
Notes: Table indicates summary of results when the dimensional subindexes enter the growth 
regressions separately . For brevity, dimensional subindexes with significant coefficients are 
shown . Windmeijer robust standard errors are in parentheses . 
Source: Authors’ calculations using revised estimations in Park and Claveria (2018b) .
The empirical findings are generally consistent with the development 
insight that better infrastructure will help economies grow faster. 
Investment in infrastructure not only increases an economy’s capital 
stock, but also broadens the reach of economic activities and trade, 
creating opportunities for the realisation of economies of scale. This, 
in turn, lowers production and distribution costs, which allows more 
goods to reach more people across greater geographic areas. Moreover, 
infrastructure creates jobs and boosts business opportunities and helps 
narrow the development gap nationally and subregionally, promoting 
inclusive and sustainable growth.
Moreover, infrastructure connectivity tends to exert a significant and 
negative impact on poverty (Table 1.4). Overall integration as well as that 
of trade and investment, money and finance, and institutional and social 
integration are significant and robust drivers of poverty reduction. Their 
impact in curbing poverty is even more pronounced for lower-income 
countries.
33
1. INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Table 1.4 Generalised method of moments estimation results: 
Poverty regressions








Log(overall RII) –16 .56*** –13 .29*** –20 .35
(3 .518) (4 .658) (14 .30)
Log(overall RII) x log(real GDP 
per capita)
1 .813*** 1 .441*** 2 .241
(0 .361) (0 .459) (1 .613)
Log(trade and investment) –2 .730*** –3 .069** –5 .598***
(0 .907) (1 .374) (2 .075)
Log(trade and investment) x 
log(real GDP per capita)
0 .296*** 0 .332** 0 .648**
(0 .0999) (0 .153) (0 .255)
Log(money and finance) –9 .582*** –8 .439*** –8 .656***
(1 .853) (1 .909) (2 .009)
Log(money and finance) x 
log(real GDP per capita)
1 .208*** 0 .881*** 0 .897***
(0 .193) (0 .221) (0 .235)
Log(infrastructure and connectivity) –6 .353*** –11 .42* –26 .93**
(2 .319) (5 .839) (10 .70)
Log(infrastructure and connectivity) x 
log(real GDP per capita)
–3 .682 –1 .422** –3 .298***
(5 .401) (0 .615) (1 .061)
Log(institutional and social 
integration)
0 .469 –7 .275 –18 .44*
(0 .573) (5 .445) (11 .00)
Log(institutional and social 
integration) x log(real GDP per capita)
0 .722*** 0 .791 2 .016*
(0 .254) (0 .560) (1 .121)
With control variables Yes Yes Yes
*** significant at the 1 per cent level
** significant at the 5 per cent level 
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
Notes: Table indicates summary of results when the dimensional subindexes enter the growth 
regressions separately . For brevity, dimensional subindexes with significant coefficients are 
shown . Windmeijer robust standard errors are in parentheses . 
Source: Authors’ calculations using revised estimations in Park and Claveria (2018b) .
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Improved infrastructure can help reduce poverty by providing the 
poor with greater opportunity to participate in market activities. 
Cross-border infrastructure projects—for example, in transport, energy 
and telecommunications—are essential for the movement of goods, 
services, people and information across countries. They enlarge market 
access, reduce economic distance, facilitate trade, and increase investment 
and labour flows. The resulting intensification of cross-border economic 
activities can create employment, particularly in the labour-intensive 
sectors of developing economies, thus contributing to poverty reduction 
(ADB 2006).
Concluding remarks
The Asia-Pacific has made remarkable progress in regional economic 
integration, which has been anchored in the region’s strong trade and 
investment linkages and the associated expansion of regional value 
chains. Together with market-driven actions, government-led policies 
have promoted regional economic integration. In the process of regional 
economic integration, regional economies have removed barriers to trade 
and the transfer of capital (both physical and human) and technology. 
Strong regional dynamics, driven by intraregional trade and financial 
flows, have also encouraged the participation of low-income countries 
in the fast-growing regional and global value chains and boosted their 
economic performance. 
Nevertheless, the progress of economic integration has not been even 
across subregions and countries in Asia and the Pacific, leading to unequal 
economic and social outcomes. Infrastructure connectivity and easier 
access to markets are often critical factors that divide high-performance 
countries from low-performance ones. Therefore, providing adequate 
quality infrastructure remains critical for regional integration and how 
individual countries can leverage regional integration for inclusive growth. 
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (UNESCAP 2017) also recognises the significant potential 
of regional economic integration and interconnectivity to support 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at 
regional and subregional levels. Substantially increasing investment 
in transport, energy and information and communication technology 
35
1. INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
infrastructure can contribute directly to some SDGs, especially by 
ensuring access to affordable, reliable and modern forms of energy for 
all (Goal 7) and building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive 
and sustainable industrialisation and fostering innovation (Goal 9). 
Such infrastructure projects should also help connect small, low-income 
and geographically distant countries with the main regional markets. 
In  addition, strengthening regional cooperation and integration can 
generate opportunities for increasing employment and incomes across 
the region. 
In reviewing the progress of regional integration, with particular focus on 
infrastructure connectivity, this chapter finds empirical evidence for the 
positive impacts of regional integration and infrastructure connectivity 
on economic growth that are inclusive and reduce poverty. However, 
there remains considerable room for further policy efforts to enhance 
regional integration and boost regional connectivity. Effective investment 
in regional infrastructure and connectivity will turn the region into an 
attractive place for business, investment and living. Further integration 
efforts should pay greater attention to ensuring impacts on regional 
economies are more inclusive, with broader economic participation 
and socially equitable results. Prioritisation of development strategies 
should focus on connecting the poor, remote and disadvantaged to 
regional centres.




Proportion of intraregional goods exports to total goods exports
Proportion of intraregional goods imports to total goods imports
Intraregional trade intensity index
Proportion of intraregional foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
to total FDI inflows





Proportion of intraregional cross-border equity liabilities to total 
cross-border equity liabilities
Proportion of intraregional cross-border bond liabilities to total 
cross-border bond liabilities
Pairwise dispersion of deposit rates averaged regionally relative 
to that averaged globally
Pairwise correlation of equity returns averaged regionally minus 
that averaged globally




Ratio between average trade complementarity index over regional 
trading partners and average trade complementarity index over all 
trading partners
Ratio between average trade concentration index over regional 
trading partners and average trade concentration index over all 
trading partners
Proportion of intraregional intermediate goods exports to total 
intraregional goods exports




Ratio between average trade cost over regional trading partners 
and average trade cost over all trading partners
Ratio between average liner shipping connectivity index over 
regional trading partners and average liner shipping connectivity 
index over all trading partners
Logistics performance index (overall)
Doing Business Index (overall)
Movement of 
people
Proportion of intraregional outbound migration to total outbound 
migration
Proportion of intraregional tourists to total tourists (inbound plus 
outbound)
Proportion of intraregional remittances to total remittances




Proportion of other Asian countries with which free-trade 
agreements have been signed
Proportion of other Asian countries that have an embassy
Proportion of other Asian countries that have signed business 
investment treaties 
Proportion of other Asian countries that have signed double 
taxation treaties 
Cultural proximity with other Asian countries relative to that with all 
other countries
Sources: Huh and Park (2018); Park and Claveria (2018a) .
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Appendix Table 1.2 Variables in growth, inequality and poverty 
regressions: Description and sources
Variable Description Source
Real GDP per capita GDP per capita based on purchasing 





School enrolment, secondary (% gross) World Bank (2021)
Investment (% of GDP) Gross capital formation (% of GDP) World Bank (2021)
Inflation rate Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank (2021)
Control of corruption Control of corruption, estimate World Bank (2021)
Financial openness Sum of foreign assets (monetary, 
Other Depository Corporations 
Survey, net foreign assets, liabilities 
to nonresidents) and foreign liabilities 
(monetary, Other Depository 
Corporations Survey, net foreign 
assets, claims on nonresidents) divided 





(IMF n .d .) 
Log(M2/GDP) Logarithm of money supply (M2) 




Trade openness Exports plus imports (% of GDP) World Bank (2021)
Social benefit incidence Benefit incidence of social insurance 
programs to poorest quintile (% of total 
social insurance benefits)
World Bank (2021)
Gini Gini index (World Bank estimate) World Bank (2021)
Poverty gap Poverty gap at $1 .90 a day (2011 PPP) 
(%)
World Bank (2021)
Poverty headcount ratio Poverty headcount ratio at $1 .90 a day 
(2011 PPP) (% of population)
World Bank (2021)
Source: Park and Claveria (2018b) .
Appendix Table 1.3 Control variables in growth, poverty and 
inequality regressions





Control of corruption index
Log(real GDP per capita)





Log(real GDP per capita)
Log(Gini index)
Source: Park and Claveria (2018b) .
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China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative: Contributions 
to connectivity
Pelagia Karpathiotaki, Yunhua Tian, Yanping Zhou 
and Xiaohao Huang
Introduction
The first signs of China’s desire to go abroad in a coordinated manner 
can be found in the first speech of Xi Jinping on 15 November 2012 in 
Beijing, when he emerged as general secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party and, among others, highlighted the priority of national rejuvenation 
and China’s role in world affairs: 
Our responsibility is to unite and lead people of the entire party and 
of all ethnic groups around the country while accepting the baton 
of history and continuing to work for realizing the great revival of 
the Chinese nation in order to let the Chinese nation stand more 
firmly and powerfully among all nations around the world and 
make a greater contribution to mankind. (BBC News 2012)
That day marked a turning point, as it changed the way China viewed the 
rest of the world and upgraded its role as a global player.
About a year later, in September 2013, during a visit to Kazakhstan, 
President Xi made a speech titled ‘Promote People-to-People Friendship 
and Create a Better Future’ and introduced the Silk Road Economic 
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Belt (SREB) (an overland route), which, along with the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road (MSR) (a maritime route), announced a month later 
in Indonesia, came to be collectively known today as the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). The first geographical presentation of the BRI was made 
in a map published by Xinhua News Agency on 8 May 2014. According 
to this map, the SREB would begin in Xi’an, whereas the MSR would 
start in Quanzhou’s harbour in Fujian Province. 
The political significance of the BRI initially was demonstrated in the 
‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the 
Reform’, adopted on 12 November 2013, according to which:
We will set up development-oriented financial institutions, 
accelerate the construction of infrastructure connecting China 
with neighbouring countries and regions, and work hard to build 
a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road, so as to 
form a new pattern of all-round opening. (Article 26, Section VII) 
The BRI has become so integral to China’s foreign policy strategy that 
it was adopted into the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution on 
24 October 2017: 
The Party shall constantly work to develop good neighbourly 
relations between China and its surrounding countries and work 
to strengthen unity and cooperation between China and other 
developing countries. It shall follow the principle of achieving 
shared growth through discussion and collaboration, and pursue 
the Belt and Road Initiative. (CPC 2017)
Since 2013, many official documents and white papers have been 
published that clarify the principles, priorities and thematic specialisations 
of the BRI. Undoubtedly, the first official and probably one of the 
most important documents on the BRI was the ‘Vision and Actions 
on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road’, jointly issued by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Commerce at the Boao Forum on 28 March 2015. It is an 
action plan on the principles, framework and cooperation priorities and 
mechanisms of the BRI. 
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According to this document, the BRI is:
• open to all countries, and international and regional 
organisations for engagement
• advocates peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, 
mutual learning and mutual benefit
• promotes practical cooperation in all fields, and works to build 
a community of shared interests, destiny, and responsibility 
featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and 
cultural inclusiveness. 
In 2016, the State Council published the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for 
National Informatisation, devoting a section to the construction of an 
‘online Silk Road’ and encouraging the full participation of Chinese 
internet companies. In May 2017, speaking at the first BRI forum in 
Beijing, President Xi reiterated the critical role of the digital Silk Road 
in the overall initiative. He called for further integration into the BRI of 
next-generation network technologies—including artificial intelligence, 
nanotechnology, quantum computing, big data, cloud computing and 
the concept of smart cities—to enable innovation-driven development 
(Xinhuanet 2017). 
In January 2017, China and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
agreed to jointly implement a BRI project focused on health. In August 
that year, China hosted an international conference on health related to 
the Silk Road. On 16 March 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic 
and while Italy was facing perhaps the greatest humanitarian crisis in its 
modern history, President Xi, during a phone conversation with then 
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, raised the notion of working 
closer with Italy to build a ‘Health Silk Road’.
Today, the BRI’s overland route comprises six land corridors: 
1. The China–Mongolia–Russia Economic corridor (CMREC). 
2. The New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB). 
3. The China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor 
(CCWAEC). 
4. The China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC). 
5. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). 
6. The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor 
(BCIMEC). 
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In addition, the maritime route of the BRI proposes more direct linkage 
of Chinese ports with emerging countries and economic regions such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to 
another official document, the ‘Vision for Maritime Cooperation under 
the BRI’, released on 20 June 2017 by the NDRC and the State Oceanic 
Administration (SOA), the BRI comprises three sea routes, or blue 
economic passages:
7. The China–Indian Ocean–Africa–Mediterranean Sea Blue Economic 
Passage, linking the CIPEC, CPEC and CCIMEC. 
8. The China–Oceania–South Pacific Blue Economic Passage.
9. The China–Northern Europe Blue Economic Passage, through the 
Arctic Ocean. 
On 28 January 2018, China’s State Council Information Office released 
a white paper titled ‘China’s Arctic Policy’, detailing the country’s plan to 
develop shipping lanes opened up by climate change. 
The original name of the BRI was coined in 2013 by President Xi, who drew 
inspiration from the concept of the Silk Road, which was established during 
the Han Dynasty 2,000 years ago and was an ancient network of trade 
routes that had for centuries connected China to the Mediterranean via 
Eurasia. The term ‘Silk Road’ was coined by German geographer Ferdinand 
von Richthofen in 1877. In China, the ancient trading routes across Eurasia 
were more prosaically called the northern and southern routes. The reference 
to the ancient Silk Road was not chosen by chance. It conjures up images 
of peaceful and diverse exchanges from one prosperous end of the Eurasian 
continent to the other and is easily identifiable in countries outside China 
as a shared heritage defying civilisational differences.
Chinese sources never refer to the BRI as the New Silk Road Initiative 
(NSRI) because this term was first envisioned in 2011 by the United States 
as a means for Afghanistan to integrate further into the region by resuming 
traditional trading routes and reconstructing significant infrastructure 
links broken by decades of conflict. The NSRI shares a focus on energy 
and transportation infrastructure with China’s SREB. 
In the ‘Vision and Actions’ document, the BRI is described as 倡议 (‘a call 
for action’), translated into English as ‘initiative’. In August 2015, China’s 
NDRC, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Commerce, clarified that the BRI is the official English translation and 
words such as ‘strategy’, ‘program’, ‘agenda’ and ‘project’ are inaccurate 
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(Xie 2015). According to the official documents, the BRI is a unilateral 
concept that requires willing cooperation from others who also have a 
stake in the provision of public goods, which is why Chinese officials will 
not use the term ‘strategy’, which requires close association or alliances 
among those who share its specific goals. Because the initiative relies on 
voluntary participation, it faces a collective action problem. 
The BRI is not just a development plan; it is also an important element 
of Chinese foreign policy in the twenty-first century, and therefore the 
definition of what constitutes a BRI project is broad. For the purposes 
of this chapter, BRI projects are any that originated in China (that have 
direct Chinese participation at a consultant, owner, contractor and 
financer level) and are focused on Asia, Europe and Africa, but open to 
all partners and fulfil the scope of the two Chinese policy documents 
that outline the BRI: the ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ and the 
‘Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative’. 
In 2019, the NDRC compiled an official list of participating BRI nations 
and approved projects. Many of the BRI-branded projects began before 
2013 but gained momentum under the initiative.
In this chapter, we focus on the contributions of the BRI to connectivity, 
and its consequences, but first, we examine some of its philosophical and 
geopolitical features, including its governance. These are the topics of the 
following two sections. We then identify the BRI’s contributions to 
connectivity. We examine the economic effects of connectivity on trade, 
foreign investment and global value chains. Subsequently, we examine 
some risks in the BRI, including political and legal, debt sustainability 
questions, governance risks and those associated with the environment. 
The final section of the chapter provides a conclusion. 
BRI foundations
Philosophy
The BRI is a unique megaproject in global economic history, which is 
in line with President Xi’s ‘Thoughts’ on China as a global power and 
globalisation in the twenty-first century, and which contributes to his 
mission of national rejuvenation. At its core, the initiative incorporates 
elements of Chinese and Western philosophy. 
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In contrast with Western philosophy, the BRI is not a project ‘based on 
models’, which means it does not have a clearly defined framework, clearly 
measurable goals or defined action steps or a timetable, but will gradually 
evolve and adapt to the dynamics of the international environment. The 
BRI generates strategic flexibility, seeks relative advantage for China and 
preaches avoidance of direct conflict. According to Chinese philosophy, 
a Chinese general does not set goals or make plans; he tries to detect 
and exploit the internal dynamics of the ‘environment’ and adapts his 
decisions to the natural course of things, to make the conditions work 
in his favour. 
Another element of Chinese philosophy that also characterises the BRI is 
‘transformation’—mainly as an ideological concept. According to Engels 
and Marx, only in the final analysis is the economy the driving force of 
history, but people are becoming aware of the conflicts that are taking 
place in the economic world, in the ideological field. ‘Transformation’ is 
a process that causes gradual changes that often are not visible in the short 
term, reducing the chance of friction, in contrast with the term ‘action’ 
(as in Western philosophy), in which friction is usually inevitable. Through 
the BRI, China seeks to ‘transform’ the international environment and 
promote an alternative model of globalisation and world order adapted 
to the twenty-first century with a moral advantage to create a fairer 
world based on globally accepted values (not Western or Eastern) and 
without any discrimination regarding different political or social systems 
(Karpathiotaki 2016).
On the other hand, the official geographical presentation of the BRI 
and its basic principles incorporate elements of Western philosophy and 
culture. The BRI’s ‘roads’, ‘corridors’ and ‘passages’ give shape to the 
project, creating geometric ‘ideal models’, which in fact are not absolutely 
and immediately applicable but they contribute to a better understanding 
of the project by the Western world. In addition, the principles and values 
that officially are promoted by the BRI are in line with the principles of the 
UN Charter, and especially Article 26 of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974: 
All States have the duty to coexist in tolerance and live together 
in peace, irrespective of differences in political, economic, social 
and cultural systems, and to facilitate trade between States having 
different economic and social systems. International trade should 
be conducted without prejudice to generalized non-discriminatory 
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and non-reciprocal preferences in favour of developing countries, 
on the basis of mutual advantage, equitable benefits and the 
exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment. (UN 1974)
The BRI is China’s attempt to balance the Western-centric perception 
of the world and propose a new world order that resembles the one 
determined in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia treaties. China, through 
the BRI, seeks to redefine the role of the ‘state’ in the twenty-first century 
as the basic political unit of the international system, which can interact 
with other states in the global market but at the same time maintains 
control of its economic future, its political system and its foreign policy. 
This is in contrast to the perception of the ‘flat world’, without ‘borders’, 
which in some degree described globalisation until recently. 
The success of the BRI is not easily or immediately measurable but it 
will be judged largely at the ideological level and, in future, it could be 
measured by the impact it has on the global community and the acceptance 
of the BRI’s values. 
Geopolitics
China is the largest nation in Eurasia, with an extensive coastline 
stretching from the tropical zone to the temperate zone. It has one of 
the most advantageous geographical positions on the planet, while from 
a geopolitical point of view, it faces challenges through its proximity to 
other potential world powers (Russia, India, Japan). In this environment, 
China’s strategic decision to ‘go out’ by land and sea through the BRI 
could be seen as an expected and realistic political decision, with its main 
goals, on the one hand, to achieve its key national interests of economic 
survival and growth and, on the other, to increase its political capital at 
the international level to settle key issues of its national security. The BRI 
does not take a missionary approach to international relations, as was the 
case with the United States after World War II, because China does not 
seem to propagate any particular ideology or system of governance.
The BRI is an effort to create a network of infrastructure on the 
southern Eurasian coast (‘Rimland’) and in Central Asia (‘Heartland’), 
but also in the Arctic north, with final destinations in Europe that 
could lead to the unification of Eurasia and provide autonomy from 
the oceanic communications network dominated by the United States. 
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This  infrastructure could shape a new anthropogeographic reality in 
Eurasia that could affect the international system and have extremely 
important geopolitical implications for the world (Costas 2019). 
The BRI could be seen as China’s ‘anti-containment’ strategy because it 
contributes to the ‘unification’ of Eurasia—an attempt to counter the 
United States’ ‘containment’ strategy that traditionally seeks the ‘division’ 
of Eurasia and the prevention of the emergence of a dominant power in the 
region. The United States’ containment strategy incorporates theoretical 
elements of different geopolitical theories (Mackinder, Spykman and 
Mahan), emphasises control of Rimland (Asia Minor, Arabia, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, China, Korea and eastern Siberia excluding 
Russia), and combines Mackinder–Spykman’s theory with Mahan’s 
argument, which considered naval power and control of the ocean as the 
key elements for world domination. 
The melting of the Arctic ice sheet ‘liberates’ Russia from the north, 
with Rimland no longer a semicircle formed by the inaccessibility of the 
Arctic, and now more of a ring. The melting of the Arctic ice not only 
adds more sea routes to the existing maritime transportation network but 
also contributes to the ‘unification’ of the Eurasian maritime region into 
a single and indivisible web of maritime routes that allow the Eurasian 
east to communicate with the west without crossing the open ocean 
dominated by the United States. The MSR and the Polar Silk Road 
(PSR) are key elements of China’s strategy and contribute to the shaping 
of a single maritime transportation web around the Eurasian continent, 
which geopolitically is much more important than the simple sum of its 
various sea routes (Costas 2019). 
In conclusion, the BRI is a key element of a new geopolitical mechanism 
that, seeking to protect China’s national and security interests, incorporates 
historical experience (the Cold War), is a response to US efforts to contain 
China’s emergence and contributes to the transfer of the balance of power 
from the Western hemisphere to the Eastern, which could facilitate the 
emergence of a new bipolar global system to succeed the current unstable 
multipolar one. Even if the international system does not become bipolar 
in the near future, a multipolar system based on a more equal balance of 
power could create greater stability in the international system than what 
we are experiencing today. 
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Development
China’s BRI is the largest such initiative in global history. Investing in 
infrastructure is a crucial aspect of a successful growth strategy. Woetzel 
et al. (2017) find that in all countries there is a significant gap between 
what they are spending and their infrastructure requirements if they are to 
continue to grow well until 2035. The BRI initiative is generally popular 
in the developing world, where almost all countries face infrastructure 
deficiencies and are not willing to attract private investment, which 
generally requires a very high rate of return, making it expensive. Therefore, 
developing countries that want to establish infrastructure quickly often 
have little alternative than to participate in the BRI.
China lends money to developing countries to construct infrastructure 
for transport, power and water supply and other sectors. In his opening 
remarks at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2017, President 
Xi noted: ‘Infrastructure connectivity is the foundation of development 
through cooperation … We should improve transregional logistics 
networks and promote connectivity of policies, rules and standards 
so as to provide institutional safeguards for enhancing connectivity’ 
(Xinhuanet 2017).
The World Bank and other development banks were originally set up for 
this core function, but now only about 30 per cent of World Bank lending 
is for infrastructure and its procedures are extraordinarily bureaucratic 
and time-consuming (Jones 2019). On the other hand, China is offering 
to finance infrastructure at what could be called commercial terms. Most 
of its loans are in dollars on commercial terms that are more generous 
than developing countries can get from private investors, but much more 
costly than funds from Western donors or the concessional windows of 
the multilateral development banks (Dollar 2020). In addition, many 
BRI projects would be unbankable by Western standards. Even so, they 
can still be important to the countries involved and they ‘make sense’ 
to China.
To illustrate, ASEAN countries traditionally could rely on Western 
support—through bilateral financing and the multilateral development 
banks—to finance some of their infrastructure investment. However, that 
is no longer the case. Japan is the only remaining significant financier 
of infrastructure. During 2015–17, Japan committed US$13 billion to 
transport and energy infrastructure in ASEAN countries. No other Western 
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donor reached $1 billion per year. The total from the six major Western 
sources—Australia, Japan, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World 
Bank, United States and South Korea—amounted to about 2 per  cent 
of the infrastructure financing needs of the ASEAN countries. There are 
two main reasons for this: first, the overall amount of Western aid is not 
keeping up with demand and, second, the donors are generally turning 
away from infrastructure. Another aspect of declining Western support is 
the ideological view that infrastructure can be left to private investment, 
which has proved hard to achieve. 
BRI governance
The BRI has typically been described as a cooperative arrangement 
among likeminded states interested in advancing infrastructure and 
connectivity projects around the world. The initiative is not yet a formal 
institutionalised body and is still highly centralised and coordinated from 
the top by the Chinese political leadership. As the breadth and depth 
of the BRI have grown in terms of the projects undertaken, the actors 
involved and the objectives being pursued, the need for a more formalised 
institutional architecture has become clear. 
Institutional evolution
On 4 November 2014, the eighth meeting of the Central Leading Group 
for Financial and Economic Affairs, chaired by President Xi, focused on 
the BRI. On 9–11 December 2014, the BRI was identified at the Central 
Economic Work Conference as a key strategy for 2015 for the promotion 
of regional economic development. At the end of March 2015, the Chinese 
Government issued its ‘Vision and Actions’ document defining the BRI’s 
guiding principles, routes and cooperation priorities and identifying 
the NDRC as the lead organisation for coordinating BRI efforts, with 
some shared responsibility from the ministries of commerce and foreign 
affairs. At the same time, two task forces were established under the State 
Council’s guidance to supervise all BRI-related activities: the Leading 
Small Group on Advancing the Construction of the Belt and Road, and 
the Office of the Leading Small Group on Advancing the Construction 
of the Belt and Road, located within the NDRC, which manages the day-
to-day central oversight and coordination work with relevant ministries 
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and entities. In addition, in 2017, the Belt and Road Promotion Centre 
within the NDRC was created. Moreover, nearly 32 Chinese provinces 
are also participating. 
At the top of the chain, President Xi gives guidance during regular study 
sessions specifically dedicated to the BRI. Following the Thirteenth 
National People’s Congress in March 2018, Vice-Premier and Politburo 
Standing Committee member Han Zheng became chairman of the 
Leading Small Group, while State Counsellor and former minister of 
foreign affairs Yang Jiechi, Vice-Premier Hu Chunhua, Secretary-General 
of the State Council Xiao Jie and NDRC Director He Lifeng assumed 
responsibility as vice-chairmen. 
BRI leading small groups have also been created in relevant Chinese 
ministries and in each province. Similar to the central one, ministerial and 
provincial groups meet on a regular basis and include representatives from 
a variety of relevant government entities whose responsibilities pertain to 
the advancement of the BRI. Since 2013, several white papers have been 
released to inform global audiences of the BRI’s new priorities. 
China has vowed to provide financial support for the BRI. In its initial 
stages, the Chinese Government extended the scope of its financial backing 
to US$90 billion for the Silk Road Fund (SRF), which was established in 
2014 to foster development along the BRI route. Its major stakeholders 
are the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the Export–Import 
Bank of China (Exim Bank), China Investment Corporation and China 
Development Bank. Moreover, China has built very large banking 
institutions to support its outward investments and its credit, lending 
and aid activities, such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and the 
Exim Bank.
BRI takes a more multilateral approach
To date, China has organised two Belt and Road Forums (BRFs) for 
International Cooperation in Beijing, in 2017 and 2019, with the 
participation of state leaders from around the world. The purpose of 
the BRF is to build a more open and efficient international cooperation 
platform, a closer, stronger partnership network and to push for a more 
just, reasonable and balanced international governance system. Key terms 
supporting multilateralism—such as ‘inclusive’, ‘voluntary participation’ 
and ‘being open to all and respectful of national and international 
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commitments’—have been prominent in the forum’s rhetoric. President 
Xi called for the BRF to become a regular event, suggesting it would be 
used to implement a multilateral institutional architecture for the BRI. 
In addition to the BRF, China has initiated two international development–
oriented banks, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 
New Development Bank (NDB). The AIIB began operations in January 
2016 and has evolved into a high-profile multilateral institution that now 
has 102 approved members worldwide, while the NDB was established 
in 2014 and remains largely restricted to the five BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
Another aspect of the BRI related to global governance is collaboration 
with multilateral development banks (MDBs)—in particular, the World 
Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
the ADB, the AIIB, the NDB and the European Investment Bank. These 
six MDBs signed a joint memorandum of understanding with China 
on 14 May 2017 to support the BRI. In terms of overall finances and 
institutions, however, the MDBs are only one piece of a larger picture. 
In recent years and especially since the first BRF, Beijing has taken a range 
of steps to exert more control over the BRI, including a more muted 
publicity drive, clearer rules for state-owned enterprises, restricting the 
use of the BRI brand and building overseas auditing and anticorruption 
mechanisms. It is also stepping up efforts to get developed nations to join 
in to spread the risk of building projects in poorer nations and to counter 
allegations the BRI is an attempt to build China’s political influence. 
However, to fully engage with other stakeholders, China would have to 
invent a bureaucratic framework with reasonable consistency, setting up 
clear criteria for selecting potential projects that are credit-worthy. This 
consistency would have to be spelt out clearly, and practised diligently, to 
reassure international partners. 
In May 2017, during the first BRF for International Cooperation, 
the BRF Advisory Council was created to give multilateral intellectual 
support to the forum. The council is an international policy advisory 
body with 11 members from international organisations, research and 
politics. Two members are from China and the remainder are from 
Asia, Europe and Africa. The council is led by Shamshar Akhtar, former 
executive secretary of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
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and the Pacific, and Justin Yifu Lin, former senior vice-president of the 
World Bank and Honorary Dean of the National School of Development 
at Peking University. 
The BRF and its advisory council could emerge as the major multilateral 
platform for BRI cooperation. They may also benefit from the models of 
some existing multilateral platforms on how to institute an architecture 
of supporting mechanisms. The principles of extensive consultation, joint 
efforts and shared benefits call intrinsically for a multilateral approach 
to working together. Becoming more multilateral could also broaden the 
support base of BRI cooperation and enhance the sense of ownership 
of all partners. 
Indicative of this orientation are the findings and recommendations of the 
first report issued by the BRF Advisory Council. It proposed to promote 
an open world economy by fostering a global, broad-based partnership 
built on connectivity, to focus on building high-quality BRI cooperation 
by galvanising a shared commitment to multilateralism, to build a ‘clean 
Silk Road’ with ‘zero tolerance for corruption’ and to use green finance to 
accelerate achieving the ambitions of the BRI. According to the report, 
the development of cooperative financing and sectoral multilateral 
mechanisms would also be essential for sustaining further development 
of cooperation in the long term. 
The BRF Advisory Council has also suggested that BRI cooperation stay 
committed to upholding multilateralism, safeguarding the rules-based 
multilateral trading system centred on the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), promoting free and open trade and investment and opposing 
all forms of protectionism. However, in this regard, greater synergy needs 
to be tapped between the BRI and various national, regional and global 
development strategies, including, among others, the UN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development (which aims to improve global development 
along 17 Sustainable Development Goals), the African Union’s Agenda 
2063, the development plan of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Master 
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Connectivity Blueprint, the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC) and the EU Strategy on Connecting Europe 
and Asia. 
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The move to create a multilateral architecture for the BRI is inevitable. 
To date, most formal arrangements exist in the form of bilateral treaties or 
contracts on specific projects. Since its 2013 launch, the BRI has not been 
described as a formal organisational setup; rather, the BRI has been used 
as a descriptive label for a range of projects being undertaken around the 
world that involve China in some way.
The advisory council’s report directly addressed the issue of enhancing the 
BRI’s institutional architecture. It suggested the BRF become formalised 
and meet every two to three years to discuss and set the broad parameters 
of the BRI. From this, there can also be ‘satellite events’ on a regional or 
sectoral basis to examine particular issues. The BRF Advisory Council 
further recommended expanding and leveraging diversified sources 
of finance for BRI projects—in particular, to fill the funding gap for 
sustainable infrastructure.
Formalising the BRI’s activities through a multilateral architecture will 
also bring more effectiveness to the connectivity and infrastructure 
projects through more organised planning that in turn increases the 
effectiveness of the projects. And, as the advisory council explains, ‘going 
more multilateral could broaden the supporter base of the Belt and 
Road cooperation and enhance the sense of ownership of all partners’ 
(Yang  2019). The advisory council’s suggestions must be acted on to 
transform the BRI into a formal international institution.
The BRI’s impacts on connectivity
In this section, we review the consequences of the BRI for both transport 
and digital connectivity. We then discuss the importance of policy 
coordination across economies to capture these benefits.
Infrastructure connectivity
Transport connectivity
BRI-related transport infrastructure projects—such as railways, highways 
and ports—will build on existing transportation networks, creating 
new links and making the connectivity of networks denser. Reed and 
Trubetskoy (2019) compiled the first geocoded database of BRI transport 
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infrastructure projects in Eurasia (see Figure 2.1).1 The status of these 
projects differs widely: some are already operational, such as Highway 
AH-3 and Highway AH-4 connecting Russia, Mongolia and China; 
other projects are under construction, like the Juba–Mombasa Railway 
connecting Kenya and South Sudan; still others are uncertain, such as 
the Dushanbe–Afghanistan rail upgrade in Tajikistan. In Figure 2.1, the 
improvement in railway construction is remarkable. For example, while 
in 2011 there were only 17 trains travelling between Europe and China, 
carrying goods worth just US$600 million, by 2018, there were more than 
6,000 train trips between Europe and China carrying goods worth US$16 
billion (see Figure 2.2). The China–Europe Railway Express connects 
108 cities in 16 countries across Eurasia, with the main destinations in 
Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Poland, Belarus, Netherlands 
and Uzbekistan.
Figure 2.1 BRI-related transport projects by 2018
TEU = 20-foot equivalent unit
Sources: Reed and Trubetskoy (2019); World Bank (2019) .
1  The full list of BRI-related transport projects is provided in Appendix A of Reed and Trubetskoy 
(2019). It is worth noting that there is no official list and no uniform definition of BRI-related 
transport projects. 
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Figure 2.2 Number of China–Europe Railway Express trains, 2011–18
Source: Silk Road Guoxin Big Data Technology Co . Ltd (n .d .) .
Based on the list of BRI-related transport projects compiled by Reed and 
Trubetskoy (2019), de Soyres et al. (2018) obtained information on rail 
and maritime infrastructure linked to the BRI, allowing a comparison 
of the pre-BRI and post-BRI scenarios.2 They exploit geographic 
information system (GIS) analysis to calculate the reduction in shipping 
times between cities.3 As a starting point, the transportation network in 
2013 was used to estimate the pre-BRI shipping time. The post-BRI travel 
time is computed in accordance with the ‘improved scenario’, including 
all planned BRI-related rail and maritime projects by 2018.
Before the implementation of the BRI, shipping between some 
BRI locations was slow as there was little access to quality transport 
infrastructure and services (see Table 2.1). For instance, the average 
shipping time within East Asia and the Pacific was longer than within 
other regions, taking 19.6 days. It takes, on average, 26.8 days to ship 
goods between East Asia and the Pacific and Central and Eastern Europe, 
and the average shipping time between East Asia and the Pacific and 
Central and Western Asia is also long, at 22.5 days.
2  The majority of BRI-related transport projects comprise rail and maritime infrastructure. Note 
that there is a slight difference between the list in de Soyres et al. (2018: Annex 2) and that in Reed 
and Trubetskoy (2019).
3  The global database in de Soyres et al. (2018) includes 1,000 cities in 191 countries.
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13 .4 13 .0
East Asia and 
the Pacific
26 .8 22 .5 7 .1
Middle East and 
North Africa
12 .8 15 .4 20 .4 9 .0
South Asia 22 .4 20 .3 15 .5 15 .2 11 .8
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
19 .8 23 .2 20 .6 14 .4 17 .6 4 .0
Regional 13 .9 16 .6 19 .6 14 .0 17 .8 18 .5
Note: Averaged over all country pairs in each regional pair .
Sources: de Soyres et al . (2018); World Bank (2019) .
The implementation of BRI-related transport projects can reduce 
shipping times for the BRI corridor economies (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). 
The findings of de Soyres et al. (2018) show that average shipping time 
between the BRI economies can decrease by 1.7 per cent (for the lower 
bound) and 3.2 per cent (for the upper bound).4 In particular, the decline 
in travel time is larger along the BRI economic corridors. The smallest 
improvement in shipping time is for the China–Mongolia–Russia 
Economic Corridor, for which the reduction in shipping time ranges 
between 3.6 per cent and 3.8 per cent on average. The largest improvement 
is for the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, which 
will experience a simple average decrease in travel time ranging between 
10.3 per cent and 11.9 per cent.
4  In the lower-bound scenario, there is no mode switching between the pre-BRI and the post-BRI 
shipping routes; in the upper-bound scenario, mode switching is allowed, so that routes can be moved 
from maritime lanes to railway lines for larger gains in shipping times.
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Figure 2.3 Average decline in shipping time by economy: Lower bound
Note: For each economy, the aggregate proportional reduction is calculated as the average 
proportional shipping time reduction with all other economies in the world .
Source: de Soyres et al . (2018) .
Figure 2.4 Average decline in shipping time by economy: Upper bound
Note: For each economy, the aggregate proportional reduction is calculated as the average 
proportional shipping time reduction with all other economies in the world .
Source: de Soyres et al . (2018) .
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Interestingly, the BRI can induce a positive spillover effect on shipping 
times for the non-BRI economies, which will also benefit from the 
improved transportation network when their transport routes pass through 
the new or upgraded ports or railways. As an example, the construction 
of Tanzania’s Bagamoyo Port is anticipated to benefit not only Tanzania 
but also surrounding countries. Consequently, when all BRI-related 
transport projects are implemented, the proportional decrease in travel 
time from Rwanda to Australia is predicted to be 0.5 per cent. Likewise, 
the improvement for Djibouti’s port will see a reduction of 1.2 per cent 
in the shipping time between Ethiopia and Australia. In general, shipping 
times across all country pairs in the world can come down, on average, by 
1.2 per cent (for the lower bound) and 2.5 per cent (for the upper bound).
Digital connectivity
The level of digital connectivity within and between the BRI economies 
varies widely. The World Bank (2016b) suggests the digital gap within 
economies can be as large as that between economies. Many people remain 
untouched by the modern digital revolution. As shown in Figure 2.5a, 
apart from Singapore, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and economies in the Arabian 
Peninsula, the proportion of the population using the internet was less 
than 55 per cent in most Asian economies in 2018, even in China, which 
had the largest number of internet users. Mobile broadband networks 
provide a significant channel for digital connectivity, but there are also 
two extremes to the coverage of fourth-generation (4G) mobile signals 
among the BRI economies. As shown in Figure 2.5b, 4G coverage is high 
in China, Thailand, Eastern Europe and the Arabian Peninsula, but low 
in the rest of Asia, particularly the landlocked countries. 
Efforts are being made to address the digital divide among the BRI 
economies. According to the China Academy of Information and 
Communication Technology, China is considering establishing several 
cross-border overland fibre-optic cable systems and supplying international 
internet transmission services. Therefore, countries bordering China 
will have greater access to global submarine cables. So far, remarkable 
progress has been made in the construction of China–Kyrgyzstan, China–
Myanmar, China–Pakistan and China–Russia cross-border fibre-optic 
cables, which will effectively facilitate communication connectivity within 
the BRI region. In addition, the China–Nepal cross-border fibre-optic 
cable, which launched in 2018, provides China and East Asian countries 
with the shortest internet path to Africa and the Middle East.
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Figure 2.5 Internet users and access to mobile broadband, 2018
a . Internet users (percentage of population) b . 4G coverage (percentage of population)
Note: Western European economies are included as comparators since most BRI-related 
infrastructure projects are in Eurasia, and a network is only as good as its weakest link .
Source: World Bank (2019) .
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Policy coordination
Policy coordination has played a significant role in shortening shipping 
times—for instance, by reducing border delays and the frequency of 
cargo transhipment. As an example, although there are roads linking the 
two non-bordering countries China and Uzbekistan, vehicles from one 
country were not allowed to enter the other for a long time, so their goods 
needed to transit through Kyrgyzstan for eight to 10 days. In the wake 
of the implementation of the ‘China–Uzbekistan Intergovernmental 
Agreement on International Road Transport’, the transit period between 
the two countries has been reduced to two days, and the cost of freight 
per tonne has been cut by US$300–500 (Wu 2018). More and more 
countries and international organisations have signed intergovernmental 
BRI cooperation agreements over the years. By the end of January 2020, 
the Chinese Government had signed 200 cooperation agreements with 
138 countries and 30 international organisations. In addition, the BRI 
has expanded from Eurasia to Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific.
Great importance is attached to the continued integration of the various 
development strategies, plans, platforms and projects among the BRI 
economies, achieving complementary advantages and producing effects 
according to the theory that ‘one plus one is greater than two’. So far, 
the BRI has been dovetailed with Kazakhstan’s Bright Road Initiative, 
Vietnam’s Two Corridors and One Economic Circle Plan, Indonesia’s 
Global Maritime Fulcrum Doctrine, Poland’s Amber Road Framework, 
Mongolia’s Development Road Program, Saudi Vision 2030 and so on, 
effectively promoting common prosperity and development.
There are other examples of efforts on policy coordination. First, the 
Digital Silk Road has been an important part of the BRI. In December 
2017, China, Egypt, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey and 
the United Arab Emirates jointly launched the Belt and Road Digital 
Economy International Cooperation Initiative. Sixteen countries have 
signed a memorandum of understanding with China for the construction 
of the Digital Silk Road. Second, China published the ‘Action Plan on 
Belt and Road Standard Connectivity (2018–2020)’ in December 2017, 
under which it has signed 85 standardisation cooperation agreements with 
49 economies. Third, the BRI’s long-term tax cooperation mechanism is 
maturing. In May 2018, China coorganised the Belt and Road Initiative 
Tax Cooperation Conference (BRITCC) and issued the ‘Astana Proposal 
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by BRITCC Participating Jurisdictions for Enhancing Cooperation in 
Tax Matters’, expanding the tax cooperation network to 111 countries 
and regions. Fourth, in terms of legal operations, China published the 
‘Statement of the Co-Chairs of the Forum on the Belt and Road Legal 
Cooperation’ in July 2018. Moreover, China has carried out cooperation 
on intellectual property, issuing the ‘Joint Statement on Pragmatic 
Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual Property Among Countries Along 
the Belt and Road’ with 49 BRI economies in August 2018.
Economic effects of BRI connectivity
Better infrastructure connectivity and greater policy coordination under 
the BRI framework can inject strong impetus into the economies of the 
BRI countries and regions, making the trade network between them more 
intensive, leading to more foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and 
improving their positions in global value chains (GVCs).
Impacts on trade
Trade costs
Declines in shipping times can be transformed into decreases in trade 
costs by estimating the ‘value of time’ by sector (Hummels and Schaur 
2013). De Soyres et al. (2018) investigated the BRI’s effect on trade costs 
based on their research on shipping time reductions mentioned above 
(see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). Their findings show that implementing all 
BRI-related transport projects will result in a reduction of average trade 
costs for the BRI economies ranging between 1.5 per cent and 2.8 per cent, 
and for the world ranging between 1.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent. Similar 
to the changes in shipping times, trade costs will decrease along the BRI 
economic corridors, ranging from 2.4 per cent for the China–Mongolia–
Russia Economic Corridor to 10.2 per cent for the China–Central Asia–
West Asia Economic Corridor in the upper-bound scenario.
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Figure 2.6 Average decline in trade costs by economy: Lower bound
Note: For each economy, all destinations are weighted by import flows .
Source: de Soyres et al . (2018) .
Figure 2.7 Average decline in trade costs by economy: Upper bound
Note: For each economy, all destinations are weighted by import flows .
Source: de Soyres et al . (2018) .
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Overall trade flows
Based on the results for trade cost reductions from de Soyres et. al. (2018), 
Maliszewska and van der Mensbrugghe (2019) and de Soyres et al. (2019) 
use a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a static 
structural general equilibrium (SGE) model, respectively, to study the 
impacts of BRI infrastructure improvements on trade (see Figure 2.8).5
According to the results from the CGE model, the exports of the BRI 
economies increase by 2.8 per cent (in 2030 relative to the baseline) 
and global exports increase by 1.7 per cent. The BRI countries that will 
experience the largest trade growth are Thailand (14.9 per cent), Malaysia 
(12.4 per cent), Pakistan (9.8 per cent) and Bangladesh (8.7 per cent). 
Non-BRI economies can also benefit from the denser transport network 
generated by BRI-related transport projects, experiencing an increase 
in export volume of 0.7 per cent in aggregate. Among the non-BRI 
economies, Ethiopia will obtain the largest trade gains by taking advantage 
of the new ports in East Africa, with an increase in exports of 3.9 per cent. 
The United States and the remaining high-income economies will also 
benefit greatly, with their export volumes increasing by 3.4 per cent 
and 1.4 per  cent, respectively.6 However, not all non-BRI economies 
will benefit from the BRI’s improved transportation network. The non-
BRI economies in Latin America and the rest of Western Europe will 
experience a slight decrease in trade (by –0.5 per cent and –0.3 per cent, 
respectively) due to trade diversion.7
The trade effects of the BRI infrastructure improvements projected by the 
SGE model are similar to those predicted by the CGE model but tend to 
be much larger. The BRI economies are projected to increase exports by 
up to 9.7 per cent, while global export volumes will go up by 6.3 per cent. 
The proportional increase in the non-BRI economies’ exports is predicted 
5  The CGE model in Maliszewska and van der Mensbrugghe (2019) is the ENVISAGE model 
developed by the World Bank, incorporating five production factors, 28 sectors and 34 countries and 
regions. The SGE model in de Soyres et al. (2019) is based on the Ricardian model in Caliendo and 
Parro (2015), which includes sectoral linkages, trade in intermediate goods and sectoral heterogeneity, 
comprising 107 countries and regions. The CGE model has a more detailed structure of the economy 
than the SGE model, which comes at the expense of a higher level of aggregation of countries into 
large regions.
6  The remaining high-income economies include Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and Canada.
7  The rest of Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway.
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to be 4.1 per cent. The results from the two models are complementary and 
should be viewed as providing a range for the potential trade-promoting 
effects of the BRI transport infrastructure improvements. Unlike the CGE 
analysis, the SGE model stresses the connections through GVCs because 
it supposes that there are strong complementarities between the foreign 
and domestic inputs in production. As trade costs fall due to the denser 
transportation network, the SGE model projects that firms will increase 
their use of imported input products, with larger promotion effects on 
their productivity and export volumes.





Structural general equilibrium model Computable general equilibrium model
Figure 2.8 Export-promoting effects of BRI infrastructure 
improvements: Upper bound
Sources: de Soyres et al . (2019); Maliszewska and van der Mensbrugghe (2019); World 
Bank (2019) .
Bilateral trade flows
The BRI is anticipated to reshape trade relationships for participating 
economies with each other and with the rest of the world. Long trading 
times before the implementation of the BRI led to the downturn in 
intra–BRI country trade (see Table 2.1). The SGE model predicts that 
implementing all BRI-related transport projects will induce growth of 
7.2 per cent in intra–BRI country trade. 
Changes in trade flows will differ by region, depending on the extent to 
which new or improved infrastructure affects trade costs and the countries’ 
economic structures. Table 2.2 reports that all BRI regions, except the 
Middle East and North Africa, will expand their exports to East Asia 
and the Pacific, reflecting a surge in imports for economies like China, 
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Thailand and Malaysia. The BRI transport infrastructure improvements 
will also lead to an increase in exports from East Asian and Pacific 
economies to other BRI regions—most remarkably, to the Middle East 
and North Africa (10.98 per cent), Europe and Central Asia (8.63 per 
cent)—and among themselves (5.88 per cent). Regional value chains will 
be intensified. Other significant changes in bilateral trade flows are the 
increase in exports from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe and 
Central Asia (37.87 per cent) and South Asia (25.90 per cent). This can 
be interpreted by firms’ access to cheaper inputs from other BRI regions, 
which enhances their competitiveness in overseas markets. Such channels 
are of particular importance for firms in Europe and Central Asia, whose 
exports to non-BRI areas will increase by 18.35 per cent.
























Exporters East Asia and 
Pacific
5 .88 8 .63 10 .98 0 .75 –4 .05 9 .86
Europe and 
Central Asia
0 .27 9 .59 13 .69 0 .29 23 .82 18 .35
Middle East and 
North Africa
–1 .76 37 .87 3 .76 25 .90 8 .21 8 .59
South Asia 5 .98 13 .86 8 .52 1 .12 –1 .45 5 .65
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
16 .95 22 .37 11 .00 17 .43 –0 .28 15 .03
Source: de Soyres et al . (2019) .
In terms of the trade effects of BRI digital connectivity, Zhang (2018) 
uses the gravity model to investigate the impact of telecommunications 
infrastructure construction on bilateral trade flows among the BRI 
countries in Asia, which shows that each 1 per cent increase in the 
level of telecommunications infrastructure will lead to a 1.56 per cent 
rise in import volumes. Compared with transport infrastructure, the 
improvement in telecommunications infrastructure can not only raise 
trade efficiency, but also reduce information asymmetry, which helps the 
price mechanism come into play.
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Impact of BRI policy coordination on trade
Policy coordination in the BRI framework plays a non-negligible role in 
achieving unimpeded trade. Based on the quadratic assignment procedure, 
Chong and Qin (2017) compare the trade networks before and after 
the implementation of the BRI and find that intergovernmental trade 
agreements have a significant and positive impact on trade in the BRI 
economies. Tao and Qiao (2020) achieved a similar result by using the 
gravity model. Tian and Liu (2019) examine the validity of the BRI and 
suggest it has boosted bilateral trade among the participating economies, 
helping avoid the trend of reverse globalisation. Zheng and Zhou (2019) 
further classify the BRI corridor economies into those that have reached 
intergovernmental trade agreements and those that have not, noting 
that trade agreements have a greater potential trade-promoting effect on 
the BRI economies without agreements. This can be explained by the 
fact that the BRI economies without trade agreements mostly adopt 
protectionist policies and set higher trade barriers for their relatively 
backward economies. Once a trade agreement is reached to lower trade 
barriers, it will create a lot of trade.
Policy coordination can magnify the trade gains from infrastructure 
improvements. De Soyres et al. (2019) simulate two scenarios of 
complementary policy reform for the BRI economies: 1) a 50 per cent 
decline in border delays, and 2) a 50 per cent decline in preferential 
tariffs. As shown in Figure 2.9a, a decrease in border delays and tariffs will 
amplify the promotion effects of BRI-related transport projects by a factor 
of about four on global trade, and even five on trade among the BRI 
economies. In terms of border delays, if, in addition to the transportation 
network improvements, border delays are reduced by half, exports from 
the BRI economies will increase by 28.1 per cent. This is not surprising 
given the long delays at the borders of many BRI economies. It can be 
verified in Figures 2.9b and 2.9c: the largest trade-promoting effect of 
BRI infrastructure improvements and border delay reductions will be for 
low-income economies and the Middle East and North Africa, which 
tend to have longer border delays. In terms of tariffs, a 50 per cent decline 
in tariffs among all the BRI economies will amplify the trade-promoting 
effect of BRI-related infrastructure projects more than the 50 per cent 
decline in border delays. Not surprisingly, regions with higher tariffs, 
such as sub-Saharan Africa, will obtain the largest trade gains under this 
policy scenario.
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Figure 2.9 Trade-promoting effects of BRI infrastructure 
improvements and policy coordination
a) Gains by area
b) Gains by income group 
c) Gains by region
Source: de Soyres et al . (2019) .
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Enhancement of trade facilitation
Both infrastructure connectivity and policy coordination can promote 
trade through enhancing trade facilitation. Feng and Zhang (2019) 
identify a core of 23 countries along the six BRI corridors by sifting 
through the data in the Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2019 and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WEF 2016, 2019; World Bank 2021a). Based on this, they 
compute changes in the levels of trade facilitation in the six BRI corridors 
from 2013 to 2018. Their trade facilitation index is weighted by four first-
level indicators—namely, ‘government capacity and policy environment’, 
‘customs and border management’, ‘logistics and infrastructure’ and 
‘financial and communication capability’—which are subdivided into 


















































































Figure 2.10 Trade facilitation scores for the BRI economic corridors, 
2013 and 2018
Source: Feng and Zhang (2019) .
Since 2013, with the exception of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, 
trade facilitation in the BRI economic corridors has improved significantly 
but the degree of development varies with each corridor (see Figure 2.10). 
Among them, the New Eurasian Land Bridge (65.23 points) had the best 
performance in 2018, while the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar 
Economic Corridor (51.27 points) had the worst, with its weakest areas in 
‘financial and communication capability’ and ‘logistics and infrastructure’ 
(Feng and Zhang 2019). The China–Mongolia–Russia Economic 
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Corridor has experienced the largest improvement in trade facilitation, 
particularly in ‘financial and communication capability’ and ‘customs and 
border management’ (Feng and Zhang 2019).
Impact on the structure of trade networks
The BRI has brought the trade network between the corridor economies 
closer and changed its structure from a multicore pattern to one with 
China as its single core. Zhao and Sun (2019) map the simplified BRI 
trade network for 2003 and 2017, which retains only the largest trade 
flows between the 66 BRI countries and regions (see Figures 2.11 and 
2.12). Before the launch of the BRI, China had become one of the 
central nodes of the regional trade network, in 2003, directly connecting 
economies including Thailand, India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Israel and so on. Meanwhile, Russia was also a core node of this regional 
trade network, linking economies such as Turkey, Romania, Greece and 
the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Hence, 
there was a multicore BRI trade network in 2003. However, some BRI 
economies remained independent from this network, such as Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia and North Macedonia, which indicates 
the network was relatively loose in 2003. 
The structure of the BRI trade network changed in 2017. China’s central 
role has been significantly enhanced: more economies have direct trade 
linkages with China. There were many economies indirectly connecting 
with China through ‘brokers’ (like India, Thailand and Israel) in 2003, 
but in 2017, China became their largest trading partner. Zhao and Sun 
(2019) indicate the sustained development of China’s economy and trade 
is the most important reason for this transformation. On the other hand, 
the density of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ trade network, 
with Russia as its core, has decreased. The scope of the isolated local 
trade network has also declined: only the largest trade flows of Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were not directly connected to the 
core BRI trade network in 2017. This reflects the fact the BRI has reduced 
the decentralisation of regional trade in the area and gradually deepened 
regional trade integration.
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Figure 2.11 Structure of BRI corridor economies’ trade networks, 2003
Source: Zhao and Sun (2019) .
Figure 2.12 Structure of BRI corridor economies’ trade networks, 2017
Source: Zhao and Sun (2019) .
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Impacts on foreign direct investment
Longer travel time is a barrier to FDI flows. Based on the estimates in 
de Soyres et al. (2018), Chen and Lin (2018) studied the impact of the 
proposed BRI transportation network on FDI flows to the BRI economies. 
They find the proposed infrastructure improvements are projected to 
induce a 4.97 per cent increase in total FDI flows to the BRI economies. 
Specifically, there will be a 4.36 per cent increase in FDI flows within the 
BRI area, a 4.63 per cent increase in FDI flows from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies and 
a 5.75 per cent increase in FDI flows from the non-BRI area.
Across regions, the proposed BRI transportation network will lead to the 
largest increase in FDI flows to BRI economies in sub-Saharan Africa 
(7.5 per cent), followed by Central Asia (7.3 per cent), East Asia and the 
Pacific (6.3 per cent), South Asia (5.2 per cent), Europe (3.7 per cent) and 
the Middle East and North Africa (3.4 per cent) (see Figure 2.13). 









Figure 2.13 Promotion effects on FDI of BRI infrastructure 
improvements
Sources: Chen and Lin (2018); World Bank (2019) .
Impacts on global value chains
Based on value added in trade, Dai and Song (2019) measure the changes in 
correlations among GVCs from 2010 to 2017, finding that there has been 
a significant overall trend of enhancement and considerable adjustment. 
They further explore whether the reconstruction of GVCs is related to 
China’s BRI. Their results show the industrial relevance of the BRI area 
to GVCs has been significantly reinforced, while that in the non-BRI 
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area has been significantly weakened. It is worth noting that the relevance 
between the BRI and non-BRI areas has also shown a strengthening 
trend. From these results, a preliminary judgement can be reached that 
the implementation of the BRI has promoted the reconstruction of GVCs 
to a certain extent.
In fact, the economies along the BRI economic corridor have comparative 
advantages such as cheap labour and abundant natural resources, which 
make them important destinations for a new round of international 
industrial gradient transfers and considerable partners with which China 
can carry out cooperation on production capacity. Therefore, there are 
two possible reasons for the aforementioned GVC change. On the one 
hand, with the rising prices of production factors in China, especially 
labour costs, multinational companies in developed economies will 
relocate more of their industries and production links to BRI economies. 
On the other hand, in the BRI framework, China has actively transferred 
its industries that have gradually lost their comparative advantages to other 
BRI economies, and even carried out cooperation in high-end industries 
such as environmental protection, thus promoting the integration 
of the BRI economies into GVCs. If the former factor dominates, the 
reconstruction of GVCs may not be caused by China’s BRI. To figure 
out this problem, Dai and Song (2019) first measure the changes in the 
upstream dependence of the BRI economies on North America, Western 
Europe and China. 
The results in Table 2.3 show that the BRI economies in most regions 
have intensified their upstream dependence on North America, Western 
Europe and China, which verifies that the BRI economies are indeed 
important destinations for a new round of international industrial 
transfers. However, it should be noted that the upstream dependence of 
the BRI economies on China has increased the most. 
Table 2.3 Changes in upstream dependence of the BRI economies on 










North America 0 .25 0 .47 0 .61 –0 .27 –0 .19 0 .46
Western Europe 0 .46 0 .75 4 .76 –0 .29 –0 .71 1 .31
China 1 .26 1 .49 0 .92 0 .45 –0 .12 1 .35
Source: Dai and Song (2019) .
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Dai and Song (2019) also compute the changes in the downstream 
influence of North America, Western Europe and China on the BRI 
economies. As shown in Table 2.4, China’s downstream influence on 
the BRI economies has increased more than that of North America. 
Compared with Western Europe, China also has a greater upward trend 
in its downstream influence on the BRI economies—except for those in 
Eastern Europe, because they have close relations with Western Europe. 
Therefore, in terms of both upstream dependence and downstream 
influence, it can be inferred that the implementation of China’s BRI has 
significantly promoted the reconstruction of GVCs. 
Table 2.4 Changes in the downstream influence of North America, 
Western Europe and China on the BRI economies, 2010–17 (per cent)
North America Western Europe China
East Asia 0 .16 0 .15 1 .11
ASEAN 0 .19 0 .12 0 .88
Eastern Europe 0 .11 0 .76 0 .30
South Asia –0 .06 –0 .04 0 .06
Central Asia 0 .00 –0 .01 0 .00
Others 0 .45 0 .73 1 .47
Source: Dai and Song (2019) .
Based on data from 2004 to 2014, Peng and Li (2018) find that China’s 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in the BRI economies can 
improve its position in GVCs through the industrial separation effect. 
This is because, after transferring certain industries to the BRI economies, 
Chinese firms can make room for higher-tech production links or industries 
that retain comparative advantages. At the same time, China’s OFDI in 
the BRI economies can improve the host country’s position in GVCs 
through positive technology spillovers and demand-pull effects. In the 
case of industrial separation, on the one hand, Chinese firms may transfer 
some advanced technologies to the BRI economies to ensure the quality 
of imported intermediate products; on the other, when firms can spare 
more energy to improve product quality, consumer demands for products 
will increase, which will further strengthen the existing production mode 
and gradually improve the host country’s position in GVCs.
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Risks along the Belt and Road
BRI-related projects involve various inherent risks, which are exacerbated 
by weak risk-prevention and control mechanisms and poor economic 
foundations in many participating economies. How to identify and 
manage these risks appropriately and efficiently becomes increasingly 
worthy of attention.
Political and legal risks
The complexity and impact of political and legal risks are difficult 
to assess. Political changes and differences in legal systems may lead to 
changes in the way foreign loans or direct investment are made and pose 
more challenges to the implementation of cross-border projects.
A political risk may be distinguished from others by defining it as one that 
causes losses due to certain political incidents, such as a change in national 
government or the deterioration of relationships between countries. 
Political risks can be categorised as geopolitical risks, risks of political 
power change, sovereign credit risks, as well as risks of nationalisation. 
Since most of the BRI economies are in geopolitically fragmented regions, 
and the development of the BRI entails the interests and strategic goals 
of some world powers, geopolitical risks become a major component of 
political risk. Most of the time, the risk of a change in political power 
will affect OFDI through evoking turbulence in society and increasing 
uncertainties about the executive effectiveness of contracts. Sovereign 
credit risks exist as the host countries or regions may default during the 
projects. According to the Handbook of Country Risk issued by the China 
Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure 2017, 2018), the 
overall sovereign credit level of the BRI economies is far below the world 
average. In addition, to protect domestic industries, the host government 
may issue policies to restrict the effective control of local assets by foreign-
invested enterprises, which is actually an expropriation of those enterprises.
One typical case of political risk is the Myanmar Myitsone Hydropower 
Project initiated by the Myanmar Government with the China Power 
Investment Corporation in 2006. There have been many twists in the 
development of the project over the past decade or so, and it is still on 
hold. This is mainly due to the political conflicts between the central 
government and the Kachin Independence Army, the National League 
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for Democracy and various Western nongovernmental organisations in 
Myanmar, which is in a geopolitically fragmented region and faces risks 
created by games among the great powers.
Legal risks comprise changes to or uncertainties in systems of foreign 
investment, intellectual property protection, labour rights protection, 
environmental regulation, taxation, foreign exchange management and so 
on. There are significant differences between the laws and regulations of 
the BRI economies and, in many, they are incomplete.
In 2012, the Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (Chinalco) 
announced its intention to make a bid for a proportional takeover of up to 
60 per cent of the common shares of Ivanhoe Mines’ subsidiary coalminer 
SouthGobi Resources, which eventually failed. To stop Chinalco’s 
acquisition of SouthGobi Resources, the Mongolian Government hastily 
introduced new foreign investment supervision laws. Mongolia lacks 
a complete legal system and a stable legal environment for investment. 
Overall, the legal factors played an influential role in the failure of 
this acquisition.
According to Guo (2020), there are a number of options to reduce the 
risks mentioned above. The governments of BRI corridor economies could 
actively undertake political diplomacy with one another and sign more 
high-quality bilateral or regional trade and investment agreements so their 
economies can build and rely on multilateral, pluralistic and multilevel 
cooperation mechanisms to provide policy and institutional guarantees. 
More specifically, the BRI economies could establish a joint meeting 
mechanism for their leaders to coordinate and resolve issues associated 
with trade and investment cooperation and provide a normalised platform 
for healthy, orderly and sustainable development of cooperation. 
Debt sustainability risks
As described in a report called Harmonizing Investment and Financing 
Standards Towards Sustainable Development Along the Belt and Road by 
the China Development Bank (CDB 2019), the debt sustainability of 
countries along the BRI economic corridor has become a focus regionally 
and has also drawn attention from the international community. It is 
necessary to balance the relationship between financing development 
needs and debt sustainability.
77
2. CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
Table 2.5 Sovereign credit risk ratings of the BRI countries and regions, 
2017–18
Region Country 2017 2018 Region Country 2017 2018
Northeast 
Asia
Russia BB BBB South Asia India BBB BBB
Mongolia CC CCC Pakistan B B
Southeast 
Asia
Singapore A AA Bangladesh BB BB
Malaysia A A Sri Lanka CCC CCC
Indonesia BBB BBB Maldives CC CC
Myanmar B B Bhutan CCC CCC
Thailand BBB BBB Nepal CCC CCC
Laos CCC CCC Central Asia Kazakhstan BBB BBB
Cambodia B B Uzbekistan B B
Vietnam BB BB Tajikistan CCC CCC
Brunei BBB BBB Turkmenistan BBB BBB
Philippines BBB BBB Kyrgyzstan CC CC







Yemen CCC CC Belarus BB BB
Iraq BB BB Ukraine CCC CCC
Iran BB BB Albania CCC B
Israel AA AA Estonia A A
United Arab 
Emirates
A A Bulgaria BB BB
Oman BB BB Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
CCC CCC
Turkey BBB BB Poland AA AA
Syria C C Montenegro CCC B
Jordan BB BB Czech 
Republic
AAA AAA
Lebanon BB BB Croatia BBB BBB
Saudi Arabia A A Latvia BBB BBB
Qatar A A Lithuania A A
Kuwait BBB BBB Romania BBB BBB
Bahrain BB BB North 
Macedonia
BB BB
Egypt CCC CCC Hungary A A
Afghanistan CC CC Serbia B B
Azerbaijan BB BB Slovakia AA AA
Georgia B B Slovenia A A
Armenia CCC CCC
Sources: Sinosure (2017, 2018) . 
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Debt sustainability risks come from a country’s present and future ability 
to fulfil its debt servicing obligations, which are affected by its current debt 
level and prospective borrowings. In general, a key factor for achieving 
external and public debt sustainability is macroeconomic stability. 
Large infrastructure investments involving debt financing in the BRI 
economies entail risks to debt sustainability. There is a need for systematic 
understanding, management and alleviation of debt sustainability risk by 
taking into account its historical and systematic causes from the perspective 
of national and global development. The level of sovereign credit risk is 
an indicator with which to analyse the sustainability of sovereign debt. 
Sinosure grades this risk into nine levels, from low to high: AAA, AA, A, 
BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC and C. As shown in Table 2.5, the overall level of 
debt sustainability risk in the BRI economies is high, but shows a slight 
downward trend.
According to the World Bank (2019), in economies where there is low 
scrutiny or low risk of debt distress, if indebtedness is not substantially 
increased as a result of the BRI, they will generally have the fiscal space 
to increase investment. However, it is necessary that projects are selected 
and implemented well to maximise the gains and that financial terms 
are appropriate and transparent. In addition, evaluating the BRI’s impact 
on the BRI economies’ debt sustainability outlook and fiscal risks is also 
an important procedure. Economies with limited or no fiscal space for 
expansion would need to limit the number of debt-financed projects, rely 
on grants or highly concessional financing, favour FDI over debt financing 
and, if possible, increase public savings to finance additional investments.
When it comes to a concrete method for analysing debt sustainability 
risks, a framework is provided by China’s Ministry of Finance. Specifying 
the scope of debt is the first step. China’s framework clarifies the scope 
of debt as the general public sector debt on which the principal and/
or interest must be paid to creditors, including bonds, loans and other 
accounts payable. Dividing economies into groups and predicting their 
macroeconomic trends are critical methods to make the analysis clearer 
and more accurate. After these procedures, stress testing is performed on 
different scenarios to measure the sensitivity of the expected debt burden 
index to changes in given situations. Following the test, we could judge 
the risk signals, modify the model result and obtain a risk rating report. 
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It is worth noting that accurate and timely information is the premise 
of reliable analysis. Governments should actively participate in the 
construction of the BRI risk-monitoring system and jointly build 
a comprehensive early warning system for project risk.
Governance risks
Governance risks vary across corridor economies and correlate closely 
with the quality of domestic institutions.
Large infrastructure projects can induce corruption—a common 
governance risk that is reflected in the abuse of public office for private 
gain. Infrastructure sector corruption can include improper influence 
over budgeting, the selection of projects and rent extraction in return 
for a  carriage permit, construction contracts, leases or concessions 
(World  Bank  2007). The World Bank indicates that corruption 
risks correlate closely with a country’s development level, since less-
developed countries lack a strong rule of law and combating corruption 
is fundamentally about addressing poor governance. There is, indeed, 
a positive correlation between the Corruption Perception Index and the 
Rule of Law Index (see Figure 2.14). Countries or regions with high 
levels of corruption tend to have weak rule of law. This may be because 
the weak rule of law promotes and reduces the possibility of detecting 
corruption. According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators database (2021b), the average score for corruption control in 
64 major BRI economies was –0.26 in 2018 (ranging from –2.5 to 2.5) 
(see Figure 2.15). There were 40 BRI economies (that is, more than half 
of the major BRI economies) with a Control of Corruption ranking in 
the bottom 50 per cent of the world. Consequently, the efficiency and 
transparency of BRI government work will be affected, which means FDI 
is likely to suffer corruption risks in the BRI economies. 
Procurement in the BRI projects should be open, transparent and executed 
by the best-placed firms, regardless of their ownership or nationality, to 
avoid risk. For host borrowing economies, following international best 
practice is necessary to maximise value for money, which is also important 
for China and the financial institutions that finance BRI projects as it can 
help ensure the integrity and financial performance of projects.
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Figure 2.14 Relationship between Corruption Perception Index and 
Rule of Law Index for BRI economies, 2017
Note: Rule of Law Index scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating weak perceived rule 
of law and 1 indicating strong perceived rule of law .

























































































































































































































































































Figure 2.15 Control of Corruption scores for the BRI economies, 2018
Notes: The Control of Corruption scores range from –2 .5 (weak control, high corruption) to 
2 .5 (strong control, low corruption) . Blue bars indicate countries with governance scores in 
the top 10 per cent of 215 countries in the world; dark-green bars indicate countries in the 
top 10–25 per cent; light-green bars indicate countries in the top 25–50 per cent; orange 
bars indicate countries in the top 50–75 per cent; light-red bars indicate countries in the top 
75–90 per cent; and dark-red bars indicate countries in the bottom 10 per cent .
Source: World Bank (2021a) . 
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Studies by the World Bank (2019) suggest that corruption mitigation can 
be divided into supply-side measures and demand-side measures. On the 
supply side, developing common auditing standards and enhancing audit 
and related institutions are critical. The multistakeholder Construction 
Sector Transparency Initiative can help economies obtain greater benefits 
from public infrastructure investment by improving transparency and 
accountability. Using a set of indicators called red flags that can alert 
officials to potential corruption during the infrastructure construction 
period is essential. Implementing integrity pacts and applying information 
and communications technology can also enhance transparency and 
reduce corruption risks. Social responsibility is the starting point for 
demand-side measures. Community monitoring and citizen report cards 
that strengthen public accountability can be implemented to effectively 
combat corruption and improve governance of projects. 
Studies by the World Bank emphasise three tracks to improve procurement 
practices by the BRI host economies, China and multilateral international 
agreements. For the BRI hosts, a first step could be to use diagnostics 
related to the readiness of the national procurement system with pre-
tendering due diligence before determining which procurement rules to 
apply. Mobilising resources to document the awarding of projects across 
economies could be an effective approach to increase transparency and 
generate more information. Two similar paths for China to enhance 
competition and transparency are associated with international best 
practice and establish a threshold for BRI projects. One is to introduce 
international competitive bidding and the other is to include foreign-
invested enterprises and organise public national competition once the 
threshold is exceeded. In addition, multilateral cooperation, such as the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement, can promote the use of 
transparent and competitive procurement practices. 
Environmental and social risks
Many BRI projects are large-scale transportation projects that expose local 
communities to environmental and social risks.
Environmental risks refer to environmental pollution, natural resource 
destruction and other problems created during project construction 
that result in the risk of projects being shelved or huge fines for foreign-
invested enterprises. Many BRI economies already have resource and 
environmental problems and, thus, numerous conservation areas have 
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been constructed (see Figure 2.16). However, many still lack strong 
environmental supervision and protection systems (Guo 2020). In 
addition, environmental risks are also affected by political, economic and 
legal factors. For example, the host country may approve an engineering 
project for the sake of economic development, but it may also adopt strict 
environmental protection measures in the construction process under 
pressure from the public and domestic environmental nongovernmental 
organisations, or due to regime change or legal revision. Therefore, 
environmental risks need to be taken seriously.
Figure 2.16 BRI road and railway projects in relation to biodiversity risks
CI = Conservation International
Source: World Bank (2019) .
According to Losos et al. (2018), the impacts of environmental risks 
include both the direct impacts of infrastructure construction and 
the indirect impacts caused by firms’ response to new routes. Direct 
BRI environmental impacts include pollution from increased traffic, 
topographical and hydrological damage and the alteration of habitats at 
the expense of biodiversity. BRI projects tend to follow existing transport 
routes and substitute them with rail, which can reduce pollution compared 
with road and air travel. Indirect BRI environmental impacts could be both 
positive and negative. The positive impacts could include densification of 
settlement and production and a switch to off-farm activities that support 
rural land consolidation and restoration (Kaczan  2016). However, the 
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negative effects are more pronounced, including increased emissions and 
opening up border locations to development. Environmental problems 
can develop by the creation not just of new settlements, but also of 
particularly high-cost activities such as logging and illegal wildlife trade.
Social risks are closely related to environmental risks, because communities 
and their environment are directly or indirectly affected by large-scale 
infrastructure projects. According to the World Bank (2019), the impacts 
that should be considered include: 
• threats to human security
• disproportionate risks to vulnerable people
• discrimination against individuals or groups in the provision of 
development resources and project benefits
• involuntary requisition of land or restrictions on land use
• tenure and use of land and natural resources
• health, safety and wellbeing of workers and communities affected by 
projects
• cultural heritage. 
In particular, the BRI projects pose a unique challenge of rapid migration 
to meet the need for labour. Rapid migration has negative impacts on local 
public infrastructure, utilities, housing, sustainable resource management 
and social dynamics (World Bank 2016a). More specifically, it leads to 
increased demand and competition for local goods and services, resulting 
in rising prices, the crowding out of local consumers and increased demand 
on resources, thus causing social conflict, increased rates of illegal activity 
and crime and even increased risks of the spread of infectious diseases.
There are four aspects to the policies to mitigate environmental risks 
that will be discussed in this section: avoid, reduce, restore and offset 
(World Bank 2019). Transport routes need to be arranged to avoid 
vulnerable environments—that is, to remove risks at the source. As  a 
result, identification and analysis of alternative routes are essential. 
Integrating environmental consciousness into projects will reduce adverse 
impacts on the environment. Engineering and complementary policies 
include wildlife crossings, tunnel and bridge engineering, regulation 
and enforcement of forest and vulnerable species protection and social 
cost-benefit analyses in selecting transport options. Remedial measures 
for repairing damage created by the construction process are necessary 
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to restore the environment. Meanwhile, offset can include investments in 
offsite locations to compensate for environmental damage that cannot 
be avoided, reduced or restored, so as to ensure neutral or positive 
environmental outcomes overall.
For social risks, the World Bank (2016a) has a framework for screening 
investments to identify the risk profile for labour influxes and determine 
the necessary mitigation measures—such as encouraging the local 
recruitment of workers, affirmative action measures during the recruitment 
process to give women employment opportunities and ensuring that 
sufficient background checks are conducted on workers. Trafficking of 
women and children for prostitution as well as of drugs are issues that 
deserve attention. The spread of sexually transmitted diseases along traffic 
corridors should also be taken seriously by governments, which requires 
corresponding policies to limit their spread and raise people’s awareness 
of prevention.
China has in fact made some efforts to reduce the environmental and 
social risks of the BRI. On 25 April 2019, 19 international financial 
institutions signed the ‘Green Investment Principle of the Belt and 
Road Initiative’ at the second BRF for International Cooperation. This 
principle aims to improve the BRI investment environment and social 
risk management level and promote green investment. It covers strategy 
formulation, corporate governance, project management, information 
disclosure and communication and the use of green financial tools.
Conclusion
China’s BRI is a unique megaproject in global economic history, which is 
in line with President Xi Jinping’s ‘Thoughts’ on China as a global power 
and on globalisation in the twenty-first century and contributes to fulfilling 
his mission of national rejuvenation. The project at its core incorporates 
elements of Chinese and Western philosophy, generates strategic flexibility 
and seeks relative economic advantage. The BRI is a key element of a new 
geopolitical mechanism that is seeking to protect China’s national and 
security interests, incorporates historical experience (the Cold War) and 
could be seen as China’s ‘anti-containment’ strategy because it contributes 
to the ‘unification’ of the Eurasian mainland (Heartland and Rimland) 
and seeks autonomy from the oceanic transportation network that is 
dominated by the United States.
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China’s BRI has brought the connectivity between the BRI countries 
closer in terms of infrastructure and policy. As a result, it has shortened 
shipping times, lowered trade costs and injected strong impetus into the 
economies of the BRI countries, making the trade network between them 
more intensive, leading to greater FDI flows into them and improving 
their positions in GVCs.
The BRI projects involve various inherent risks, such as political and legal, 
debt sustainability, governance and environmental and social. Although 
Chinese companies have a wealth of experience, they may encounter 
many problems due to the wide range of BRI projects. With numerous 
opportunities for development presented by the BRI, these potential risks 
and the necessary countermeasures have become issues for attention. 
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The connectivity of the 
Greater Mekong Subregion: 
A view from the sky
Wichsinee Wibulpolprasert, Winit Theanvanichpant 
and Somkiat Tangkitvanich1 
Countries succeed when they have a magnetic quality and an 
openness to the world around them: when they invest more 
in bridges than walls. 
— Tom Fletcher (2016: 18)
Introduction
Transport infrastructure is an important element for both local and cross-
border economic development. In the past 20 years, the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) has seen remarkable growth in the amount of transport 
infrastructure that connects countries in the region along numerous 
economic corridors, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
1  We are grateful to Panu Nuangjumnong and Jirawit Wongchan-Uma from Geo-Informatics 
and Space Technology Development for their assistance in digitising and interpreting the satellite 
data. We also would like to thank Dr Watcharas Leelawath and Dr Souknilanh Keola for their helpful 
comments. 
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Figure 3.1 GMS economic corridors
Source: www .greatermekong .org .
One prominent example of this connectivity is the series of Thailand–
Laos friendship bridges across the Mekong River (see Table 3.1). The 
first friendship bridge opened in April 1994 and connects Vientiane 
prefecture in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) to Thailand’s 
Nong Khai Province. The second bridge opened in January 2007, 
connecting Suvannakhet (Lao PDR) to Mukdahan (Thailand). The third 
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bridge connects Nakhon Phanom (Thailand) to Thakhek, Khammouan 
(Lao PDR), and opened in November 2011. The most recent friendship 
bridge was completed in December 2013, connecting Chiang Khong 
(Thailand) to Ban Houayxay (Lao PDR).
Table 3.1 Thailand–Laos friendship bridges
Bridge Opening date Thailand Laos Funded by
First April 1994 Nongkhai Vientiane Australian Government
Second December 2006 Mukdahan Savannakhet Japanese loan
Third November 2011 Nakhon Phanom Khammouan Thai Government
Fourth December 2013 Chiang Rai Ban Houayxay Thai, Lao and Chinese 
governments
Sources: Fernquest (2011); Wikipedia; Fujimura (2017) .
Connective structures such as cross-border bridges allow regional trade to 
prosper by significantly reducing transportation times and costs. While 
the direct benefit of reduced transportation costs/times from enhanced 
connectivity is usually apparent and easily measurable, the indirect 
benefits that spill over to local communities are much harder to measure 
due to the lack of microlevel data.
Given the announcement of additional friendship bridge investments, 
understanding the interactions between the connective infrastructure 
investments, local economic activities and urbanisation can be informative 
from a cost-benefit standpoint as well as for urban planning purposes.
To our knowledge, existing studies that evaluate microlevel impacts 
of infrastructure in the GMS are rare due to the unavailability of fine-
grained urbanisation and economic data. Most are the feasibility studies 
conducted by investors prior to commissioning the construction project 
(MOT 2008), ex-ante studies (Warr et al. 2009) or post-evaluation 
descriptive studies that focus on the direct trade benefits (Fujimura 2017).
For an ex-ante study, Warr et al. (2009) use a general equilibrium model 
to estimate the effects of the second Mekong River bridge. Their results 
suggest that, in the short run, transport cost reductions would produce 
a modest increase in interregional trade volumes in both directions and 
a small increase in real consumption in Thailand and Lao PDR. Over 
a longer period, the economic benefits to both regions would be much 
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larger, as capital and labour become more mobile. They do not confirm 
the belief that the benefits of cross-border infrastructure projects occur 
only, or overwhelmingly, in the richer region. 
The most comprehensive post-evaluation study was conducted by 
Fujimura (2017), which quantified the cost-benefit ratios along selected 
segments of the GMS economic corridors as well as the economic impacts 
at the country or subregional level. Despite finding a net positive economic 
impact from infrastructure in the GMS as a whole, the author admitted 
that incomplete data could compromise the robustness of the results. 
The various remote sensing data that became available recently, along 
with the development of image classification techniques, have great 
potential to fill this gap and allow researchers to conduct retrospective 
microlevel studies of infrastructure investment that have not been 
possible before. For example, a study by Vernon Henderson et al. (2012) 
famously demonstrates that local economic activity can be estimated from 
satellite images of observed night light. Several other existing studies have 
developed classification techniques to translate raw satellite images into 
meaningful pixel-based identification of built-up areas and different types 
of land use (Goldblatt et al. 2016, 2018). 
This study sets out to answer two questions that characterise the 
relationship between connective infrastructure, local industrialisation 
and local urbanisation. The first is whether connective infrastructure 
is a necessary condition for industrialisation, or is it industrialisation/
trade that necessitates the construction of bridges (the bridges are just 
enhancers)? Second, are there any indirect benefits (spillovers) from either 
the bridge construction or the industrialisation on the local economy?
We will focus our analysis on the impacts of the construction of the second 
(2007) and third (2009) Thailand–Laos friendship bridges as the time 
before and since their opening dates allow us long enough observation 
periods. Our analysis strategy follows three steps. First, we construct 
a  measurement of urbanisation over time using publicly available data 
from various sources. We then characterise the interaction between 
connective infrastructure (the friendship bridges), industrialisation and 
patterns of local urbanisation. Last, we synthesise policy implications and 
lessons learned for the future development of connective infrastructure in 
the GMS.
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Literature review
While this chapter will focus on the relationship between cross-border 
infrastructure, local industrialisation and local urbanisation, this section 
will review previous research more broadly to gain insights into the 
impacts of transport infrastructure on trade and urbanisation. 
There are numerous studies of the impacts of transport infrastructure 
on trade, all of which seem to confirm that the presence of transport 
infrastructure (road networks, airports, railways and ports) has resulted in 
increased trade flows (for example, Ismail and Mahyideen 2015; Celbis 
et al. 2013). In the context of the GMS economies, Fujimura and Edmonds 
(2006) find that cross-border and domestic transport infrastructure together 
can reduce trade costs and lead directly to increased trade and investment.
However, there are far fewer studies related to the impacts of transport 
infrastructure on urbanisation patterns. Most empirical works are 
undertaken in the context of developed countries. A typical finding is 
that improved transport infrastructure leads to agglomeration economies 
of increased access to markets, innovation spillovers and a greater labour 
pool (for example, Duranton and Puga 2004; World Bank 2009). Most 
existing works also focus on intracity roads and metro lines, rather than 
intercity transport infrastructure. Studies of the impacts of cross-border 
infrastructure such as international bridges are even harder to find, 
especially in the context of developing countries. 
Baum-Snow et al. (2012) find the configurations of urban railroads and 
highways have influenced urban forms in Chinese cities since 1990. 
In particular, each radial highway displaces about 4 per cent of the central 
city’s population to surrounding regions and ring roads displace an 
additional 20 per cent or so, with stronger effects in the richer coastal and 
central regions. Each radial railroad reduces central-city industrial gross 
domestic product (GDP) by about 20 per cent, with ring roads displacing 
an additional 50 per cent.
More recent empirical studies are related to the impact of high-speed 
rail networks in China and Japan. In the case of China, Ke et al. (2017) 
construct hypothetical counterfactuals for per capita real GDP of cities 
along the high-speed rail network in the absence of their respective 
high-speed rail projects. They find that the gains from high-speed rail 
are heterogeneous with regard to location, route and region. Cities with 
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positive effects are concentrated in the eastern coastal regions of China 
and in core urban agglomeration regions that allow them to become 
transportation hubs. In general, the gain for local economies is greater for 
cities that are more industrialised, with greater ability for the service sector 
to absorb labour and better supporting infrastructure.
Using the least-cost spanning tree to address the nonrandom route 
selection issue, Yu et al. (2019) find that high-speed railway connections in 
China have led to a reduction in GDP per capita for connected peripheral 
prefectures. They also find that the reduction of GDP per capita is driven 
by significant contractions in capital inputs, industrial outputs and skilled 
labour outflows. 
In the case of Japan, Li and Xu (2018) show that high-speed railroads 
can either polarise or diffuse economic geography based on the sector 
and distance between cities. In other words, economic activity could 
agglomerate from distant to core areas or disperse from the core to the 
periphery at the same time. To support their findings, they cite empirical 
evidence from the 1982 introduction of two major high-speed railways 
in Japan, which halved intercity transit times. They find that noncore 
areas lost 3–6 per cent of their population; service sector employment 
declined by 7 per cent, whereas manufacturing employment increased 
by 21 per cent. Municipalities within approximately 150 kilometres of 
Tokyo expanded, while the more distant ones contracted.
Overall, previous research finds that transport infrastructure tends 
to increase economic activity, trade and output. However, intercity 
transport links often produce uneven results in economic activity and 
urbanisation patterns among larger cities (hubs) and smaller ones (spokes 
or peripheries). 
Background to the friendship bridges
The second Mekong friendship bridge
The second Thailand–Laos Mekong Friendship Bridge was completed 
in November 2006. It connects Mukdahan and Savannakhet and was 
designed to be a part of the GMS’s East–West Economic Corridor 
(EWEC), which stretches from Yangon, Myanmar, in the west to Danang, 
Vietnam, in the east.
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The second bridge construction project, funded by a Japanese Government 
official development assistance (ODA) loan, aimed to promote regional 
economic development, logistics and trade through the corridor. Prior to 
the bridge’s opening, a ferry service was the only transport option to cross 
the river. Transporting goods from Bangkok to Hanoi via ship took from 
one and a half to two weeks. Transport overland via the second friendship 
bridge reduced the time to three days (JIBTV 2014).
Apart from promoting regional connectivity, the second friendship bridge 
was partially built to support Japanese industries that operate in the 
region. The first special economic zone (SEZ) in Laos, the Savan-Seno 
SEZ, was completed in Savannakhet in 2003. Some Japanese factories 
consider the Savan-Seno SEZ a perfect location, for several reasons. First, 
goods can be transported overland to either Da Nang port in Vietnam (to 
be shipped to East Asian countries) or Laem Chabang port in Thailand. 
Second, labour and electricity costs are much cheaper in Laos than in 
Thailand (JIBTV 2014). 
With these considerations in mind, the Japanese Government, via the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), helped complete an 
improvement project for National Road No. 9 that connects Savannakhet 
in Laos to Vietnam. This, along with the construction of the second 
friendship bridge connecting Thailand to Savannakhet, naturally made 
the landlocked Laos a more attractive manufacturing and distribution 
base, which has attracted many Japanese firms to establish their factories 
there (JICA 2017). 
The industrial and connective infrastructure development of the Savan-
Seno SEZ and the second friendship bridge is considered a perfect 
example of the ‘Thailand-plus-one business model’ for Japanese firms. 
The model proposes that Japanese companies that operate industrial 
clusters in Thailand can shift some of their labour-intensive activities to 
SEZs in the CLM countries (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) near the 
Thai border. Such a strategy will enhance the companies’ supply chain 
competitiveness via the lower labour costs in the CLM countries while 
maintaining access to the strengthened transportation infrastructure in 
Thailand (Oizumi 2013).
With the above context in mind, we hypothesise the relationship between 
connectivity, industrialisation and urbanisation for the second friendship 
bridge as follows: industrialisation (the establishment of the SEZ) drives local 
urbanisation and the demand for connective infrastructure.
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The third Mekong friendship bridge
The third friendship bridge was commissioned in a vastly different context 
than the second bridge. First, it was financed by Thailand’s government 
with the objective of strengthening regional connectivity in general. The 
third bridge is part of Asian Highway Route AH15, connecting Thailand’s 
Udon Thani Province to Vinh in Vietnam. It also gives closer trade access 
to southern China. According to the feasibility study, the third bridge 
shortened ground shipping from Thailand to central Vietnam by 100 
kilometres, saving approximately two hours of driving compared with 
crossing the second bridge (MOT 2008). Second, there was no industrial 
base or SEZ in the area before the bridge’s construction. Instead, the 
Government of Laos decided to establish the Thakhek SEZ right across 
the Mekong River from Nakhon Phanom after the bridge was finished, 
with the aim of capturing the spillover benefits from the improved 
connectivity (Royal Thai Consulate-General 2019). 
With these differences in mind, we hypothesise the relationship between 
connectivity, industrialisation and urbanisation for the third friendship 




Table 3.2 summarises the high-level indicators of the local economy and 
urbanisation in Thailand’s provinces. 
Table 3.2 High-level indicators for local urbanisation
Indicator Description Data period Data source
Cross-border 
trade value
Export and import value of 
trade along the Mukdahan–
Savannakhet and Nakhon 
Phanom–Kammouan borders
2003–16 Bank of Thailand 




Number of inbound/outbound 
passenger vehicles, trucks 
and passengers passing 
through the Mukdahan–
Savannakhet and Nakhon 
Phanom–Kammouan 
immigration checkpoints
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Indicator Description Data period Data source
Gross provincial 
product
Province-level measure of 
value added
2002–18 Office of the National 
Economic and Social 
Development Council 
(NESDC n .d .)
Yearly built-up 
area expansion
New built-up area in square 
kilometres that appears yearly, 
as identified from satellite 
imagery 
2001–18 Landsat 5,7, 8 
(details below) 
(USGS n .d .)
Satellite imagery data
Our satellite imagery data for the study area come from Landsat 5, 7 
and 8. The Landsat satellites take pictures of the Earth’s surface and 
record reflected energy in various wavelengths of the electromagnetic 
spectrum (‘bands’) (NASA n.d.). Each pixel represents a gridded area of 
approximately 30 by 30 metres (that is, a resolution of 30 metres). 
Table 3.3 Examples of the various bands in Landsat 5 and 8
Band 
no.
Band name Wavelength (μm) Resolution (m) Band applications
1 Visible Blue 0 .45–0 .52 30 Bathymetric mapping, 
distinguishing soil 





0 .52–0 .60 30 Emphasises peak 
vegetation, which is 
useful for assessing 
plant vigour
3 Visible Red 0 .63–0 .69 30 Discriminates vegetation 
slopes
4 NIR 0 .76–0 .90 30 Emphasises biomass 
content and shorelines
5 SWIR 1 1 .55–1 .75 30 Discriminates moisture 
content of soil and 
vegetation; penetrates 
thin clouds
6 Thermal 10 .40–12 .50 120 Thermal mapping and 
estimated soil moisture
7 SWIR 2 2 .08–2 .35 30 Hydrothermally altered 
rocks associated with 
mineral deposits
Source: EOSDA (n .d .) .
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Figure 3.2 Landsat mission schedule
Source: USGS (n .d .) .
Since different satellites have different mission periods (Figure 3.2), 
we  had to combine the snapshot imagery data from three different 
satellites—Landsat 5, 7 and 8—to cover our entire study period, from 
2000 to 2020 (De Riggi 2017). 
We acquired the resulting dataset that records various bands of wavelength 
in the target area from the EarthExplorer website of the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS n.d.). Note that even though the images of the 
same location are taken every 16 days, we screened only for the best yearly 
snapshot with the lowest cloud cover. Table 3.4 summarises our yearly 
data source and the snapshot time frame. 
Table 3.4 Final satellite imagery data source
Year Data date Satellite
Mukdahan/Savannakhet Nakhon Phanom/Khammouan
2000 4 November 2000 4 November 2000 Landsat-7
2001 23 November 2001 23 November 2001 Landsat-7
2002 10 November 2002 10 November 2002 Landsat-7
2003 21 November 2003 21 November 2003 Landsat-5
2004 22 October 2004 22 October 2004 Landsat-5
2005 10 November 2005 10 November 2005 Landsat-5
2006 12 October 2006 12 October 2006 Landsat-5
2007 8 November 2007 8 November 2007 Landsat-7
2008 4 December 2008 4 December 2008 Landsat-5
2009 4 October 2009 4 October 2009 Landsat-5
2010 20 October 2010 20 October 2010 Landsat-5
2011 6 July 2011 6 July 2011 Landsat-5
2012 20 October 2012 20 October 2012 Landsat-7
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Year Data date Satellite
Mukdahan/Savannakhet Nakhon Phanom/Khammouan
2013 7 October 2013 7 October 2013 Landsat-7
2014 2 October 2014 2 October 2014 Landsat-8
2015 1 July 2015 1 July 2015 Landsat-8
2016 14 June 2016 14 June 2016 Landsat-8
2017 26 October 2017 26 October 2017 Landsat-8
2018 13 October 2018 13 October 2018 Landsat-8
Last, the data preparation and classification steps were performed on ENVI 
and ArcGIS software. Figure 3.3 summarises the data-processing steps.
Figure 3.3 Data-processing steps
Source: Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development team .
Built-up area classification
The next step in data processing is to translate the raw wavelength data 
into meaningful measures of urbanisation. We make use of the widely used 
Normalized Difference Built-Up Index (NDBI) to classify image pixels 
as built-up and non–built-up areas. The NDBI utilises the properties 
of built-up areas and bare soil, which reflect more shortwave infrared 
(SWIR) than near-infrared (NIR) waves, while green vegetation generally 
reflects more NIR than SWIR. 
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONNECTIVITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
102




The index value ranges from –1 to 1 and can be interpreted as follows:
• NDBI > 0 and close to 1 indicates a built-up area.
• NDBI close to 0 indicates a vegetated area.
• NDBI < 0 and close to –1 indicates a water body.
This study uses an NDBI cut-off value of 0.65 to classify pixels as built-up 
area. Note that we finetune the cut-off values for different data years to 
achieve the highest classification accuracy.
After an initial classification using the NDBI, we are still left with many 
false-positive built-up areas. This is because the NDBI alone cannot 
distinguish real built-up areas from barren land with bare soil. Thus, 
we refine our classification results with two additional steps. First, we 
compare the initial classified data against verified land use data and high-
resolution satellite imagery from the most recent year (2018). The logic 
is simple: the verified land use data and high-resolution images constitute 
our ‘ground truth’ for the real built-up area boundary, thus any built-up 
pixels classified initially by the NDBI that fall outside this boundary in 
2018 are false positives and are excluded from our data layer in all years. 
Next, we perform a final visual inspection by comparing the resulting 
classified built-up area with the raw satellite image year by year. We then 
manually remove from our dataset the classified built-up areas that do not 
look like real built-up areas. 
Strengths and limitations of using satellite 
imagery data
Using the satellite imagery (Landsat) data to track urbanisation progress 
has several strengths. First, it is publicly available online. This makes it 
affordable and accessible for anyone. Second, the data span a long period. 
This allows researchers to study land use changes before the administrative 
data became available. Third, the imagery data are truthful in the sense that 
they are recorded by the camera’s sensors and are not easily manipulated.
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Despite these many advantages, there are several limitations that readers 
should beware of when interpreting the results in this chapter. First, the 
Landsat data’s resolution of 30 metres is considered relatively low. This 
property naturally lends itself to a simple classification method such as the 
NDBI rather than a more sophisticated/accurate classification method. 
Second, while the NDBI is easy to calculate and interpret, it is not 
highly accurate and requires additional post-classification refinements, as 
mentioned above. Third, even when the NDBI can classify built-up pixels 
correctly, it cannot distinguish between different types of built-up areas. 
This limitation means that, without additional information, researchers 
will not be able to assess the quality of urbanisation, as both highly 
developed and less-developed areas will be classified as built-up.
In addition to the satellite imagery data, we have explored the usability 
of night-time light imagery data. The main night-time light data that 
cover our period of interest are the OLS-DMSP night-time light series 
provided by the US National Centers for Environmental Information 
(NCEI n.d.). Unfortunately, this dataset has several limitations. First, 
and most importantly, the different satellites used to collect data for this 
series have different (unknown) baseline calibration values, which means 
the night-time light index is not comparable across years. This limitation 
is particularly noticeable when the study area is small. Second, the low 
resolution of the night-time light data (1 kilometre) prevent detailed 
geospatial analysis, which is crucial when our study areas are small.
Results and discussion
This section discusses the observed relationships between the construction 
of the friendship bridges, urbanisation and trade activity. Recall that our 
focus areas are Mukdahan (Thailand) and Savannakhet (Laos) for the 
second friendship bridge and Nakhon Phanom (Thailand) and Thakhek 
(Laos) for the third friendship bridge. 
Macrolevel changes post bridge construction
We first investigate the province-level changes in different indicators 
of urbanisation, starting with cross-border trade volumes. Figure 3.4 
shows the yearly export and import trade values (in million Thai baht, 
or THB) across the Mukdahan–Nakhon Phanom border. Two interesting 
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observations stand out. First, border trade value is dominated by exports 
to rather than imports from Laos. Closer inspection reveals that the top 
export products across Mukdahan’s border are computing chips and 
electronic circuits, while the top import products are pure copper and 
appliance components. On the other hand, the top export products from 
Nakhon Phanom are computer memory units and fruit, while the top 
import products into Nakhon Phanom are mainly electronic devices, 
memory hard disks and computers. Second, both the export and the 
import trade values increased exponentially shortly after the opening of 
the two friendship bridges. These two observations clearly indicate the 
direct benefit of the bridges on trade facilitation.
Figure 3.4 Changes in border export and import values
Source: Authors’ creation .
Next, we look at the combined (inbound and outbound) cross-border 
traffic volume over time, in Figure 3.5. Unfortunately, no data are available 
before 2008, making it impossible to spot whether there was any abrupt 
change in traffic volume after the second bridge opened. However, if we 
assume that the change in traffic volume follows a pattern similar to that 
of the change in trade value, we expect to see the traffic volume for the 
second bridge spike after 2009. Unlike the change in trade value, however, 
the cross-border traffic volume seems to increase only gradually over time. 
The observed exponential growth in trade value along with a gradual 
increase in traffic volume (especially truck traffic) imply a  significant 
increase in the proportion of high-value products among the goods traded 
or a significant improvement in truck capacity utilisation, or both. 
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Figure 3.5 Cross-border traffic volume
Source: Authors’ creation .
Last, we inspect the year-on-year change in the expansion of built-up areas 
and the gross provincial product (GPP) of the two Thai border provinces, 
in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. We notice a rapid expansion of built-up areas in 
the early 2000s, which gradually slows over time. This slowdown is mainly 
a result of the fact that there was only a very small built-up area in all the 
regions being studied in the base year, 2002. Therefore, a small expansion 
in built-up area translates to large year-on-year growth. First, similar to 
traffic volume, the built-up area expansion or increase in GPP does not 
seem to respond to the opening of the two bridges in any significant way. 
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Figure 3.6 Year-on-year change in built-up area expansion
Source: Authors’ creation .
Figure 3.7 Year-on-year change in GPP
Source: Authors’ creation .
Together, all the province-level data indicate that, besides providing the 
obvious direct trade benefits, the friendship bridges seem to have had 
limited impact on local urbanisation.
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Built-up area growth pattern
We next turn our attention to the pattern of built-up area expansion 
around the two friendship bridges. Figure 3.8 shows this expansion in 
2000, 2005, 2009 and 2015. Each dot represents a new built-up area 
created in each year. The orange or red colour indicates locations with 
a  high density of new built-up areas (‘built-up hotspots’). We can see 
the intense built-up hotspots in Savannakhet that occurred near the city’s 
core  in 2005, which corresponded with the opening of the Savan-Seno 
SEZ in 2003. New built-up hotspots in Mukdahan, on the other hand, 
are less intense and are scattered along the existing highways and city core. 
By comparing the built-up hotspot map from 2005 (before the bridge’s 
opening) with that from 2009 (after the bridge’s opening), we can see that 
the second friendship bridge did not seem to change the pattern of built-
up area expansion in a profound way.
Figure 3.8a Location of newly created built-up areas in 2000 
(second bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
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Figure 3.8b Location of newly created built-up areas in 2004 
(second bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
Figure 3.8c Location of newly created built-up areas in 2005 
(second bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
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Figure 3.8d Location of newly created built-up areas in 2009 
(second bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
To quantify the observed growth pattern, we calculate the built-up area 
expansion within a radius of 0– 10 kilometres and 11–30 kilometres 
north and south of the second friendship bridge. Figure 3.9 shows the 
radius analysis frame. Most of the existing city areas of Mukdahan and 
Savannakhet, as well as the Savan-Seno SEZ, lie within 10 kilometres 
south of the second bridge. The area in the 11–30-kilometre ring south of 
the bridge consists mainly of existing highways.
Figure 3.10 shows the annual increase in built-up area within various 
distances from the bridge between 2001 and 2018. One can see that 
most of the built-up area expansion occurred south of the bridge. Built-
up areas in the 0–10-kilometre radius of Mukdahan and Savannakhet 
expanded rapidly from 2003 to 2004, which coincided with the opening 
of the Savan-Seno SEZ. After 2005, however, the expansion in this radius 
slowed while that in the 11–30-kilometre radius continued. The opening 
of the second friendship bridge in 2007 did not seem to alter the growth 
of built-up areas in any of the analysis frames.
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Figure 3.9 Radius analysis for Mukdahan and Savannakhet 
(second bridge)
Source: Built-up area map created using Landsat imagery from 2018 .
Together, the analyses suggest that the creation of the Savan-Seno SEZ 
had a strong correlation with local urbanisation while the opening of the 
friendship bridges had no significant correlation with local urbanisation. 
Mukdahan appears to be just a throughway for the passage of goods 
and may benefit only from a small local spillover to communities along 
the highway leading up to the bridge. Therefore, we characterise the 
relationship for the second friendship bridge as industrialisation (from the 
SEZ) that rapidly drove connectivity (the bridge) and urbanisation.
We performed the same descriptive analysis for the third friendship bridge. 
Figure 3.11 plots the location of the new built-up hotspots in 2000, 2005, 
2010 and 2015 in Nakhon Phanom and Khammouan. Built-up areas 
grew gradually out of the existing city cores and along major highways. 
The opening of the third friendship bridge in 2012 did not change the 
pattern of built-up area expansion in a profound way. 
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Figure 3.10 Annual increase in built-up area in Mukdahan and 
Savannakhet (second bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
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Figure 3.11a Location of new built-
up areas in 2000 (third bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
Figure 3.11b Location of new built-
up areas in 2005 (third bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
Figure 3.11c Location of new built-
up areas in 2010 (third bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
Figure 3.11d Location of new built-
up areas in 2015 (third bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
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Figure 3.12 Radius analysis for Nakhon Phanom and Khammouan 
(third bridge)
Source: Map created using Landsat imagery for 2018 .
A similar radius analysis for the third friendship bridge reveals that most 
of the existing city area (Nakhon Phanom and Khammouan) and major 
highways were located in the 10–30-kilometre ring south of the bridge 
(Figure 3.12). The newly created Thakhek SEZ in 2012 was in the 
same area.
Figure 3.13 plots the annual built-up area expansion in the 0–10-kilometre 
and 11–30-kilometre radii north and south of the bridge. The plots reveal 
that most of the new built-up hotspots in both Nakhon Phanom and 
Khammouan are within the 11–30-kilometre ring south of the third 
friendship bridge. However, the trend in built-up area expansion does 
not show any significant change after the opening of the third bridge and 
the Thakhek SEZ in 2012. 
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Figure 3.13 Annual increase in built-up area in Nakhon Phanom and 
Khammouan (third bridge)
Source: Authors’ creation .
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Together, the data for the third friendship bridge indicate that new 
built-up areas continued to expand in relation to the existing cities and 
highways, not in relation to the bridge or the new Thakhek SEZ. Readers 
should be reminded that the context and timing of the third bridge and 
the SEZ are very different from those of the second bridge: the third 
bridge was built, first, to enhance connectivity in the region in general, 
and then the Thakhek SEZ in Laos was established to capture the spillover 
benefits from the bridge. Therefore, we characterise this relationship as 
connectivity (the bridge) slowly driving industrialisation and urbanisation. 
Overall, our findings show that the friendship bridges, as connective 
infrastructure, contributed to a clear increase in economic activity—most 
notably, in cross-border trade and cross-border traffic. This is broadly 
in line with the findings of previous work on the economic benefits of 
transport infrastructure. We also find that the impacts of the two bridges 
on patterns of urbanisation in the connected cities largely depend on the 
historical context of the surrounding areas. This adds a new insight to 
previous findings that intercity transport infrastructure often produces 
uneven results in urbanisation between larger cities and smaller ones. 
Conclusions and policy implications
Our major descriptive findings can be summarised as follows. First, 
connectivity has a strong direct relationship with border trade. This can 
be seen from the opening of the second and third Mekong friendship 
bridges, which were followed by an explosion in border trade value. 
Second, connectivity may not have a profound impact on local 
urbanisation since the built-up area surrounding the bridges continued 
to expand in relation to the existing cities, the SEZ and highways, but 
not in relation to the bridges. Last, the interaction between connectivity, 
industrialisation and urbanisation for the second bridge is characterised 
as industrialisation-driven urbanisation and connectivity. On the other 
hand, the interaction for the third bridge is characterised as connectivity-
driven (slow) urbanisation and industrialisation.
Importantly, we would like to emphasise that the relationships we 
characterise here represent only the correlation between industrialisation, 
bridge construction and built-up area expansion. Estimating a causal 
relationship is not possible at the local level due to the lack of other control 
variables. Importantly, the observed increase in the built-up areas or trade 
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volumes after the bridges’ construction cannot be entirely attributed to 
the bridges as several other factors also influence growth. For example, 
existing highways and industrial policies (for example, the Savan-Seno 
SEZ) could have driven the growth in these border cities even without 
the bridges. 
The main lesson learned from these two case studies is that enhanced 
physical connectivity alone may have significant direct benefits on trade; 
however, the indirect benefit spillovers on the local economy may be 
limited. Instead, careful industrial and urban planning, along with 
physical connectivity enhancement, have a much greater potential to create 
additional local benefits and maximise the returns on the investment in 
such large connective infrastructure. 
Last, the current study presents several limitations that can serve as 
areas for future study. First, due to data limitations, the relationships we 
characterise here only capture the correlation (and not causation) between 
industrialisation, bridge construction and built-up area expansion. 
A  future study that aims to estimate the causal impact of the SEZ or 
bridge construction should gather a richer and longer dataset to control 
for the confounding factors of urbanisation such as local policies or 
institutional detail on the bridge construction decision-making process. 
Second, the satellite imagery data and classification method used in 
this study lack the resolution and depth required to assess the quality of 
urbanisation. A future study can make use of the commercially available 
higher-resolution satellite data, additional ground-truth data and a more 
sophisticated classification technique to differentiate building types and 
the quality of urbanisation. Third, the lessons learned from the two 
case studies might not be representative of other connective bridges in 
the region. Different political, cultural and social contexts can result 
in different interactions between connectivity, industrialisation and 
urbanisation. Thus, expanding the study coverage to other countries in 
the GMS will result in generalisable policy implications. 
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The digital economy in 
Southeast Asia: Emerging 
policy priorities and 




Southeast Asia’s digital economy2 is expanding at an unprecedented rate. 
This is evidenced by the rise of technology ‘unicorn’ companies valued 
at more than US$1 billion (four of which are in Indonesia), cross-border 
e-commerce platforms and the growing number of entrepreneurs who are 
innovating and using technology to grow. The use of digital technologies 
has the potential to transform—indeed, disrupt—all sectors of the 
economy, from logistics and finance to agriculture and social services. 
1  This chapter summarises the findings of a recent World Bank report, The Digital Economy in 
Southeast Asia: Building the foundations for future growth (Beschorner et al. 2019), focusing on key 
policy enablers. Also see World Bank (2019).
2  The term ‘digital economy’ is used to refer to private-sector utilisation of digital technologies as 
a driver of economic growth, innovation and other means of transforming the economy. In this sense, 
the digital economy is not restricted to the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, 
but rather encompasses the adoption of digital technology in all sectors of the economy.
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These developments have also spurred increased interest from the 
region’s governments and regional organisations, in promoting faster and 
more inclusive digitisation and technology adoption in various sectors. 
However, the full potential of technology as a driver of private-sector and 
wider economic growth is not yet being realised. Southeast Asia still faces 
significant barriers to growing its digital economy, many of which need to 
be addressed through enabling policies and regulations, as well as greater 
regional cooperation and collaboration. This chapter focuses primarily on 
these policy and regulatory factors. 
Regional digital economy overview
The emergence and growth of the digital economy in Southeast Asia are 
being driven by improved internet access and usage across the region 
(Figure 4.1). Individuals in the region’s emerging markets are spending 
substantial time online—more than four hours per day, for example, in 







Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam
2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017
Figure 4.1 Individuals using the internet in selected Southeast Asian 
economies (percentage of population)
Source: World Bank staff calculations using World Bank (2021b) .
According to recent surveys on internet usage, about 80 per cent of 
consumers regularly obtain information on products and services from 
social media (Kemp 2017). E-commerce spending in the region is also 
rising (Figure 4.2), facilitated by marketplaces/platforms where small and 
medium enterprises can also sell to consumers online. In big cities, the use 
of smartphones for messaging and social media has become ubiquitous. 
Ridesharing and delivery services using apps to obtain bookings are 
rapidly changing the face of urban transport and logistics services.
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Used the internet to buy something online in the past year (% age 15+) 
Figure 4.2 E-commerce adoption by country, 2017
LIC = low-income country
MIC = medium-income country
EAP = East Asia and the Pacific
Source: World Bank (2018a) . 
Digital platforms—a combination of technical innovation, new business 
models and value proposition—in the private and, in some cases, the 
public sectors offer a range of products and services via digital channels. 
Platform-based businesses have experienced remarkable growth and 
further expansion is projected. 
The internet has dramatically lowered the cost of delivering services, 
as well as marketing, ordering and paying for them. Total Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) trade in telecommunications, 
computer and information services (adding exports and imports) almost 
doubled between 2010 and 2016 (Figure 4.3) and its share of total 
ASEAN services trade grew by 28 per cent. 
Digital technologies are facilitating payment and lending, promoting 
financial inclusion. In 2016, investments in the Southeast Asian fintech 
market increased to US$252 million—up one-third from 2015; the upward 
trend continued in 2017. The fintech landscape is dominated by payments 
and mobile wallets (43 per cent), followed by financial comparison 
platforms (15 per cent) and retail investment portals (11 per cent) (UOB 
2017). Digital content development is another significant growth area. 
Ad-based video-on-demand (AVOD) or user-generated content platforms 
such as YouTube are very popular in Southeast Asia, with Vietnam and 
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Thailand ranking among the 10 markets with the highest viewership 
globally (Fujita 2017). The growing volume of local content highlights 
the increasing adoption by local media companies of digital platforms for 






























ASEAN  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Viet Nam
Figure 4.3 Telecommunications, computer and information services 
trade, ASEAN member countries
Note: Figure shows exports plus imports, for trade with all countries, to indicate the overall 
growth of trade rather than trade in one direction or another . The bars refer to the scale on 
the right axis, the lines to the scale on the left axis .
Source: Authors’ calculations using information from ASEAN Secretariat .
However, the broader diffusion of digital technologies among businesses 
in Southeast Asia is still low, as illustrated by the World Bank’s Digital 
Adoption Index (DAI) (Figure 4.4). The DAI measures the relative 
adoption of digital technologies by individuals, businesses and 
governments, based on a standard set of indicators across 180 countries 
relative to their income level. For example, Malaysia performs well in 
overall digital adoption in comparison with some Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, but scores 
below expectations for its income level for digital adoption by businesses. 
These findings are also confirmed by the results of World Bank enterprise 
surveys. The limited use of digital technology by firms in Southeast Asia 
may reflect the digital divide between large and smaller firms, as globally 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) lag in technology adoption at 
all levels of economic development (OECD 2017). Other factors include 
the lack of necessary digital skills or limited availability of affordable 
broadband internet. 
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Figure 4.4 Digital adoption by individuals, governments and businesses 
relative to world average, ASEAN member countries3
Note: The diffusion of digital technologies among businesses uses proxy data such as the 
proportion of businesses with websites, the use of secure servers, internet bandwidth and 
mobile broadband . 
Source: World Bank (2016b) . 
Looking ahead, digital technologies offer significant new opportunities 
for firms, including in lowering barriers to entry, particularly to global 
value chains (GVCs). SMEs may benefit disproportionately, as once-
unaffordable computing power, storage and development platforms 
become cheaper (for example, via cloud computing), identifying talent 
becomes easier and markets become easier to reach (OECD 2017). 
Emerging technologies such as fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks—
particularly with their potential to expand the utilisation of device-to-
device communications or the Internet of Things (IoT)—blockchain-
enabled distributed data management, big data analytics and machine 
learning/artificial intelligence have major potential for disrupting business 
models across economic sectors and service delivery mechanisms. 
Digital economy policy enablers … or barriers?
For the digital economy to have a significant impact on poverty reduction 
and inclusion in Southeast Asia, its key policy enablers or ‘foundations’ 
need to be better understood. 
3  The overall DAI is the simple average of three subindexes, each of which comprises technologies 
necessary for the respective agent to promote development in the digital era: increasing productivity and 
accelerating broad-based growth for business, expanding opportunities and improving welfare for people 
and increasing the efficiency and accountability of service delivery for government (World Bank 2016a). 
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These foundations, underpinned by a stable macroeconomic environment 
and supportive business environment, include affordable and consistent 
internet connectivity, secure payment systems and mechanisms, availability 
of appropriate and adaptable workforce skills, reliable logistics services 
to facilitate the delivery of goods and a series of crosscutting policies and 
regulations supporting and securing online transactions and protecting 
consumers (Table 4.1). This is essentially what the World Development 
Report 2016 (World Bank 2016b) refers to as the nondigital or ‘analogue’ 
complements needed to enable the digital economy and is discussed 
in more detail in The Digital Economy in Southeast Asia: Building the 
foundations for future growth (Beschorner et al. 2019). 
Table 4.1 Digital economy foundations at a glance
Connectivity Affordable, reliable and high-quality broadband internet 
access is a prerequisite for and a physical underpinning of the 
digital economy .
Payments Access to safe and secure digital payment services provides 
the opportunity to engage in electronic transactions whether 
as consumers or entrepreneurs, domestically or overseas .
Digital skills In a digitally driven economy, skills needs range from basic 
digital and data literacy to specialised skills to harness the 
productivity benefits of digital innovation .
Logistics E-commerce is particularly dependent on well-regulated, 
widely available and cost-effective logistics services given the 
higher demand for delivery of goods, especially at low values, 
both within and across borders .
Digital policy and 
regulation
Policies that promote trust are essential for growing 
participation in the digital economy . These cover a range 
of areas, from data privacy and cybersecurity to consumer 
protection . Regional coordination of such policies is desirable .
There are significant differences between and within Southeast Asian 
countries in terms of internet access, speed and cost; in particular, 
differences within countries between urban and rural/remote internet 
access and quality can be especially large. The extent of utilisation of 
digital payments varies across countries. Significant gaps also exist between 
traditional models of education and training and the evolving demands 
for digital skills in the workforce. Policies and regulations for managing 
data, especially the flow of data across borders, are still evolving. 
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4. THE DIGITAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Connectivity: Particularly high-speed (broadband) 
internet access
Digital connectivity in Southeast Asia is improving, driven by substantial 
investment primarily from the private sector. Broadband internet 
penetration grew 13 per cent per year in Southeast Asia between 2011 
and 2016 (ITU 2017). However, as of mid-2019, about half the 
region’s population still lacked broadband access (Figure 4.5). Mobile 
broadband access (notably, 4G and, prospectively, 5G) is improving as 
is the proliferation of smartphones, but quality and affordability remain 
challenging in many areas. Fixed broadband access—for example, through 
optical-fibre connections to the premises, which is essential for data-
intensive transactions required by many businesses—is lagging. 
Internet speeds—key determinants of service quality—in the largest 
Southeast Asian economies fall short of the global leaders, although the 
gap is closing. The largest middle-income developing countries in the 
region all fall below the OECD’s average speed for mobile and fixed 
broadband. Thailand is the only economy ranked within the top-20 
countries globally measured as the proportion of the population with 
broadband plans at 15  megabits per second (Mbps) or faster (Akamai 
2017). Although Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam are currently 
behind, the year-on-year growth rates—520 per cent, 509 per cent and 
1,222 per cent, respectively, for 2016–17—are encouraging. 
Internet affordability, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
income, has seen steady improvement globally and in Southeast Asia 
(ITU 2016, 2018). However, while mobile broadband is becoming 
more affordable—less than 5 per cent of gross national income (GNI) 
per capita4—fixed broadband is typically less affordable. There are also 
significant variations in the availability, quality and pricing of broadband 
services within countries, which are attributable to geography and 
population distribution (particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines), 
technical factors (such as the type of backhaul technologies available, 
such as fibre, microwave or satellite), overall costs of service deployment, 
expected revenue for service providers, local constraints such as permits 
and rights-of-way requirements and lower levels of competition in 
particular regions. 
4  Gross national income (GNI) is defined as the sum of value added by all producers who are 
residents in a nation, plus any product taxes (minus subsidies) not included in output, plus income 
received from abroad such as employee compensation and property income.
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Figure 4.5 Broadband internet penetration in ASEAN member 
countries (percentage of population)
Notes: Mobile broadband means access to the internet using a 3G or (faster) 4G-enabled 
device . A GSM 2G connection means that the user has only a basic data service—that is, 
text messaging . Fixed broadband means access to the internet using fixed-line networks 
such as xDSL (digital subscriber lines) or optical fibre connected to the premises . These 
data show the number of mobile and fixed broadband internet subscribers as a percentage 
of the population for each country . 
Sources: ITU (2018); GSMA (2019); TeleGeography (2021) . 
Governments have an important role to play in facilitating faster 
broadband rollout through regulatory reforms that can, for example, 
improve competition in the broadband value chain (wholesale and retail) 
and help to optimise investments in unserved and underserved locations 
as well as increasing the uptake of services. Sound competition policy 
remains highly relevant in this regard, though the nature of the competitive 
landscape has shifted from voice-based to platform-based service delivery. 
Regulatory authorities also have an important role in quality-of-service 
oversight. 
Priority policy and regulatory reforms for improved digital connectivity 
include the following. 
• Open access and nondiscriminatory pricing: Regulations that help 
to create a more level playing field for telecommunications/internet 
service providers to access critical infrastructure/networks at all 
levels of the broadband value chain. This includes the ‘first mile’, 
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or international gateway, as well as the ‘middle mile’ or ‘backbone’ 
networks and last-mile fixed networks—for example, fibre to the 
home (FTTH). Open access at the wholesale level helps to promote 
more equitable competition among retail service provides, lowering 
the cost of internet services at the retail level. 
• Passive infrastructure sharing: Regulations that encourage or, in 
some cases, mandate service providers to share tower networks 
(for  wireless backbone infrastructure, for example, microwaves and 
mobile base stations) and/or fixed broadband facilities to enable more 
efficient utilisation of resources and reductions in the cost of network 
installation and maintenance. Passive infrastructure may account for up 
to 80 per cent of digital infrastructure investment costs, so the savings 
are potentially significant. There are further opportunities for sharing 
digital infrastructure across sectors (for example, optical-fibre cables 
collocated with power transmission networks, roads and pipelines). 
• Radio spectrum management: Spectrum is a scare resource, particularly 
in densely populated urban environments, which governments 
allocate—for example, to telecoms and broadcasting service providers, 
among others, to enable them to provide communications services 
across designated frequencies. Evolving communications technologies 
may require the review and/or reallocation of spectrum among 
service providers to maximise efficient utilisation. For example, the 
700-megahertz band—typically allocated for analogue broadcasting—
is being progressively phased out globally as countries migrate to digital 
television. The spectrum can then be freed up for additional mobile 
broadband (for example, 4G) deployment.
• Foreign ownership restrictions that still apply in some countries in the 
telecommunications/internet sector: A review/revision of these may 
enable greater foreign investment in connectivity infrastructure and 
promote more competition in service delivery. 
• National broadband plans: Several governments in the region have 
published such plans with indicative targets for coverage and internet 
speeds. Given the rapidly increasing demand, there is scope to set more 
ambitious targets for reducing the digital divide and to strengthen 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
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Payments
Finance is both an enabler of the digital economy and one of the main 
sectors where digitisation is supporting significant changes in business 
models and available services. For example, digital financial services can 
potentially offer a new pathway into the formal financial system for 
‘unbanked’ people in the region. 
The use of digital payments in Southeast Asia is still lagging, constrained 
by low consumer awareness and lack of trust in the security and reliability 
of online transactions. Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
fall below the middle-income country average (27 per cent) for account 
holders using the internet or mobile phones to access their accounts 
(Figure 4.6). 











Make or receive digital payments Did not make or receive digital payments
Figure 4.6 Digital payments use is still relatively limited
Source: World Bank (2018a) . 
The level of online payments for internet purchases in Thailand and 
Malaysia is roughly one-third lower than the average for middle-income 
countries (around 71 per cent), and around half the level in Singapore. 
In Vietnam, the use of online payments is 14 per cent that of the average 
for middle-income countries. About 85 per cent of account owners 
(70 per cent of adults) had made or received a digital payment in the year 
under review in Malaysia, but only around 35 per cent for Indonesia and 
22 per cent for Vietnam (World Bank 2018a). 
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Policymakers face a variety of challenges in facilitating the expansion 
of digital payments, including the following.
• Consumer protection, given that digital financial services and 
products are now being delivered through new channels and business 
models. These models challenge traditional thinking about disclosure 
and recourse—for example, if the consumer suffers a loss, liability 
can be unclear due to the multiple parties involved in service delivery 
such as intermediaries and third-party providers of communications 
and technology services. Policymakers will need to consider how to 
update conventional product standards and guidelines to address 
these concerns. 
• Increased need for cross-sectoral coordination and communication. 
Digital financial inclusion—which involves new providers, services 
and consumers—requires significant cross-sectoral coordination and 
communication among regulators and supervisors, both at country 
and global levels. This is an important agenda item for regional 
organisations. 
• Customer identity/digital identity document (ID). Financial identity 
for poor people when services are delivered digitally carries the potential 
for both inclusion and gains for anti–money laundering and countering 
the financing of terrorism, but it also raises privacy and fraud risks. 
Meaningful and manageable laws based on privacy principles—at the 
national and global levels—and effective enforcement thereof offer the 
prospect of win-win solutions. Policymakers, development partners 
and other stakeholders worldwide are also recognising the need to 
develop comprehensive ID programs to enable access to financial and 
other services.
• Monitoring systems. Reporting and monitoring systems need to 
become more sophisticated, with a greater focus on direct linkages 
to financial institutions’ information systems (where feasible) 
and development of real-time monitoring capabilities, to enable 
implementation of appropriate privacy and data protections for users. 
• Interoperability of digital services across service providers and points 
of service, including agents and service providers. This issue is critical 
for national efforts to broaden the reach of financial services into 
previously underserved, often rural, areas as well as for other fund 
transfers—for example, government services delivery. 
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Skills for the digital economy
The growth of the digital economy is placing a premium on certain skills 
and reducing returns on others. Recent literature shows an emerging 
consensus around three ‘tiers’ of skills, outlined in Table 4.3, which are 
considered essential in the digital economy.5
Structural changes in Southeast Asian economies have already been 
raising the demand for workers to have more advanced skills, but the 
digital economy is leading to more rapid changes in business models and 
activities. As a result, specific occupational skills are likely to become 
obsolete more quickly than in the past. Thus, skills policies should aim to 
build adaptability among workers, not just focus on specific occupations 
(World Bank 2016b: 259). The skill set for the digital economy is 
a combination of the ‘soft’ skills of critical thinking and problem-solving, 
communication, teamwork and creativity, beyond the traditional focus 
on ‘hard’ skills such as programming and coding, science and technology. 
This underlines the importance of governments investing in human 
capital, not only to build basic literacy and numeracy, but also to develop 
sociobehavioural skills, which also reinforce adaptability in a rapidly 
changing environment (World Bank 2019).
Table 4.3 High-level digital skills categories
Types Description Target Examples
Basic digital/
ICT skills
Ability to use digital 
technologies (for example, 
send emails, find work-
related information on 
the internet, use digital 
apps and nonspecialised 
software, awareness of 
and ability to stay safe in 
cyberspace)










Soft skills required to 
work in a technology-
rich environment and to 
participate in ICT-enabled 
collaborative work (for 
example, communicate via 
social networks, market 
products on e-commerce 
platforms or analyse data 




US: Partnership for 
21st Century Skills 
US: Agenda for 
New Skills for Jobs 
5  See, for example, OECD (2016); UNESCO (2018).
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Types Description Target Examples
Advanced and 
specialist skills 
Skills needed to drive 
innovation, support digital 
infrastructure and the 




















ICT = information and communication technology
Key policy priorities include the following. 
• Digital skills strategy development and curriculum updates. These will 
need to be undertaken at all levels of education systems, as well as for 
lifelong learning programs. Some governments in Southeast Asia are 
already implementing programs to build a foundation of core skills 
to help workers meet the demands of increasingly technology-driven 
economic environments. Examples include Singapore’s SkillsFuture 
for the Digital Workplace initiative, Malaysia’s #mydigitalmaker 
movement and Thailand’s Net Pracharat skills awareness and digital 
literacy program. Given the rapid pace of changing skill needs, more 
systematic collaboration between governments and the private sector 
can help identify and anticipate these needs. 
• Regional skills mobility. Regional efforts to promote talent mobility 
within ASEAN member countries, including providing for the 
transferability and recognition of education and skills through common 
certification protocols, will be important to reap the full benefits of 
technology and facilitate increased regional integration. Joint skills 
training and mutual recognition of occupational qualifications and 
standards between ASEAN nations also can promote talent flows from 
economies with specific skill surpluses to those where such skills are in 
short supply. This needs to be coupled with policies that support the 
regional movement of skilled personnel, which may require the lifting 
of restrictive policies in some country contexts.
Logistics
Improved connectivity, the spread of digital payments and adoption of 
e-commerce are all leading to higher demand for the delivery of goods 
within and across borders, raising the importance of logistics (trade 
facilitation and fulfilment) services. E-commerce consumers, whether 
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firms or individuals, are demanding delivery services that are fast, efficient, 
reliable and traceable. Recent Logistics Performance Index (LPI) data6 
indicate improved overall performance from 2016 to 2018 in Thailand, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Lao PDR. In absolute terms, 
performance overall for ASEAN is not especially strong; only Thailand 
and Vietnam placed in the top 25 per cent of performers in the LPI in 
2018, and Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines placed in the top 
50 per cent. Figure 4.7 illustrates comparative performance on two key 
indicators from the LPI across selected countries: customs and border 























































Border Management Logistics quality and competence Overall LPI
Figure 4.7 Logistics performance indicators: Selected key 
indicators, 2018
Source: World Bank (2018b) .
Key policy and regulatory issues for governments related to logistics 
include the following. 
• Harmonisation of ‘de minimis’ thresholds across countries. A particular 
feature of the growth of e-commerce is that it is leading to an increase 
in shipments of low-value, small consignments, both within and across 
borders. At present, most governments have de minimis thresholds in 
place, setting a value for individual shipments below which customs 
duties and other taxes are not charged. As the volume of goods falling 
below these thresholds grows, many governments perceive this as 
6  The LPI collects the perceptions of logistics service providers about several aspects of logistics 
performance: 1) the efficiency of customs and border management clearances, 2) the quality of 
trade-related and transport-related infrastructure, 3) the ease of arranging competitively priced 
international shipments, 4) the competence and quality of logistics services, 5) the ability to track 
and trace consignments and 6) the frequency with which shipments reach consignees within the 
scheduled or expected delivery time.
137
4. THE DIGITAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
generating risk—for community protection and safety, revenue 
collection and intellectual property enforcement, among other areas. 
This has led to widely varying standards across countries. A common 
approach in Southeast Asia (for example, by ASEAN) is needed, and 
governments could facilitate cross-border e-commerce.
• Maintaining risk-based approaches to managing border clearances, 
including simplified procedures for low-value, low-risk goods and 
‘trusted trader’ schemes for frequent traders with strong compliance 
records. Efficiency and control can be facilitated by ensuring that 
logistics operators or e-commerce firms provide data to customs 
agencies in advance of a parcel’s arrival. The majority of small parcels 
crossing borders through e-commerce are likely to be legitimate 
shipments and inspecting all or most parcels will not only impede 
trade but also entail high administrative costs for customs and 
other agencies.
• Reducing internal regulatory barriers. These include phasing out 
fragmented licensing arrangements for logistics services and reducing 
market entry barriers—for example, foreign equity limits and 
minimum capital requirements that increase logistics costs in some 
countries, such as Indonesia. 
• Facilitating provision of space, especially in urban areas, for warehouse 
and distribution facilities would enable more timely delivery of small 
parcels (e-commerce companies require up to three times the inventory 
space of ‘offline’ retailers) (Prologis 2016). 
• Facilitating last-mile delivery in those Southeast Asian economies 
that still have large gaps in postal addressing, such as Indonesia and 
Myanmar, is critical, given the heavy reliance on postal networks 
for e-commerce deliveries. In Indonesia, for example, the lack of 
standardisation in addressing systems and parcel sizes requires the use 
of manual rather than automatic sorting, which is likely to push costs 
up as e-commerce demand grows. Alternative solutions (for example, 
pick-ups at supermarkets or parcel lockers) will be needed  and in 
some cases have already been developed by private-sector firms 
and consumers. 
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Crosscutting digital economy policy and regulation
Policies to promote trust in the internet and digital activities are essential 
for growing participation in the digital economy and for managing risks 
associated with technologies such as cloud computing, big data analytics, 
the IoT and, prospectively, artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning. This includes policies and regulations on electronic transactions 
more broadly, but also specific measures addressing data protection and 
privacy—particularly the issue of cross-border data flows—cybersecurity 
and consumer protection. Other relevant crosscutting policies relate to 
digital entrepreneurship, digital government and digital identity programs.
Southeast Asian governments have generally adopted policies and 
regulations pertaining to e-commerce. This focus is also evident in 
ASEAN’s regional digital agenda, which has a strong focus on e-commerce 
rather than the digitisation of industries. ASEAN member countries have 
adopted two UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
instruments, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC) and, more 
recently, the Convention on Electronic Contracting. Both instruments 
prohibit discrimination against contracts originating in electronic form 
and disparity of treatment between electronic communications and paper 
documents.7 These prohibitions are regarded as ‘enabling’ e-commerce 
by removing doubts about the enforceability of online contracts. While 
multiple ASEAN jurisdictions have enacted domestic legislation based on 
either the MLEC or the convention, the adoption of the MLEC has not 
been uniform.
Most Southeast Asian countries—except Cambodia, Lao PDR and 
Myanmar—have general legal frameworks for secure electronic 
transactions, data protection and privacy and consumer protection for 
online purchases (see Table 4.4). Challenges include implementation and 
enforcement and development of subsidiary legislation and regulations to 
address the detailed issues outlined above. 
7  See UNCITRAL (1999: Article 8, Explanatory Note, para. 129).
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Table 4.4 Legal frameworks in ASEAN countries for electronic 
transactions, data protection, privacy and online purchases
Country Does the 
country 




























Yes No Yes Yes
Cambodia Draft No Draft Draft
Indonesia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lao PDR Yes Yes Draft Yes
Malaysia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Myanmar Yes No Yes Yes
Philippines Yes Yes Yes Yes
Singapore Yes Yes Yes Yes
Thailand Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vietnam Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: UNCTAD (n .d .) . 
Data protection and privacy
The use of data is central to the digital economy. Accordingly, a robust 
legal and regulatory regime that addresses issues of data ownership, 
protects personal data and builds trust, while allowing the legitimate use of 
data, is a critical requirement. The extent to which countries in the region 
have legal and regulatory frameworks on the ownership, governance and 
privacy of data varies. Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines adopted 
comprehensive data protection laws earlier last decade. Thailand’s personal 
data protection law was to come into force in May 2020. In Indonesia, 
sectoral regulations applicable to electronic service providers are already 
in place and a draft law on data protection is pending presidential 
approval. Vietnam has a variety of specific regulations in place but no 
crosscutting data protection law. Cambodia, Brunei, Lao PDR and 
Myanmar lack publicly announced plans to introduce comprehensive 
data protection frameworks.
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The ease of transmitting data across borders is central to the growth of 
cross-border business models. At the transactional level, data underpin 
the flow of goods and services within countries around the region and 
between Southeast Asia and its major trading partners. Effective use of 
data is also a necessary condition for the adoption of cloud technologies 
that can reduce upfront capital costs and boost productivity (Meltzer and 
Lovelock 2018). Cross-border data flows generate more economic value 
than traditional flows of traded goods, according to some estimates. These 
flows accounted for US$2.8 trillion of global GDP in 2014 and have the 
potential to reach US$11 trillion by 2025 (Manyika and Chui 2015).8 
Indeed, the ability to move data rapidly and globally is the new growth 
engine for many businesses. 
The region has seen a push by some governments to restrict cross-border 
data flows, especially of sensitive personal data. The regulatory regimes 
in Indonesia and Vietnam include data localisation requirements under 
which businesses are obliged to ensure that various forms of data are 
processed and stored on servers/facilities physically located within national 
borders or that at least a copy of the data are available locally and accessible 
for law enforcement purposes (‘data mirroring’). The arguments for such 
regulations include enhancing national security, protecting personal 
privacy, aiding law enforcement and preventing foreign surveillance, in 
addition to appeals to the principle of sovereignty. But governments have 
also imposed restrictions to support domestic technology sectors or to 
promote the construction of in-country data centres and the creation of 
highly skilled technical jobs (FTI Consulting 2017). Such restrictions 
have economic and trade costs and, according to the European Centre 
for International Political Economy, may reduce GDP by 0.5 per cent 
in Indonesia, 0.4 per cent in South Korea and 1.7 per cent in Vietnam 
(Bauer et al. 2014).
Blanket data localisation restrictions can have widespread impacts beyond 
the digital economy because of the increasingly central importance of 
data to economic activity—for example, the use of data to monitor the 
efficiency of production processes or the performance of engineering 
parts to identify needs for maintenance or replacement. Moreover, many 
services critical for increasing productivity (including for SMEs)—for 
example, research and development services provided from a subsidiary 
8  There is no consensus on estimates of the value and impact of data flows and gathering such data 
is highly challenging.
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to a domestic manufacturing firm, design services for an engineering 
company or marketing for an agricultural producer—are accessed through 
cross-border data transfers. 
Data localisation regulations should be designed to reduce risk—whether 
to privacy, from cyberattack or from delays due to law enforcement—to 
an acceptable level relative to the economic and social benefits, including 
innovation, expected from the use of the data.9 In most cases, legitimate 
regulatory goals can be achieved at lower costs to growth and trade than 
those involved in blanket requirements on data localisation. For example, 
in most countries, only certain types of data are required to be held on 
local servers (for example, data of national security importance), rather 
than mandating a blanket requirement. Such approaches should avoid 
excessive regulatory complexity—for example, by introducing multiple 
categories of data that are not clearly defined—or relying on imprecise 
provisions. 
The negative impacts of regulations that impede data flows often go 
unobserved, as many governments do not have the capacity to adequately 
measure the contributions of data to the digital economy. Governments 
could improve their measurement of the effects of cross-border data flows 
and thus the impact of data localisation requirements by increasing the 
sample sizes used when measuring trade in services and collecting data 
more often and at a more granular level. They could also collect more 
detailed and specific data on cross-border data flows and develop better 
measures to capture how the digital economy contributes to GDP, job 
growth and productivity. ASEAN could support measurement and data 
collection by developing a standard nomenclature for terms, standard 
metrics and indicators related to the digital economy. 
A key challenge is finding ways for data to flow freely between countries 
in the region with different regulatory approaches to privacy. There 
are ongoing efforts to facilitate data flows through self-regulatory 
instruments—notably, through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system, which enables 
personal data to flow freely even in the absence of two governments having 
recognised the other’s privacy laws as equivalent. Instead, APEC relies on 
businesses to ensure that data sent to third parties, either domestically or 
abroad, continue to be protected consistent with APEC privacy principles. 
9  This principle has been adopted by the OECD (OECD Secretariat 2015: Principle 5).
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The APEC CBPR regime also requires accountability agents accredited by 
their local government to monitor and hold businesses accountable for 
privacy breaches.10 To date, in Asia, only Japan has effectively joined the 
scheme, but it will soon be operational in Singapore and South Korea 
once their governments appoint accountability agents. The Philippines 
and Vietnam have expressed an interest in joining the scheme. 
Another, complementary approach is to work towards the convergence 
of data privacy laws across countries. Some Southeast Asian jurisdictions 
have effectively implemented the high-level principles and concepts 
embedded in various international legal instruments, frameworks or 
guidelines into their national legal systems, including the OECD Privacy 
Principles, EU Directive 95/46/EC (now the General Data Protection 
Regulation, or GDPR), the APEC Privacy Framework and the ASEAN 
Data Protection Framework. However, divergence has increased as 
jurisdictions have prescribed more and more detailed requirements to 
ensure enforcement and compliance (Hogan Lovells 2018:  4). Local or 
regional actions seeking to promote the convergence of existing data 
protection laws should be encouraged.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity threats have wideranging implications for commercial 
activities and personal privacy and have triggered a range of regulatory 
responses. Cybersecurity is a function of multiple elements—technical, 
financial, physical and human resources.
Countries in the region have to date underinvested in the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
infrastructure of cybersecurity. In 2017, expenditure on cybersecurity 
ranged from 0.22 per cent of GDP in Singapore (the third highest globally) 
to 0.02 per cent in Indonesia. Overall, ASEAN member countries spent 
about 0.07 per cent of GDP on cybersecurity—below the global spending 
average of 0.13 per cent (AT Kearney 2018). According to an assessment 
by AT Kearney, ASEAN member countries need to increase spending on 
cybersecurity to between 0.35 per cent and 0.61 per cent of collective 
GDP—or about US$171 billion—between 2017 and 2025.
10  Trustarc and JIPDEC have been recognised as accountability agents in the United States and 
Japan, respectively. 
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Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and, more recently, 
Indonesia have established national cybersecurity strategies and agencies 
to coordinate cybersecurity agendas, but specific governance mechanisms 
and policies are still underdeveloped. One major contributing factor is the 
global and regional shortage of skills in these areas.
To address current and emerging threats, Southeast Asian governments 
will need to accelerate the development of national cybersecurity strategies 
with a well-defined vision, scope, objectives and a practical roadmap for 
implementation. An approach based on the identification, analysis and 
evaluation of risk will be crucial. 
A regional governance framework to address cybersecurity is also yet 
to be established. The focus to date has been on including cybercrime 
in existing frameworks, particularly ASEAN mechanisms. ASEAN is 
working on a more coordinated approach to develop a comprehensive 
cybersecurity framework that establishes regional cybersecurity standards 
and encourages intelligence sharing. 
Consumer protection
Complementing e-commerce and e-transaction laws, consumer protection 
laws and regulations are essential for building an ecosystem of trust and 
confidence in electronic transactions. Concerns about potentially greater 
consumer vulnerabilities through the rise of the digital economy have 
driven a growing focus on consumer protection related to e-commerce 
and other aspects of the digital economy. For example, online consumer 
protection has featured in several ASEAN initiatives and is also a theme 
in Indonesia’s E-Commerce Roadmap (2017). 
Consumer concerns about trust and reliability in e-commerce appear 
to be a barrier to further growth. The overall lack of trust in online 
transactions is demonstrated by the fact that, despite an increase in the use 
of some digital payments—for example, in Thailand and Malaysia—cash 
on delivery remains the preferred payment mode in emerging Southeast 
Asian markets, as noted in the section above. 
The main effort at the regional level to address these issues is the ASEAN 
Strategic Action Plan for Consumer Protection 2025, the implementation 
of which has focused on information-sharing between regulators, although 
there are also more ambitious goals, such as creating a cross-border redress 
system and a rapid alert system on product safety. However,  ASEAN’s 
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initiatives can only advance as far and as quickly as the members themselves 
can enforce laws and regulations that protect transactions both online and 
offline, and not all countries have consumer protection laws in place. 
Digital entrepreneurship
Many governments in Southeast Asia are considering options to improve 
the ‘digital entrepreneurship ecosystem’ through strengthening the wider 
business environment and facilitating access to staff with skills appropriate 
for the digital economy. In addition, governments are increasingly 
interested in issues specific to digital startups, including access to finance 
for entrepreneurs, awareness-raising of the potential of the digital economy 
or targeted financial or other support to help firms grow.
Support to strengthen the foundations of the digital economy, along 
with the wider business environment, must be balanced with providing 
targeted support for digital startups. For example, a recent World Bank 
report on Malaysia’s digital economy (Record et al. 2018) recommends 
the government shift its role from providing a wide range of support 
programs for entrepreneurship to addressing structural reforms, especially 
to supply-side factors like access to skills and finance, while avoiding 
crowding out private investment, channelling government funds into 
ineffective programs or putting burdensome regulations in place.
Digital government11 and digital identification
The provision of online services to citizens and businesses, typically via 
a digital government ‘platform’ or portal (such as www.gov.sg in Singapore 
or www.malaysia.gov.my in Malaysia), can boost the growth of the digital 
economy. Developing online business registration platforms and shifting 
from paper-based to online systems for government approval of cross-
border trade shipments can encourage firms to adopt digital technologies. 
The provision of digital services can help raise digital awareness and 
literacy. And the digitisation of government payments can increase 
financial inclusion. For example, 14 per cent of bank account holders in 
Thailand opened their account to enable receipt of a government transfer. 
There is considerable potential for increasing financial inclusion through 
11  There are numerous definitions of this concept. The term ‘e-government’ is used to refer to the 
use of information and communication technologies, specifically the internet, to deliver services to 
individuals and businesses. The term ‘digital government’ is used more holistically to refer to ‘the use 
of digital technologies, as an integrated part of governments’ modernisation strategies, to create public 
value’ (OECD 2014). 
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digitising government payments. For example, in the Philippines, six 
million unbanked people receive government payments in cash, even 
though 58 per cent of them own a mobile phone (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
2018). The adoption of government-issued digital IDs can boost financial 
inclusion by helping to meet ‘know your customer’ and other regulatory 
requirements. 
Digital ID systems are widely recognised as key enablers for the development 
of digital government, e-commerce and the digital economy (World Bank 
2016b: 194–97). Digital ID systems facilitate reliable authentication of 
a person’s identity on demand and bind users of online transactions with 
their ‘real world’ or legal identities. E-commerce and the IoT have also 
created a need for verifiable digital identities for legal entities and devices. 
Interoperability of digital IDs across borders can accelerate economic 
integration and create opportunities for new markets. 
Digital identity is a foundational platform with 
potential for impact across a wide range of sectors
Healthcare
Digital identity system
• UHC registry 
• Unique patient IDs
Financial inclusion
• Removing KYC barriers
• Payments interoperability









• Using the ID to travel
• Streamlining visas
Digital economy
• Doing transactions online
• Trusted cross-border 
e-commerce
Figure 4.8 Digital IDs in the digital economy ecosystem
KYC = know your customer
EMIS = educational management information system
UHC = universal health coverage
Source: Prepared by the Identification for Development (ID4D) team at the World Bank 
presentation in 2019 .
Digital ID is also associated with advancing a range of other development 
outcomes, including comprehensive social safety nets, streamlined public 
administration, financial inclusion and the empowerment of women. 
Five ASEAN member states—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand—have fully digitised their foundational ID system and 
have established an associated public key infrastructure. The foundational 
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ID is widely used in public and private-sector face-to-face transactions, 
including ubiquitous use of the unique identification number. All these 
systems, except for Singapore’s, use smartcards with data such as private 
keys and biometrics stored on the chip. Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam 
are currently piloting digitised foundational ID systems. Myanmar has 
listed the development of a digital ID system as one of 12 priorities in its 
national economic policy.12
Towards a regional digital economy?
Almost all governments in Southeast Asia have developed national 
strategies or high-level plans, endorsed at the head of government or 
a similar level, for growing the digital economy, but implementation 
remains a challenge. A robust assessment of where the market is adjusting 
well to digital transformation would help determine where government 
intervention would be most useful and where it is not required. Such 
a targeted approach to intervention would be less challenging to implement 
and would help establish a logical sequence for the implementation of 
various initiatives. Furthermore, more effective consultation and feedback 
mechanisms are required for policymakers to gain the perspectives of 
private-sector firms at every stage of national digital economy strategies—
from conception to implementation and monitoring. Government 
strategies on the digital economy will need to include implementation 
plans with concrete targets, timelines and institutional coordination to 
ensure delivery and accountability.
Given a range of potentially important cross-country dimensions of the 
digital economy, regional cooperation—for example, through ASEAN—
could be leveraged to strengthen the enabling environment for the 
growth of the digital economy in individual Southeast Asian countries 
as well as to facilitate deeper integration between national economies. 
Digital platforms—for example, for e-commerce, transport and financial 
services—are increasingly transnational. Greater regional cooperation 
12  ‘Foundational ID system’ is an ID system used for general purposes (for example, national IDs 
and birth certificates) as the root of someone’s identity. By comparison, a functional ID system is 
intended for a specific purpose—for example, a passport is for travel, a driver’s licence is for permission 
to drive. Public key infrastructure is widely known in digital ID and ICT circles. Essentially, it is a 
technology for authenticating people or things by using cryptography to match a private key (a digital 
certificate held by a user) and a public key (held by an authority). A unique ID number (for example, 
a national ID number) is one type of credential issued by a foundational ID system. Other examples 
include a card or a username (World Bank 2021a). 
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could help address many of the issues identified in this chapter, including 
data privacy (to improve the coherence of legal frameworks), cybersecurity 
(to prevent and respond to threats) and consumer protection (to improve 
cross-border appeal and redress mechanisms), among others. Identifying 
concrete measures that can be taken in these areas is an important area for 
future analysis and policy cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN could encourage its members to develop the necessary 
infrastructure for information and communication technology (ICT) 
development, reduce barriers to participation in digital markets and 
harmonise regulations. Supporting development of the digital economy 
will also strengthen ASEAN’s overall objective of promoting regional 
economic integration. ASEAN has adopted initiatives to support the 
growth of the digital economy, including the first and second ASEAN ICT 
masterplans (AIM2015 and AIM2020) and the Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity 2025, while high-level ASEAN agreements—notably, the 
2015 and 2025 economic blueprints—demonstrate a broadening of the 
vision for the digital economy in the region. 
However, there is scope to go further in cooperation on the digital 
economy at the ASEAN level, especially in terms of detailed actions, 
timelines and targets. There are no monitoring or ranking mechanisms 
to evaluate progress at the national or regional level in developing critical 
enablers, such as the impact of privacy laws, data protection or incentives 
to support universal broadband access, mobile financial services, 
e-commerce and other key areas of the digital economy. Though the 
current approach recognises the importance of regulatory harmonisation, 
it offers no concrete principles for how regulations need to be extended 
and harmonised to create a single digital market, including by taking 
interim steps such as developing a common standard that applies to 
digital services, like the European Union’s privacy directive or the 
streamlined sales tax system in the United States for interstate e-commerce 
transactions. Clearer links could be drawn between digital economy efforts 
and longstanding ASEAN priorities in areas such as trade facilitation. The 
ASEAN E-commerce Consultative Committee offers a forum to pursue 
this. ASEAN is currently developing a digital data governance framework 
for consideration by member states. 
APEC has made more rapid progress than ASEAN in developing specific, 
in-depth guidelines, principles and capacity-building programs to facilitate 
the adoption of digital economy principles—namely, in key areas such 
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as data privacy, cybersecurity, electronic trade, digital infrastructure and 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprise development. ASEAN could 
learn from this experience in developing a common, unified approach to 
issues like data privacy. 
Conclusion
The digital economy is widely seen as presenting significant opportunities 
to propel future growth in Southeast Asia. The region already has rapidly 
rising internet usage, although business, and indeed government, use of 
digital technology remains below its potential. 
A concerted effort by the region’s governments, both individually and 
collectively, to strengthen the foundations of the digital economy 
could address five key areas: connectivity, digital payments, digital 
skills, logistics, and crosscutting digital policies and regulations. Some 
regulatory gaps need to be filled (such as on consumer protection and 
data privacy) and some regulations could be adjusted to more effectively 
achieve policy goals (such as on cross-border data localisation). In some 
areas, governments should step back and allow the private sector to 
innovate and invest in digitisation. The development and implementation 
of national and regional digital economy plans could be improved by 
shifting from high-level planning to strengthened implementation and 
coordination across governments, by fostering greater private-sector 
participation in planning, implementation and monitoring of plans, and 
pursuing concrete initiatives to address policy and regulatory blockages. 
Beyond setting the overall policy and regulatory framework for the digital 
economy, governments have a direct role to play, including through 
supporting digital entrepreneurship and other digital initiatives. 
Governments, businesses and citizens alike are increasingly concerned 
about various risks associated with digitisation, some of which—like 
inadequate protection of personal data and cybersecurity threats—are 
directly linked to the technologies associated with the digital economy. 
Others relate to the new types of business models developing in the digital 
economy—for example, the challenges to the protection of consumer 
rights when buyers and sellers are physically separated and, increasingly, 
in different countries. Similarly, the slow pace of consumer adoption of 
digital payments is in part due to perceived risks and lack of trust in 
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new payment systems. While thinking about potential responses to these 
challenges has begun, further analysis at the country level is required on 
these risks and the appropriate responses. 
Other risks are longer term, with the nature of the risk and the appropriate 
responses less well defined. For example, automation is widely perceived 
as presenting risks to workers, although concrete evidence of this in 
Southeast Asia is limited. Further analysis is required to understand how 
skills demands and jobs change as the digital economy grows and what 
the implications are for national education systems, training and skills 
upgrading initiatives and national social protection schemes.13 Growing 
concerns about the risks presented by using the internet to spread 
misinformation could lead to responses that restrict the medium’s potential 
as a means of open exchange of ideas and information. The discussion on 
data flows and cybersecurity highlighted that heavy restrictions on the use 
of the internet—for example, through data localisation requirements—are 
not necessary to protect citizens’ interests and would impair the growth of 
the digital economy. 
Finally, digitisation offers various ways to boost inclusiveness. The rapidly 
decreasing cost of broadband (especially mobile broadband) is helping 
more people access information and connect to economic opportunities. 
For example, e-commerce platforms are bringing new entrepreneurs into 
international trade. At the same time, there are still significant disparities 
in the cost and quality of internet access—most visible between central 
and more remote regions of large, geographically dispersed countries 
like Indonesia, but also between urban and rural areas of countries like 
Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia. Similarly, the wide discrepancies in 
quality and affordability of internet access between countries also needs 
to be addressed to boost the inclusiveness of the digital economy in the 
region. While the digital economy can help create new opportunities 
to overcome barriers in the offline economy, those who lack adequate 
connectivity or the skills to participate risk being left behind.
13  Another area for future analysis is the issue of digital economy taxation. Governments in 
Southeast Asia are becoming concerned that e-commerce could be eroding the tax base and creating 
disadvantages for locally based firms. As policy responses in the region are evolving, this chapter does 
not address this topic in detail. 
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Table 4.5 Policy priorities summary for developing Southeast 
Asian countries











private investment in 
broadband
Allow greater 














Payments Facilitate innovation in 
digital payments 
Promote use (for 
example, payments for 
government services) 




Skills Continue upgrading 
basic education, 
including a focus on 
building digital skills at 
the primary school level
Integrate digital skills 
development across 
the curriculum including 
technical as well as 
‘soft’ skills . Implement 
approaches for lifelong 








Targeted digital skills 
training, especially for 




to identify future skills 
needs and meet short-
term gaps
Logistics Issue clear regulations 
for small-parcel trade









barriers to entry in 
logistics
Enable innovation 
in digitised logistics 
services
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Data policies Ensure legal regime 
exists for data privacy 
and protection
Build regulatory 
capacity and raise 





Caution on introducing 
data localisation
Roll back blanket data 
localisation policies 





Cybersecurity Ensure laws cover 
cybercrime and build 
enforcement capacity
Boost public and 













Establish legal regime 
for consumer protection
Strengthen regulatory 











support for skills 
upgrading and 
technology adoption 
as overall digital 
foundations are 
strengthened
Ensure coordination of 
SME support programs 







Digital ID Consolidate 
implementation of digital 
IDs















actions and institutional 
responsibilities to 
implement and monitor 
digital economy 
strategies or master 
plans
Regional vision for 
open, integrated 
digital economy
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Connecting locals to locals: 
Market discovery through 
e-commerce
Voraprapa Nakavachara and Santitarn Sathirathai
Introduction
The digital economy, once a fringe market, has experienced remarkable 
growth globally. Technological advancements and the increasing ubiquity 
of affordable internet and internet-enabled devices have led to a spate 
of industries being disrupted and digitised. Though its introduction in 
Southeast Asia occurred far later than in the West, the digital economy 
throughout the region has seen a massive leap in growth. A report by 
Google and Temasek (2018) estimates that the internet economy within 
ASEAN+6 (defined as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam) more than doubled, from US$32 billion in 2015 
to US$72 billion in 2018. One of the digital economy’s most successful 
constituents, accounting for roughly 31 per cent of ASEAN+6’s digital 
economy in 2018, is e-commerce, which refers to the activity of transacting 
goods and services over the internet.
Despite the unprecedented proliferation of e-commerce, there has been 
little detailed academic research on it within the region. While there 
is some literature on e-commerce’s effects on buyers, there has been 
little attention given to the sellers on these platforms in ASEAN. This 
chapter therefore aims to contribute to the literature by examining the 
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e-commerce industry in Thailand through the perspective of its impact 
on online sellers. More specifically, the objective of the chapter is to assess 
the effects of e-commerce on the broader economy through changes in 
firm-level efficiency and market connectivity. In particular, we explore 
the impact of e-commerce adoption on the sellers’ geographical reach, 
business revenue, profit growth and, ultimately, household income. 
We chose to focus on Thailand for a number of reasons. First, Thailand 
has a burgeoning e-commerce industry that is rapidly growing. This is 
partly due to a large number of aspiring entrepreneurs and social sellers.1 
Second, Thailand has an ideal composition of traditional, brick-and-
mortar small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and ‘pure’ online 
sellers (defined as sellers with no offline stores). Third, the government is 
pushing for the development of the digital economy, especially for SMEs, 
under the ‘Thailand 4.0’ plan. 
One problem that is common to much of the previous literature on 
e-commerce sellers is sourcing data. A combination of limited access to 
sellers and low response rates results in relatively small sample sizes. These 
sample sizes were often not large enough for researchers to extensively 
analyse and address their research questions. To overcome this problem, we 
have worked closely with Sea Group and its e-commerce platform, Shopee, 
to construct a dataset from a novel and large-scale survey of sellers on 
Shopee. The benefit of collaborating with Shopee is that not only is it one 
of the largest e-commerce platforms in Southeast Asia, but also it has one 
of the most diverse seller communities. Sellers on Shopee range from pure 
online microentrepreneurs to traditional SMEs and larger companies, and 
cover various product categories. With the help of the Shopee team, we 
were able to get close to 7,000 merchant responses—enough to construct 
a sizeable microdataset for in-depth and unique analyses. The richness of 
the data also allows for connectivity analysis using mapping visualisations 
as well as regression analyses on various subsamples.
1  Social sellers are online sellers who participate in social commerce. Social commerce can refer 
to transactions on social media platforms (for example, Facebook, Instagram), sellers promoting 
products and sales through social media but transacting on an e-commerce platform or using social 
networking services (for example, live chat, live stream) native to the e-commerce platform before 
completing the transaction on the said platform. For disambiguation, we will henceforth refer to the 
first case as social commerce and the latter two as socially enabled e-commerce.
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Utilising the constructed dataset, this chapter finds that e-commerce 
adoption is associated with improvement in sellers’ household incomes. 
The benefits come from two channels. First, e-commerce empowers 
existing SMEs by significantly boosting their revenue, efficiency and 
profit growth. The improvement in profitability goes beyond a one-off 
gain as moving online seems to also result in stronger profit growth rates. 
Second, our trade connectivity analysis illustrates how e-commerce allows 
merchants, especially those in poorer regions, to discover new market 
opportunities outside their own region.
Due to data limitations, we were only able to analyse the sellers who 
eventually engaged in e-commerce. We were not able to examine the 
traditional sellers that had not yet gone online and compare the results. 
We note this as a limitation of our current study and encourage future 
research to revisit this issue once the required data are available. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides an overview 
of the e-commerce landscape within the region and in Thailand. Section 
three provides a brief literature review, while section four outlines the 
survey methodology and data. Section five begins the main empirical 
investigation and explores the economic impact of e-commerce using 
regression analysis, by looking at the impact on sellers’ revenue, profit 
growth and efficiency (proxied by revenue per employment). Section six 
delves into the impact of e-commerce on seller connectivity, by way of 
market discovery, through the use of connectivity diagrams. Section seven 
discusses this chapter’s overall findings and is followed by conclusions, 
policy implications and recommendations.
E-commerce landscape
E-commerce is defined as ‘the activity of transacting goods and services 
over the internet’. The most common forms of e-commerce are business-
to-consumer (B2C), consumer-to-consumer (C2C), consumer-to-business 
(C2B) and business-to-business (B2B) (UNESCAP and ADB 2018). 
This chapter will focus on B2C and C2C due to data availability. B2C is 
where businesses sell to consumers and more naturally lends itself to 
electronic retailing (e-tailing) and marketplace e-commerce. On the 
other hand, C2C is where users (consumers) of an e-commerce platform 
can be the buyer, seller or both, and is most commonly done through 
marketplace e-commerce or social commerce.
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E-commerce in Southeast Asia
E-commerce has seen unprecedented growth within the region, with 
total gross merchandise value (GMV) of B2C and C2C estimated to 
have more than doubled in a single year, from US$11 billion in 2017 
to US$23 billion in 2018, and it is projected to grow to US$102 billion 
by 2025 (Google and Temasek 2018). However, despite its current 
scale, e-commerce in Southeast Asia still lags far behind more mature 
e-commerce markets. According to Sathirathai and Wan (2018), in 2017, 
e-commerce penetration within the region averaged approximately 2 per 
cent of the population, which is far below both China and the United 
States, at roughly 23 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively. In context, 
e-commerce penetration of 2 per cent would put ASEAN+6 where China 
was in 2010—roughly seven years behind. This number only serves to 
highlight the nascence of the industry and, despite an already impressive 
compound annual growth rate of 39 per cent from 2015 to 2018, the 
industry is expected to grow even further.
It is important to note, however, that ASEAN+6 has characteristics unique 
to the region that have led to the evolution of business models different 
from those in other regions. The recent development of low-cost entry-
level smartphones has led to a population that accesses the internet with 
a mobile phone first and, in most cases, a mobile only. Data from Google’s 
Consumer Barometer (Think with Google 2017) reveal that smartphone 
ownership is at 74 per cent in the region, while only 40 per cent of people 
use a computer. In addition, 63 per cent of respondents claim they access 
the internet more often via smartphone than via computer or tablet. 
This trend is also reflected in mobile e-commerce penetration, for which 
around 68 per cent of internet users in ASEAN+6 have made a purchase 
online via mobile in the past month, while China and the United States 
have penetration rates of 74 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively 
(Kemp 2019b).
Lack of offline retail in ASEAN+6 and low urbanisation rates have 
supported the growth of C2C marketplaces. This form of e-commerce 
is made up almost entirely of independent sellers, the majority of which 
are SMEs. In Indonesia, McKinsey & Company (2018) estimates that, of 
the 4.5 million active sellers in 2017, 99 per cent were microenterprises. 
Furthermore, they estimate that 15 per cent of all sellers are selling their 
own products. The region is also highly social media–centric, resulting in 
the popularity of both social commerce and socially enabled e-commerce. 
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For example, McKinsey & Company (2018) estimates that more than 
37 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce value is generated through social 
commerce, with roughly one-third of all online shoppers being purely 
social commerce users.
E-commerce in Thailand
Thailand had an estimated e-commerce GMV of US$3 billion in 
2018, which was roughly 13 per cent of the region’s total. Many of the 
drivers of the prosperity of e-commerce in the region can be found in 
Thailand. On  top of already favourable demographics, a report by Sea 
and the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2018) finds that Thailand has 
the greatest propensity for entrepreneurship within Southeast Asia, with 
36 per cent of youths aspiring to be entrepreneurs in the future, compared 
with a  regional average of 25 per cent. Additionally, Thailand boasts a 
social media–centric population that is largely mobile-first. It is estimated 
that approximately 51 per cent of consumers buy goods through social 
media and the value of social commerce is roughly half of the total 
e-commerce market. 
In terms of connectivity drivers, Thailand completed its Village 
Broadband Internet Project (Net Pracharat) in 2017. The government 
installed and provided free broadband internet to 24,700 rural villages 
throughout the country. In 2018, Thailand’s internet penetration rate was 
82 per  cent (Kemp 2019a), which grew significantly from 27 per cent 
in 2011 (Kemp 2011). The country’s average fixed internet connection 
speed is 57.6 megabits per second (Mbps)—higher than the world average 
of 54.3  Mbps. Thailand’s mobile broadband connectivity (broadband 
mobile connections per capita) is 133 per cent, which is higher than the 
global average of 74 per cent.
Thailand also has unique online consumer behaviour. Banking penetration 
is relatively high in Thailand at 81 per cent of the population aged above 
15 years, compared with a regional average of 55 per cent (World Bank 
2017). While bank transfers are the most popular form of online payment, 
constituting 28 per cent of all online payments, cash on delivery remains 
highly preferred, at 20 per cent (Worldpay 2018). A survey conducted 
by ecommerceIQ (2018) finds the top two things Thai online shoppers 
value most are cheap product prices and great product selection. This may 
reflect the fact that more than half of online shoppers are outside Bangkok 
and may be more sensitive to price and product diversity. 
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Despite its already impressive growth, the outlook for Thailand’s e-commerce 
industry is still very positive. While Thailand’s e-commerce market is 
estimated to account for less than 1 per cent of retail sales, it is expected to 
rise to 5 per cent over the next five years (Jones and Pimdee 2017). This is 
expected to be further supported by the government’s recent launch of the 
Thailand 4.0 initiative, announced in October 2018 (Royal Thai Embassy 
n.d.). The third of the five agendas outlined in the announcement of the 
initiative focuses on incubating entrepreneurs and developing ‘networks of 
innovation-driven enterprise’. One objective of the agenda is to increase 
the current contribution of SMEs from 37 per cent of total GDP to 50 per 
cent within 10 years through access to financing, skills development and 
supporting the enhancement of digital transformation. The government 
has also announced plans to develop 100 smart cities within two decades 
as part of another agenda within the Thailand 4.0 initiative, thus further 
connecting more individuals and creating a more supportive environment 
for digital ventures (Christopher 2018).
Literature review
The digital revolution has changed society in many ways. From 
a  communication standpoint, online connectivity has led to the ‘death 
of distance’ in that the physical distance between people is becoming less 
relevant and no longer constrains our ability to communicate and interact 
with one another. 
Focusing on international trade, the literature has documented that the 
value and amount of trade are inversely related to the distance between 
the locations of the parties involved in the trade transaction (Lendle 
et al. 2016). This is because the further the distance between the parties, 
the higher are the costs of communication and trade arrangements. 
With e-commerce taking off in the past decade, the costs of trade have 
dramatically reduced. In addition, e-commerce benefited the economy as 
a whole in terms of lowering trade barriers, increasing employment and 
enhancing economic development (McKinsey & Company 2018).
The literature also documents the benefits of e-commerce from both 
the sellers’ and the buyers’ perspectives. From the sellers’ point of view, 
e-commerce eliminates the cost of setting up actual physical stores, 
provides alternative means of earning and makes it easier to become an 
entrepreneur (Fan et al. 2018; Dai and Zhang 2016). From the buyers’ 
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point of view, e-commerce reduces search costs, allows access to a broader 
variety of products and makes it easier to buy things from far away 
(Dolfen et al. 2019).
Most of the recent literature on e-commerce has focused on China, as 
the country’s e-commerce sector recently experienced accelerated growth. 
Fan et al. (2018), using data from Alibaba Inc., document that e-commerce 
increases domestic trade within China. In addition, the adoption of 
e-commerce increases welfare from the sellers’ perspective. Couture et al. 
(2018) evaluated the Chinese Government’s nationwide e-commerce 
expansion program and conclude that it reduced logistical barriers and 
resulted in sizeable welfare gains. However, the young and the rich appeared 
to benefit more from the program than any other group of people. Dai 
and Zhang (2016), using firm registry data, show that e-commerce helps 
people with limited financial and social capital to become entrepreneurs. 
Huang et al. (2018) find that people residing in areas with higher levels 
of e-commerce adoption are more likely to be entrepreneurs.
Despite explosive growth in e-commerce in Southeast Asia in recent 
years, only a limited number of studies have investigated the impact 
of e-commerce in the region. Wong (2003) argues that Singapore’s 
infrastructure and its people’s readiness should allow the country to 
be a  very fast adopter of e-commerce. Rowe et al. (2012) studied the 
factors driving e-commerce adoption in Vietnam and found that, 
among others, the knowledge and resources available to enterprises and 
the positive attitude of management towards technology were the most 
important factors. McKinsey & Company (2018) explore the Indonesian 
e-commerce market and conclude that e-commerce helps increase sales 
and employment. For Thailand, Cheewatrakoolpong and Mallikamas 
(2019) study factors determining whether e-commerce sellers would 
export their products. Among others, the factors determining whether 
they would export are the number of years in operation and the types 
of products they sell.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first to utilise a relatively 
large survey (close to 7,000 observations) of e-commerce sellers in 
Thailand to analyse the impact of e-commerce on sellers’ household 
income, revenue, profitability, efficiency and connectivity. Many of the 
previous studies that tried to investigate impacts from the sellers’ side 
were unable to collect a decent-sized survey due to low response rates. We 
overcome this problem by working closely with Sea Group and Shopee, 
its e-commerce platform, to launch and collect the survey data.
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The survey and data
The data used in this chapter are from a survey we conducted with the 
assistance of Sea Group and its Shopee team. The survey was prepared 
and conducted during 2018–19. The questions were sent (via the Shopee 
platform) to Shopee sellers who sold a minimum number of items over 
a six-month period. The sellers were provided with small incentives to 
participate in the survey.2 
We would like to point out that, although we were able to launch an 
extensive survey, we were not able to build an actual panel dataset. Since 
this was a voluntary survey, we needed to find a balance between the 
information we wanted to get and the information the respondents would 
be willing to comfortably provide. Therefore, there was a limitation on the 
data we could obtain. To measure the changes associated with engaging 
in e-commerce, we asked sellers about their current situation (now they 
were online) and their previous situation (when they were not online 
or when they were just starting out). This information would allow us 
to visualise the impact—although not as accurately as if we were able to 
construct a panel dataset. Also, respondents could find some questions, 
such as those relating to profit, sensitive. Therefore, instead of asking 
about actual profits, we asked how their profits had changed after they 
engaged in e-commerce.
Survey questions
The survey questionnaire included three sets of broad questions as follows 
(see Appendix 5.1 for the full questionnaire).
Questions on basic demographics
We asked sellers for their basic demographic information such as age, 
gender, education, employment status, whether they were a primary 
earner for their household, their province of residence, and so on. 
2  Although we launched the survey in a systematic way, we were not able to control who decided 
to answer the survey. Therefore, we cannot claim that the results represent the population of Shopee 
sellers or all Thai SMEs. However, in the section titled ‘Thailand’s SMEs versus our data’, we compare 
the basic statistics in our data with those for all Thai SMEs to illustrate how they fit. 
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Questions on economic impacts of e-commerce
To measure the economic impact of e-commerce, we have to segregate the 
sellers into two groups: existing SMEs and new entrepreneurs. 
Existing SMEs are sellers with a prior offline business before going online. 
For these sellers, we asked questions about their prior offline business 
such as revenue, profit growth, the number of people employed including 
the owner, the location of the customers to whom they used to sell 
and so on. We asked when they started their online business. We then 
asked  about  their business since they moved online—information that 
included current revenue, profit growth, employment, the location 
of customers and so on. In addition, we asked them about the size of 
their online business relative to their entire business. In this chapter, we 
will call these questions ‘Set A questions’ and we will call these SMEs 
‘Group A sellers’.
New entrepreneurs are sellers with no prior offline business who are just 
starting their business purely online (a few may have subsequently set 
up an offline business). For these sellers, we asked questions about their 
current online business, including the year they started, current revenue, 
profit growth, employment, the location of their customers and so on. 
In this chapter, we will call these questions ‘Set B questions’ and these 
entrepreneurs ‘Group B sellers’.
For both groups, we also asked whether entering into e-commerce (that is, 
selling online) had changed their household income. The response 
choices were: ‘Decreased significantly’, ‘Decreased somewhat’, ‘Not much 
impact’, ‘Increased somewhat’ and ‘Increased significantly’.
Other miscellaneous questions
We are also interested in why the sellers decided to enter into e-commerce, 
so we asked them about the factors that motivated them to do so. Among 
the responses are ‘External pressure (others are doing it)’, ‘Flexibility and 
better work–life balance’ and ‘Financial security’. We also asked questions 
about how they intended to spend the profits earned.
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Thailand’s SMEs versus our data
To discuss how our data fit with those for all of Thailand’s SMEs, we first 
discuss the overall summary statistics of Thailand’s SMEs as provided by 
the Office of Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion (OSMEP). The 
aggregate data for Thailand’s small enterprises (SEs), medium enterprises 
and SMEs in 2018 are shown in Table 5.1 (left panel).3 We separate the 
statistics for all enterprises and for enterprises in the wholesale and retail 
sector.4 According to the enterprise promotion office, there are 3,077,822 
SMEs in the Thai economy (1,279,557 of which are in the wholesale and 
retail sector). Only 23.03 per cent of the SMEs are registered as juristic 
entities. Thailand’s SMEs accounted for THB7,013,971 in GDP and 
employed 13,950,241 people. The imputed average monthly sales are 
THB189,906 and the imputed average employment is 4.53 people.
Most of the SMEs (99.5 per cent) are actually small enterprises. Their 
imputed average monthly sales are THB136,302 and their imputed 
average employment is 4.14 people. Of the 3,063,651 small enterprises, 
1,275,470 are in the wholesale and retail sector. Their imputed average 
monthly sales are THB122,749 and their imputed average employment 
is 3.33 people.
According to a ministerial regulation issued by Thailand’s Ministry of 
Industry in 2002, SMEs in the retail sector are defined as enterprises 
with up to 30 employees or with assets (excluding land) of up to THB60 
million. In our survey data, we have the information on employment 
but not on assets. Therefore, we applied this employment threshold 
to eliminate  sellers who are not SMEs. We were able to gather 6,860 
observations from the survey. Among them, 2,049 observations 
(29.9 per cent) belong to Group A and 4,811 observations (70.1 per cent) 
belong to Group B.5
3  Note that we were only able to gather the annual GDP and total employment. Therefore, 
we had to impute the estimated monthly sales (GDP/12/Number of enterprises) and the average 
employment (Total employment/Number of enterprises).
4  We were not able to segregate the retail sector from the wholesale sector.
5  We were able to collect the initial sample of 7,226 observations; however, we dropped those 
observations missing important information like gender and age. We also dropped observations that 
were extreme outliers (possibly due to input errors)—for example, negative age, negative revenue, 
negative employment and extremely high revenue growth (more than 10,000 per cent). Finally, we 
kept only the observations that were between the ages of 10 and 70. We also excluded observations 
that were not SMEs by definition. After the cleaning process, we had 6,860 observations.
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The basic summary statistics of our data are shown in Table 5.1 (right 
panel). Overall, average monthly sales are THB58,073 and average 
employment is 2.04 people. These statistics are lower than those for the 
total of Thai SMEs. However, looking at Group A and Group B separately, 
we find that Group A’s statistics are comparable with those of Thailand’s 
small enterprises in the wholesale and retail sector. Group A’s average 
sales are THB123,147 and average employment is 2.86 people, whereas 
imputed average sales of Thailand’s small enterprises in the wholesale and 
retail sector are THB122,749 and imputed average employment is 3.33. 
On the other hand, Group B’s average sales of THB30,298 and average 
employment of 1.69 are far below those of Thailand’s total SMEs. They 
are also lower than the average of Thailand’s small enterprises. 
Summary statistics of the sellers
Table 5.2 provides the detailed summary statistics of the sellers in our 
data. For the overall sample, the average age is 32.46 years. About 
27.9 per cent of the survey respondents are male and about 45.3 per cent 
are the primary earner for their household. The majority (68.3 per cent) 
have a bachelor’s degree as their highest education level. Also, the majority 
(43.4 per cent) are employed by organisations.
Table 5.2 Summary statistics
Variables All Group A Group B
No . of observations 6,860 2,049 4,811
Age Average (years) 32 .46 34 .16 31 .74
Male (%) 27 .9 35 .7 24 .5
Primary earner (%) 45 .3 52 .0 42 .5
Education Below high school (%) 2 .5 2 .5 2 .5
High school (%) 7 .0 6 .0 7 .5
Vocational (%) 4 .9 5 .1 4 .8
Bachelor (%) 68 .3 68 .1 68 .3
Advanced degree (%) 17 .3 18 .3 16 .8
Employment Employed full-time (%) 41 .6 25 .1 48 .7
Employed part-time (%) 1 .8 1 .9 1 .8
Not employed: Homemaker (%) 7 .0 4 .3 8 .2
Not employed: Retired (%) 0 .5 0 .2 0 .6
Not employed: Student (%) 7 .9 3 .4 9 .8
Other (%) 3 .9 3 .8 3 .9
Self-employed (%) 31 .7 58 .5 20 .2
Unemployed (%) 5 .7 2 .8 6 .9
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As mentioned above, we segregated our respondents into existing 
SMEs (Group A) and new entrepreneurs (Group B); therefore, we also 
computed the summary statistics for each of the groups separately. The 
average age of Group A is 34.16 and the average age of Group B is 
31.74 years; 35.7 per cent of Group A and 24.5 per cent of Group B are 
male. Approximately 52 per cent of Group A and 42.5 per cent of Group 
B are the primary earner in their household. We conducted T-tests (of the 
difference in means) and can conclude that Group A is older than Group 
B, Group A has more men than Group B and Group A has more primary 
earners than Group B.6 The majority of both groups (68.1 per cent of 
Group A and 68.3 per cent of Group B) have a bachelor’s degree as their 
highest level of education; Group A appears to be mostly self-employed 
(58.5 per cent) whereas Group B appears to be mostly employed by an 
organisation (50.5 per cent).
Economic impact analysis
In this section, we explore the potential economic impact of going online 
for individual sellers. We start by examining the impact on household 
income of e-commerce adoption. One of the survey questions we 
asked was how entering into e-commerce business (that is, starting to 
sell online) had changed each seller’s household income; Table 5.3 
summarises the responses.7 Overall, entering into e-commerce appears to 
have had a positive impact on household income for most sellers—in 
particular, 72 per cent reported that their household income increased 
due to e-commerce, with 16.3 per cent of respondents reporting a 
‘significant’ increase. Looking at Group A (existing SMEs) and Group B 
(new entrepreneurs) separately, the  former saw a higher proportion of 
households reporting income gains due to e-commerce. Among Group A, 
82.4 per cent of households indicated income gains, with 22.8 per cent 
seeing a significant increase, while for Group B the numbers were 67.5 per 
cent and 13.5 per cent, respectively. 
6  Specifically, the T-statistics are 11.906, 9.107 and 7.244 for the difference in the means of age, 
male (dummy) and primary earner (dummy), respectively.
7  See Appendix 5.1, Question 18 (for Set A) and Question 16 (for Set B). 
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Table 5.3 Change in household income after entering e-commerce
Answer All Group A Group B
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Decreased significantly 18 0 .3 18 0 .9 0 0 .0
Decreased somewhat 137 2 .0 33 1 .6 104 2 .2
Not much impact 1,755 25 .8 308 15 .1 1,447 30 .3
Increased somewhat 3,793 55 .7 1,212 59 .6 2,581 54 .0
Increased significantly 1,110 16 .3 464 22 .8 646 13 .5
Total 6,813 100.1 2,035 100.0 4,778 100.0
Next, we explore the mechanisms through which e-commerce adoption 
could contribute to higher household income for merchants. For existing 
SMEs, the key mechanism is likely to be improvement in profitability 
coming from rising sales and higher efficiency—that is, generating more 
revenue without ballooning costs. For new entrepreneurs, online channels 
may help provide additional income. We employ different empirical 
investigation methods to examine each group below. 
Economic analysis for existing SMEs (Group A)
Recalling that Group A sellers had an offline business before moving 
online, we were able to collect data related to their business performance 
before and after they went online. The dependent variable of interest for 
Group A sellers is the change in their performance measures. Specifically, 
we will first explore the economic impact on sellers via increased revenue 
and profit growth. Then we explore how entering into e-commerce helped 
improve their business efficiency (as proxied by revenue per employment).
The empirical model used for the analysis is Equation 5.1.
Equation 5.1
∆yi = α + β ∙ xi + θp + γc + εi
In Equation 5.1, ∆yi represents changes in the dependent variables of 
seller I, which are: 1) percentage change in revenue before versus after the 
seller went online, 2) change in profit growth before versus after the seller 
went online and 3) change in efficiency (change in revenue per employee 
before versus after the seller went online). Note that, for profits, we can 
only compare change in the growth rates—that is, acceleration—and not 
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the level of profit due to the nature of the survey questions. This means 
the measure will not capture any potential level shift in profits after 
merchants go online. 
In Equation 5.1, xi is a vector of observable characteristics of seller i. 
The key variable of interest is the degree of digital integration measured by 
the size of the online business relative to the entire business (constructed 
as group dummies with the base group being the sellers who have at most 
20 per cent of their business online; other groups are 20–40 per cent, 
40–60 per cent, 60–80 per cent and 80–100 per cent).8 We anticipate 
that the higher the degree of digital integration, the higher will be the 
positive impact of e-commerce on the SME in terms of revenue, profit 
and efficiency.
The other variables (which are the components of the vector xi) include 
the number of people employed (including the seller) prior to going 
online and years in operation of the business. The first variable is a control 
for the size of the business prior to going online. The second variable 
is a control for how long the SME has been in operation. It is possible 
that older SMEs are more likely to be traditional and may not be able to 
adjust quickly to e-commerce. We also include the information on the 
age and gender of the seller, their highest education level (constructed as 
group dummies with the base group being sellers with lower than high 
school education; other groups are high school, vocational, bachelor 
and an advanced degree) and a dummy indicating whether they entered 
e-commerce because of external pressure. In Equation 5.1, θp is the province 
dummy; γc is the main product category dummy; and εi is the error term. 
We use the robust standard errors clustered by province. For each of the 
dependent variables, we run three regressions; the first regression (the base 
analysis) has neither the province nor the product category dummies, the 
second regression has the province dummies but no product category 
dummies and the last regression has both the province dummies and the 
product category dummies.
The results are shown in Table 5.4. Columns (1) to (3) display the results 
for the percentage increase in revenue. The SMEs with a moderate to 
high online presence (40 per cent or higher) are more likely to experience 
8  Specifically, the base group are sellers with at most 20 per cent of their business online. The 
subsequent groups are sellers with more than 20 per cent but not more than 40 per cent online, sellers 
with more than 40 per cent but not more than 60 per cent online, sellers with more than 60 per cent 
but not more than 80 per cent online and sellers with more than 80 per cent up to 100 per cent online.
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a higher revenue increase after going online. Specifically, the SMEs that 
have 40–60 per cent of their business online experienced a 42.2 to 45.3 
percentage point higher change in revenue compared with the base group 
(sellers with at most 20 per cent of their business online). SMEs that 
have 60–80 per cent of their business online and those with 80–100 per 
cent experienced a 99.72 to 103.5 percentage point and 280 to 284.6 
percentage point higher percentage change, respectively, in revenue 
compared with the base group. This confirms our hypothesis that the 
higher the degree of digital integration, the higher is the positive impact 
of e-commerce on the SMEs in terms of revenue increase.








PercentOnline_A_20_40 5 .635 4 .665 9 .980
(33 .10) (35 .96) (35 .59)
PercentOnline_A_40_60 42 .18* 38 .82 45 .32**
(22 .78) (25 .29) (22 .71)
PercentOnline_A_60_80 99 .72*** 103 .5*** 100 .9***
(20 .88) (22 .09) (22 .10)
PercentOnline_A_80_100 280 .0*** 281 .5*** 284 .6***
(68 .62) (71 .59) (70 .53)
PriorEmp_A –2 .209 –2 .360 –2 .574
(1 .719) (1 .866) (1 .922)
YearsInOperation_A –0 .684 –0 .840 –0 .976
(0 .874) (0 .962) (1 .273)
Age –2 .350 –2 .431 –2 .325
(1 .751) (1 .829) (1 .914)
Male –14 .26 –21 .68 –27 .89
(13 .84) (15 .43) (17 .78)
RC_Education = 2, High School –10 .46 4 .888 12 .84
(27 .99) (31 .71) (32 .99)
RC_Education = 3, Vocational 4 .575 16 .05 27 .27
(39 .07) (41 .11) (43 .60)
RC_Education = 4, Bachelor 18 .70 32 .84 32 .74
(27 .87) (26 .99) (30 .37)
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RC_Education = 5, 
Advanced degree
13 .91 24 .64 23 .83
(28 .59) (27 .05) (28 .60)
ExtPressure_W –0 .322 1 .470 4 .021
(17 .23) (18 .47) (19 .89)
Constant 171 .8*** 470 .8*** 689 .9***
(56 .61) (65 .25) (86 .51)
Observations 1,964 1,964 1,919
R-squared 0 .030 0 .048 0 .057
Province dummies No Yes Yes
Product dummies No No Yes








PercentOnline_A_20_40 2 .613*** 2 .688*** 2 .650***
(0 .475) (0 .473) (0 .457)
PercentOnline_A_40_60 3 .705*** 3 .760*** 3 .779***
(0 .346) (0 .346) (0 .371)
PercentOnline_A_60_80 6 .662*** 6 .692*** 6 .695***
(0 .524) (0 .526) (0 .526)
PercentOnline_A_80_100 4 .574*** 4 .652*** 4 .558***
(0 .763) (0 .789) (0 .801)
PriorEmp_A –0 .0938** –0 .0916* –0 .0878*
(0 .0463) (0 .0463) (0 .0495)
YearsInOperation_A –0 .0281* –0 .0315* –0 .0331
(0 .0167) (0 .0175) (0 .0271)
Age –0 .0318** –0 .0339*** –0 .0294**
(0 .0128) (0 .0123) (0 .0129)
Male 0 .514 0 .667 0 .688
(0 .566) (0 .561) (0 .490)
RC_Education = 2, High school 1 .409 1 .622 1 .390
(1 .413) (1 .520) (1 .554)









RC_Education = 3, Vocational 1 .370 1 .754 1 .770
(1 .434) (1 .494) (1 .606)
RC_Education = 4, Bachelor 0 .875 0 .976 0 .827
(1 .257) (1 .380) (1 .457)
RC_Education = 5, 
Advanced degree
0 .783 0 .948 0 .826
(1 .212) (1 .335) (1 .409)
ExtPressure_W 0 .694 0 .812* 0 .914*
(0 .470) (0 .477) (0 .461)
Constant 1 .106 –0 .401 0 .759
(1 .402) (1 .737) (2 .950)
Observations 2,047 2,047 1,996
R-squared 0 .107 0 .134 0 .147
Province dummies No Yes Yes
Product dummies No No Yes








PercentOnline_A_20_40 6,329* 6,007 6,545*
(3,217) (3,634) (3,748)
PercentOnline_A_40_60 7,966 9,038 9,375
(5,310) (5,887) (6,065)
PercentOnline_A_60_80 10,169** 10,541** 9,180**
(4,054) (4,122) (3,905)
PercentOnline_A_80_100 20,295*** 20,836*** 21,309***
(3,249) (3,473) (3,745)
PriorEmp_A 143 .9 119 .9 97 .08
(241 .2) (232 .4) (271 .5)
YearsInOperation_A 55 .86 17 .35 194 .2
(154 .6) (171 .0) (234 .8)
Age 68 .36 35 .70 –5 .682
(209 .7) (206 .6) (221 .7)
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Male 1,218 901 .3 1,684
(2,523) (2,767) (2,893)
RC_Education = 2, High school 2,988 7,432 10,498
(6,483) (6,888) (6,600)
RC_Education = 3, Vocational 3,290 3,263 5,822
(4,078) (5,307) (6,100)
RC_Education = 4, Bachelor 5,310 9,169 10,761
(5,943) (6,722) (6,461)




ExtPressure_W –1,545 –1,198 610 .5
(1,999) (2,065) (2,169)
Constant –4,664 3,701 14,090**
(4,260) (6,153) (6,177)
Observations 2,043 2,043 1,992
R-squared 0 .010 0 .048 0 .068
Province dummies No Yes Yes
Product dummies No No Yes
Sample Group A Group A Group A
*** p < 0 .01
** p < 0 .05
* p < 0 .1
Notes: PercentOnline_A_20_40 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for Group A 
sellers who generate 20–40 per cent of total sales from online channels; YearsInOperation_A 
represents the age of the firm in years; ExtPressure_W is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the seller cited external pressure as a motivation to join e-commerce and 0 
otherwise . Robust standard errors are in parentheses .
Columns (4) to (6) display the results for change in profit growth. 
The  results reveal that SMEs with more than 20 per cent of their 
business online experienced a larger increase in profit growth. Specifically, 
the SMEs that had 20–40 per cent of their business online experienced 
a  2.6–2.7 percentage point higher increase in profit growth compared 
with the base group (sellers with at most 20 per cent of their business 
online). SMEs with 40–60 per cent online, 60–80 per cent online and 
80–100 per cent online experienced a 3.7–3.8, 6.7–6.9 and 4.6–4.7 
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONNECTIVITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
176
percentage point higher increase in profit growth, respectively, than the 
base group. Interestingly, for most groups, the higher the degree of digital 
integration, the higher was the increase in profit growth, except for the 
last group (80–100 per cent online), in which the increased profit growth 
became slightly lower. The longer the SMEs have been in operation, the 
lower is the increase in profit growth. Specifically, an additional year of 
operation is associated with a 0.03 percentage point lower increase in 
profit growth. Older sellers appeared to be doing worse than their younger 
peers (about 0.03 to 0.04 percentage points lower for an additional year 
of age). For some specifications, those who went online due to external 
pressure appeared to have a higher increase in profit growth (about 0.8 to 
0.9 percentage point higher), but the results are only slightly significant.
Columns (7) to (9) display the results for increased efficiency (change 
in revenue per employment before versus after the seller went online). 
For all specifications, the SMEs with a high online presence (60 per cent 
or higher) are associated with a larger increase in efficiency. Specifically, 
SMEs with 60–80 per cent and 80–100 per cent of their business online 
experienced a THB9,180–10,541 and THB20,295–21,309 per person 
higher value in terms of increased efficiency, respectively, compared with 
the base group. (Note that for the 20–40 per cent group, the significance 
is only minor and not robust across all specifications.)
In terms of increased efficiency, one may be concerned that efficiency 
comes at the cost of a reduction in employment. Table 5.5 addressed 
this concern, revealing changes in employment of Group A sellers after 
they went online. Only 8.8 per cent reported a decrease in employment. 
The majority (72.3 per cent) did not have any change in employment, 
whereas 18.9 per cent reported an increase in employment.
Table 5.5 Change in employment after adopting e-commerce (Group A)
Change in employment Group A
Freq. %
Decrease in employment 180 8 .8
No change 1,482 72 .3
Increase in employment 387 18 .9
Total 2,049 100.0
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Recall from our discussion regarding Table 5.1 that Group A sellers’ 
characteristics are similar to those of Thailand’s small enterprises operating 
in the wholesale and retail sector as a whole. Although we cannot claim that 
our data sample represents the population of Thai SMEs, we may consider 
the results as what could have happened to the small enterprises operating 
in the wholesale and retail sector. However, as already mentioned, due 
to data limitations, we were not able to examine and compare the results 
for the traditional sellers who did not go online. We cannot exclude the 
possibility that the SMEs that went online are the more able ones and 
thus our results could be overestimated. We note this as a limitation of our 
study and encourage future research to revisit this issue once the required 
data are available.
Economic analysis for new entrepreneurs 
(Group B)
For Group B, the sellers started online and did not have an offline 
business,9 therefore, we were only able to gather the data for their current 
business. For the empirical analysis, we are not able to compare their 
business before they went online with after they went online in the same 
way as we analysed Group A.
Recall from our discussion regarding Table 5.1 that Group B sellers are 
much smaller than the average for Thailand’s SMEs. Our interest here is 
to examine whether these smaller or individual sellers in Group B have 
augmented their household income by selling online. For this group, we 
will use logistical regressions to assess whether certain attributes of their 
online business are associated with any increase in their household income.
The empirical model used for the analysis is Equation 5.2.
Equation 5.2
yi = α + β ∙ xi + θp + γc + εi
In Equation 5.2, yi represents the dependent variable of seller i that takes 
the value of 1 if the seller reported an increase in household income and 
0 otherwise; xi is a vector of observable characteristics of seller i’s business. 
The key variables of interest are current revenue, current employment, 
years online (in this case, the same as years in operation) and whether 
9  Very few of them may have set up an offline business later on.
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the seller is the primary earner in their household. In the equation, θp is 
the province dummy; γc is the main product category dummy; and εi is the 
error term. We use the robust standard errors clustered by province. We 
run three regressions—the first (the base analysis) has neither the province 
nor the product category dummies, the second has the province dummies 
but no product category dummies and the last has both the province 
dummies and the product category dummies.
The results are shown in Table 5.6. Columns (1) to (3) report the results 
of the base analysis and the augmented analyses, respectively. The results 
reveal that having high revenue and high employment (proxied for the 
size of the business) are associated with an increase in household income. 
The increase is also more likely if the sellers are the primary earners in 
their household. 
Table 5.6 Impact on sellers (Group B)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables IncreaseHHInc IncreaseHHInc IncreaseHHInc
Ln_CurrentRev_B 0 .391*** 0 .401*** 0 .395***
(0 .0197) (0 .0225) (0 .0208)
CurrentEmp 0 .0992*** 0 .104*** 0 .114***
(0 .0268) (0 .0272) (0 .0268)
YearsOnline –0 .00404 –0 .00853 –0 .00919
(0 .0103) (0 .0105) (0 .0110)
PrimaryEarner 0 .540*** 0 .558*** 0 .542***
(0 .0688) (0 .0646) (0 .0701)
Constant –2 .694*** –3 .136*** –2 .372**
(0 .115) (0 .181) (0 .966)
Observations 4,763 4,747 4,651
R-squared 0 .133 0 .148 0 .149
Province dummies No Yes Yes
Product dummies No No Yes
Sample Group B Group B Group B
*** p < 0 .01
** p < 0 .05
* p < 0 .1
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses .
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Connectivity analysis: E-commerce’s role 
in increasing market discovery
In this section, we examine how e-commerce can help existing SMEs 
(Group A) discover new market opportunities through two main potential 
mechanisms: 
• Reducing geographical barriers: Through e-commerce, buyers are 
able to discover new products from distant provinces and regions 
more easily, in part due to reduced search costs. Sellers are also able to 
find new markets that they could not access in the past—for instance, 
through lower marketing costs and greater economies of scale in 
logistics. 
• Reducing information asymmetry: Services on e-commerce platforms 
such as functions for chatting, payments (for example, escrow) and 
data analytics can help reduce information asymmetry and improve 
trust among buyers and sellers, resulting in more efficient transactions.
Trade connections defined
As already mentioned, in our survey, we asked our Group A sellers about 
the location of the customers to whom they sell (prior to going online 
versus the current period). Specifically, we asked respondents to select 
the regions to which they sell products, with eight options representing 
the various regions in Thailand.10 Due to the potential sensitivity of this 
question, we did not ask sellers about the value of sales to each region. 
As such, we only know whether the seller sells to a particular region or to 
their own province, but not the value of sales. 
A ‘trade connection’ exists if the seller indicates they sell to a particular 
region in our survey. For instance, if a seller based in Bangkok selects the 
province of their residence, North Thailand and Northeast Thailand, we 
define this seller as having three trade connections.11 We asked the sellers 
10  These options are: 1) province of own residence, 2) Bangkok, 3) other provinces in north Thailand, 
4) other provinces in northeast Thailand, 5) other provinces in east Thailand, 6) other provinces in 
south Thailand, 7) other provinces in west Thailand and 8) provinces in central Thailand.
11  For sellers from Bangkok who selected both ‘Bangkok’ and ‘province of own residence’, we kept 
just one option. 
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for data for two periods: before the seller went online and the current 
period. Changes in responses for these periods are used to determine the 
impact of e-commerce on trade connectivity. 
The survey shows total trade connections increased materially after 
sellers adopted e-commerce. This increase was driven almost exclusively 
by trade outside the seller’s region. The number of trade connections 
roughly doubled after sellers went online, rising from 4,400 to 8,600. 
In addition, the average number of trade connections per seller increased 
from 2.1 to 4.2—that is, entrepreneurs in Thailand sold to two more 
regions, on average, after utilising e-commerce. The maps in Figure 5.1 
show how trade intensity has risen across Thailand, before and after going 
online, while Figure 5.2 shows how trade has changed before and after 
e-commerce separately for Thailand’s regions. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show 
how the increase in trade connections was driven by an increase in activity 
outside the seller’s own region. 
Figure 5.1 Increase in trade connections: Whole of Thailand
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .
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Figure 5.2 Increase in trade connections by region in Thailand
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .
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Figure 5.3 Sankey diagram: Own region versus outside own region—
before e-commerce
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .
Figure 5.4 Sankey diagram: Own region versus outside own region—
after e-commerce
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .
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Extensive versus intensive margins
To examine the trade connections in detail, we first defined extraregional 
sellers (ERS) as sellers who sell goods outside their own geographic region. 
We then tried to capture the increased trade connections from two aspects:
1. Extensive margin—the new ERS: The extensive margin can be 
measured by the increase in trade connections by sellers who were not 
originally ERS and then became ERS after going online. 
2. Intensive margin—preexisting ERS: The intensive margin can be 
measured by the increase in trade connections by sellers who were 
ERS and then sold to more regions after going online.
The increase in trade connections was driven much more by the ‘new 
ERS’  (extensive margin) than by the ‘preexisting ERS’ (intensive 
margin). The extensive margin accounted for around 76 per cent of the 
increase in trade connections for Thai sellers after moving online. The 
rest of the increase in trade connections was due to the intensive margin 
(24 per cent) (see Figure 5.5 for a waterfall chart decomposing the change 
in trade connections to the extensive and intensive margins). Figure 5.6 




















Figure 5.5 Waterfall chart: Decomposing into extensive versus 
intensive margins
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .

































Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Figure 5.6 Share of trade connection increase based on extensive 
versus intensive margins
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .
Another way to look at the extensive margin is from the seller’s perspective. 
Before moving online, around 44 per cent of sellers in Thailand sold 
outside their own region. After moving online, close to 81 per cent of 
sellers in Thailand are now selling outside their own region (see Table 5.7 
for more details).
Table 5.7 Share of sellers selling outside own region (per cent)







Bangkok 37 .92 71 .86 33 .94
Central Thailand 57 .17 86 .87 29 .70
East Thailand 49 .23 86 .15 36 .92
North Thailand 44 .10 91 .93 47 .83
Northeast Thailand 41 .18 85 .78 44 .61
South Thailand 38 .41 84 .76 46 .34
West Thailand 47 .76 86 .57 38 .81
Whole of Thailand 44 .46 80 .87 36 .41
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Market discovery
The largest increase in trade connectivity and market discovery after 
moving to e-commerce was for sellers in upcountry areas such as north 
and northeast Thailand, which are the two poorest regions.12
For instance, the shares of sellers in the north and northeast selling 
outside their own region increased by 48 percentage points and 45 
percentage points, respectively—higher than the nationwide increase of 
36 percentage points (see Table 5.7). Sellers in the north and northeast 
were also among the top three regions seeing the largest increase in average 
trade connections per seller, at 2.3 and 2.6, respectively (see Table 5.8). 
For the northern sellers, 85 per cent of the expansion in trade connections 
came from extensive margins (high counts of ERS) versus only 61 per cent 
for merchants in central Thailand. 
Table 5.8 Average number of trade connections






Bangkok 2 .16 3 .98 1 .82
Central Thailand 2 .21 4 .47 2 .26
East Thailand 2 .12 3 .78 1 .66
North Thailand 1 .98 4 .28 2 .30
Northeast Thailand 1 .88 4 .48 2 .60
South Thailand 2 .26 4 .48 2 .22
West Thailand 1 .88 4 .39 2 .51
Whole of Thailand 2 .12 4 .21 2 .09
This is important as it points to the possibility that e-commerce could 
help increase the reach of merchants who need the connections most—
those from the more remote and poorer regions. While we cannot 
establish causality from our analyses, it is interesting to note that the 
north and northeast saw the largest proportions of sellers reporting an 
increase in household income after adopting e-commerce: 86.1 per cent 
of merchants in the north and 83.8 per cent in the northeast reported an 
increase in household income after going online, both of which are higher 
than the nationwide average of 82.4 per cent (see Figure 5.7 and Table 5.9 
for the data by region). 
12  Based on the latest GDP per capita data (2016).
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Figure 5.7 Impact on household income from e-commerce by region
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the survey data .
Table 5.9 Share of households reporting an increase in income, 
by region (per cent)
Location of seller Percentage of households that report 
an increase in income
Group A Group B Whole sample
Bangkok 83 .4 64 .6 69 .6
Central Thailand 79 .9 69 .8 72 .8
East Thailand 77 .7 67 .6 70 .5
North Thailand 86 .1 72 .0 76 .6
Northeast Thailand 83 .8 70 .7 75 .5
South Thailand 85 .7 70 .8 76 .9
West Thailand 75 .8 72 .9 73 .9
Whole of Thailand 82 .4 67 .5 72 .0
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Discussions
Our analyses show that e-commerce can help improve merchants’ 
household income: 72 per cent of sellers reported an increase in income 
due to e-commerce, while 16.3 per cent reported significant improvement 
in household earnings. The improvement in income potentially works 
through different mechanisms for existing SMEs and new entrepreneurs.
Existing SMEs (Group A)
For existing SMEs, e-commerce empowers the business, raising 
profitability by lifting sales and improving efficiency. Generally, our 
models suggest the higher the degree of digital integration—measured 
by the share of e-commerce in the total business—the stronger are the 
benefits of e-commerce. Due to data limitations, we were unable to 
estimate the potential shift in the level of profits after merchants go online. 
But the significant jump in revenue and efficiency gains could indicate 
improvement in the level of profit. On average, merchants experienced 
a 163.4 per cent boost to revenue by going online, and could attain as 
much as a 284.6 per cent rise in sales if their degree of digital integration 
reached 80–100 per cent. The surge in revenue came with improvement 
in efficiency—here measured as revenue per employee. In addition, we 
showed that, for most sellers, such increased efficiency did not come at 
a cost of reduction in employment. 
Moreover, our analyses point to the potential improvement in profitability 
that goes beyond a one-off level shift. We found that merchants experience 
acceleration in profit growth as the share of e-commerce in total sales 
rises, with the benefit peaking at 6.9 per cent when the ratio hits 60–80 
per cent. This implies that digital integration may provide more than 
just a static boost to business performance, but also a more dynamic 
improvement. Perhaps the rise in the share of online sales indicates that 
firms are going through broader and/or deeper digital transformation 
(for example, digitisation of business processes) that brings about longer-
lasting efficiency gains. 
Our connectivity analysis provides important clues to why such a boost 
to revenue is possible. E-commerce helps reduce the ‘distance’ between 
sellers and buyers resulting in market discovery beyond their immediate 
location. On average, businesses saw their number of trade connections 
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double after moving online. This is predominantly through extensive 
margins—the share of sellers who sell to customers outside their own 
region rose from 44 per cent to 81 per cent after going online. But those 
who were already selling outside their own region also expanded the 
number of destinations. 
Interestingly, we found that the poorest regions in Thailand, the north 
and northeast, experienced the greatest increase in trade connections after 
sellers adopted e-commerce. Note that these two regions also contain 
among the highest shares of households reporting an improvement in 
income due to e-commerce. This points to the possibility that e-commerce 
can be utilised to develop more remote and lower-income regions, 
contributing to more inclusive economic growth.
The basic characteristics of Group A sellers resemble those of all Thailand’s 
small enterprises operating in the wholesale and retail sector; however, we 
cannot claim they are truly representative of the population. Due to data 
limitations, we were not able to examine traditional sellers who had not 
moved online. We note this as a limitation of our study and would like 
to leave this for future research to explore once the necessary data are 
available. 
New entrepreneurs (Group B)
For the new entrepreneurs, we found that e-commerce could provide 
a source of additional income. In addition, the larger the sales and the 
number of employees, the better was the probability that the sellers 
experienced higher household income. The evidence is strengthened in 
the case where the sellers are the primary earner in their household.
The basic characteristics of Group B sellers are not similar to the average 
characteristics of all Thailand’s SMEs. In fact, Group B sellers are much 
smaller in terms of sales and number of employees. The authors conjecture 
that these sellers may be operating as sole proprietors or individuals trying 
to supplement their income by selling items online. Our empirical results 
revealed that the more they can sell online the better chance they have of 
increasing their household income.
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E-commerce: Different strokes for different folks
There is also evidence suggesting that these new entrepreneurs (Group B 
sellers) are using e-commerce as a means of supplementing their income 
rather than it being the main business for the household. 
According to our data, the majority of Group B sellers are people with 
other full-time responsibilities. The shares of people with full-time 
employment or who are homemakers in Group B are twice those in Group 
A. The share of students is three times higher in Group B than Group 
A. Second, these new entrepreneurs (Group B sellers) use profits from 
their business in a different way to those in the existing SMEs (Group 
A sellers) (see Table 5.10 for details). When asked what their profits are 
used for, 60.6 per cent of respondents from Group B indicated they 
were used for ‘personal reasons’, including saving, caring for family and 
education. Existing SMEs, on the other hand, have a higher tendency to 
use the profits for business purposes such as reinvestment and hiring staff. 
Third, the two groups have different motives for adopting e-commerce 
(see Table 5.11 for details). When asked about their motivations to 
participate in e-commerce, 59.9 per cent of respondents from Group 
B nominated ‘personal reasons’—quality of life, convenience, flexibility 
and so on—while only 40.1 per cent mentioned business motivations 
including cutting costs or business expansion. For Group A, the numbers 
are 53.2 per cent for personal reasons and 46.8 per cent for business-
related purposes. In addition, the majority of Group B sellers are people 
with other full-time jobs.









Group A 2,372 1,412 473 4,357
(55 .7%) (33 .2%) (11 .1%)
Group B 5,295 2,700 741 8,736
(60 .6%) (30 .9%) (8 .5%)
Notes: Personal uses of profits include saving, paying for education and helping care for 
family . Business uses include reinvestment in the business, hiring more employees and 
increasing employees’ salaries . Mixed reasons refer to using profits to repay outstanding 
loans, where it is not possible to determine whether the loan is personal or business-related . 
Respondents to this question were allowed to select multiple answers, with no minimum or 
maximum limit to the number of choices selected . Therefore, the total responses could be 
larger or smaller than the total number of respondents .
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Table 5.11 Motivation for entering into e-commerce
Personal reasons Business reasons Total responses
Group A 4,334 3,812 8,146
(53 .2%) (46 .8%)
Group B 9,711 6,491 16,202
(59 .9%) (40 .1%)
Notes: Personal motivations include ease of online shop setup, flexibility of working hours, 
greater time for household work, shorter commute and better quality of life . Business 
motivations include the ability to expand the business, lowering business costs, external 
pressure (for example, other companies going online), financial security and to reduce 
business risk . Respondents to this question were allowed to select multiple answers, with 
no minimum or maximum limit to the number of choices selected . Therefore, the total 
responses could be larger or smaller than the total number of respondents .
Conclusions and policy implications
Using unique and large-scale survey data on merchants in Thailand, this 
chapter found that e-commerce adoption can result in improvement in 
household incomes for sellers. In particular, by reducing distance, time 
and cost constraints, e-commerce can result in two types of benefit. First, 
e-commerce empowers existing SMEs by significantly boosting their 
revenue, efficiency and profit growth. The improvement in profitability 
seems to go beyond a one-off gain as going online also results in stronger 
profit growth rates. Second, our trade connectivity analysis illustrates 
how e-commerce allows merchants, especially those in poorer regions, to 
discover new market opportunities outside their own region. In addition, 
e-commerce allows people of various employment status—including full-
time employees, homemakers and students—to earn additional income, 
while maintaining other responsibilities. 
While existing SMEs have a greater tendency to reinvest additional profits 
in their business, part-time entrepreneurs are more likely to use their extra 
earnings to care for family and pay for education. Our research also points 
to the possibility that e-commerce could help spread development to 
remote areas such as upcountry in the north and northeast of Thailand. 
Connectivity analyses showed that these two poorest regions saw the 
largest boost to trade connectivity and were among the top regions to 
report improvement in household income after e-commerce adoption. 
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Our study is, however, subject to certain limitations. Since our survey was 
voluntary, we need to find a balance between the information we would 
like to get and the information the respondents were willing to provide. 
First, we were not able to build a panel dataset. We were only able to 
ask the sellers about their current situation (now they were online) and 
their previous situation (when they were not online or when they were 
just starting off ). This information allowed us to visualise the impact, 
although not as accurately as if we were able to construct a panel dataset. 
Second, sellers may consider some information sensitive, so we avoided 
asking about it; however, we tried to ask the ‘second-best’ questions. For 
example, we avoided asking sellers about actual profit and instead asked 
about profit growth. Third, we were only able to analyse the sellers who 
had engaged in e-commerce and not those who are yet to go online to 
compare the results. We note all these as limitations of our current work 
and encourage future research to revisit this issue once the appropriate 
data are available.
However, it is still undeniable that e-commerce can potentially serve 
as a tool to contribute to economic growth, by empowering SMEs, 
new entrepreneurs and those in more remote areas. This is particularly 
important for emerging markets such as ASEAN member states, where 
99 per cent of enterprises are SMEs (Bain & Company 2018) and 
urbanisation is relatively low at only 51 per cent compared, for example, 
with 85 per cent in Latin America (UN 2019). E-commerce adoption by 
entrepreneurs is by no means automatic. To fully unlock the potential of 
e-commerce, governments and the private sector need to work together 
to address two types of constraints entrepreneurs face to selling online: 
those that prevent the adoption of e-commerce, such as limited internet 
access and lack of digital skills, and those that hold back the effectiveness 
of e-commerce, including underdeveloped logistics, payment systems and 
regulatory environments (World Bank 2019).
Promoting e-commerce adoption
We observed from our results that existing businesses gained by going 
online in terms of increases in revenue, profit growth and efficiency. 
In  addition, individuals can also earn extra income by selling online 
that could increase their total household income. Therefore, promoting 
e-commerce adoption should be a key recommendation for policymakers. 
This can be achieved in two ways: increased digital access and increased 
digital literacy.
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONNECTIVITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
192
In terms of increasing digital access, the Thai Government implemented 
the Village Broadband Internet Project (Net Pracharat) in 2017, through 
which it provided free broadband internet to 24,700 rural villages 
throughout the country. In 2018, Thailand’s internet penetration 
rate was 82 per cent (Kemp 2019a). In addition, Thailand’s mobile 
broadband connectivity (mobile broadband connections per population) 
is 133 per cent, which is higher than the global average of 74 per cent.
Improving internet access through better digital infrastructure is essential 
but not sufficient. According to Bain & Company (2018), although 
75 per cent of ASEAN SMEs see digital tools as an opportunity, only 
16  per cent truly utilise them to their full potential. The same report 
found that 45 per cent of ASEAN SMEs lack an understanding of 
technology, while 40 per cent see a gap in digital skills (Bain & Company 
2018). The authors see this lack of digital literacy as the last-mile barrier 
to e-commerce adoption. Improving digital skills is crucial to ensure that 
the rapid growth in the digital economy is inclusive, benefiting everyone 
and not just those with the knowhow to unlock its potential. 
Governments and the private sector can collaborate to provide relevant 
training for would-be online entrepreneurs. For instance, policymakers 
can work with e-commerce platforms in the region to scale up offline 
training programs to teach SMEs how to sell online. Partnerships between 
academia and industry are also crucial. Given how rapidly skillsets change, 
higher education institutions should partner with private institutions to 
adjust their curriculums to ensure what is taught in the lecture theatre is 
relevant to industry. 
Enhancing the effectiveness of e-commerce
Although the sellers in our sample who went online were able to 
discover new market opportunities, the benefits they could achieve are 
still limited by the effectiveness of e-commerce. Therefore, our policy 
recommendations would be to increase logistics efficiency, improve the 
regulatory environment and increase the adoption of digital payment 
systems.
The Thai Government has a crucial role to play in improving logistics 
infrastructure to reduce the costs of shipping items across the country. 
This goes beyond building hard infrastructure and includes improving 
the general regulatory environment for businesses such as by cutting red 
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tape, streamlining approval processes and dismantling tariff and nontariff 
barriers. For example, Thailand’s ongoing effort to use the Regulatory 
Guillotine and remove outdated laws is a step in the right direction. 
Another key constraint on e-commerce growth is the lack of digital 
payment systems and a high reliance on cash on delivery in ASEAN 
countries. The good news is that governments across the region, including 
in Thailand, are already taking steps to improve the digital payments 
ecosystem through initiatives such as QR-code standardisation and 
enabling e-KYC (know-your-customer). The next steps for policymakers 
include promoting digital IDs and improving the interoperability of 
payment systems to promote efficiency.
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Appendices
Appendix 5.1 Survey questionnaire
Demographics
Questions and options Type of variable
1. What is your gender? F/M 
2. When were you born? DD/MM/YYYY Date option in 
SurveyGizmo
3. What is the highest 
level of education you 
have attained?
No schooling/Elementary/Junior high/Senior high/
Vocational/Bachelor/Higher than Bachelor/Other
4. Are you the primary 
income earner of your 
household?
Yes/No
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Demographics
Questions and options Type of variable
5. How many people 
are there in your 
household?
Fill in: _________ (number) From 1 to 
maximum 20
6. What is your current 
employment status?
Employed full-time (35 hours/week or more)/Employed 
part-time (less than 35 hours/week)/Self-employed or 
Work for my own business/Unemployed—Looking for 
work/Not employed—Student/Not employed—Doing 
household work or taking care of dependents/Not 
employed—Retired/Other (please specify)
7. Is e-commerce your 
primary source of 
income?
Yes/No
8. What is your 
estimated monthly 
household income?
[See Appendix 5 .2] Dropdown option
9. In which province are 
you currently located?
[See Appendix 5 .2] Dropdown option
10. When did you start 
selling online?
DD/MM/YYYY Date option in 
SurveyGizmo
11. Do you have an 
offline business?
Yes/No
If you answered ‘Yes’ to Question 11, go to Question 12
If you answered ‘No’ to Question 11, go to Question Group B
12. Did you start selling 
offline before selling 
online?
Yes/No
If you answered ‘Yes’ to Question 12, go to Question Group A
If you answered ‘No’ to Question 12, go to Question Group B
Economic and social impacts of e-commerce
Question group A (Traditional business goes online)
Questions and options Type of variable
13. When did you start 
selling offline?
DD/MM/YYYY Date option in 
SurveyGizmo 
14. Question about monthly sales of your business (online + offline):
Currently, your business 





Just before your business 
went online, your business 
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Economic and social impacts of e-commerce
Question group A (Traditional business goes online)
Questions and options Type of variable
15. Online sales as a percentage of total monthly sales of your business 
are currently:
Percentage: _______________________ (0% to 100%) Percentage: 0% to 
maximum 100%
16. Question about the number of employees of your business:
Currently, the number of 
employees hired by your 
business is:
Number ______________________ No negative 
number
Just before your business 
went online, the number of 
employees hired by your 
business was:
Number ______________________ No negative 
number
17. Question about increasing profits of your business:
Currently, average profit 
increases per year by:
No increase/Increase by 1–3%/
Increase by 4–6%/Increase by 7–9%/
Increase by 10–12%/Increase by 13–
15%/Increase by 16–18%/Increase 
by 19–21%/Increase by 22–24%/
Increase by 25–27%/Increase by 
28–30%/Increase by more than 30% 
Dropdown option
Just before your business 
went online, average 
profits increased per year 
by: 
No increase/Increase by 1–3%/
Increase by 4–6%/Increase by 7–9%/
Increase by 10–12%/Increase by 13–
15%/Increase by 16–18%/Increase 
by 19–21%/Increase by 22–24%/
Increase by 25–27%/Increase by 
28–30%/Increase by more than 30% 
Dropdown option
18. How has selling online changed your household income? 
a) Increased significantly; b) Increased somewhat; c) Not much impact; d) Decreased 
somewhat; e) Decreased significantly 
19. From which regions do your customers come?
Currently [See Appendix 5 .2]
Just before your business 
went online
[See Appendix 5 .2]
Economic and social impacts of e-commerce
Question group B (Businesses that launched online only)
Questions and options Type of variable
13. Question about monthly sales of your business:
Currently, your business 
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Economic and social impacts of e-commerce
Question group B (Businesses that launched online only)
Questions and options Type of variable
When you started your 
online business, your 
business had average 




14. Question about the number of employees of your business:
Currently, the number of 
employees hired by your 
business is:
Number ______________________ No negative 
number
When you started your 
online business, the 
number of employees hired 
by your business was:
Number ______________________ No negative 
number
15. Question about increasing profits of your business:
Currently, average profit 
increases per year by:
No increase/Increase by 1–3%/
Increase by 4–6%/Increase by 7–9%/
Increase by 10–12%/Increase by 13–
15%/Increase by 16–18%/Increase 
by 19–21%/Increase by 22–24%/
Increase by 25–27%/Increase by 
28–30%/Increase by more than 30% 
Dropdown option
When you started your 
online business, average 
profits increased per year 
by:
No increase/Increase by 1–3%/
Increase by 4–6%/Increase by 7–9%/
Increase by 10–12%/Increase by 13–
15%/Increase by 16–18%/Increase 
by 19–21%/Increase by 22–24%/
Increase by 25–27%/Increase by 
28–30%/Increase by more than 30% 
Dropdown option
16. How has selling online changed your household income? 
a) Increased significantly; b) Increased somewhat; c) Not much impact; d) Decreased 
somewhat; e) Decreased significantly 
17. From which regions do your customers come?
Currently [See Appendix 5 .4]
When you started your 
online business
[See Appendix 5 .4]
Motivations for entering e-commerce and criteria for choosing 
e-commerce platform
Continue from Question group A + B
Questions and options Type of variable
19. What are your main motivations for choosing to sell via e-commerce? 
(Click all that apply)
a) Ease of setting up an online business
b) Flexibility and better work–life balance
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Motivations for entering e-commerce and criteria for choosing 
e-commerce platform
Continue from Question group A + B
Questions and options Type of variable
c) More time to handle household work and take care of children
d) Opportunity to expand the business
e) Lower cost of doing business
f) External pressure (others are doing it)
g) Shorter commute to work
h) Quality of life
i) Financial security
j) Reduced risks
20. How do you use profits gained through e-commerce? (Click all that apply)
a) Reinvest into e-commerce business
b) Hire more employees
c) Increase employee salaries and/or benefits
d) Save the additional profits
e) Pay down loans (e .g ., mortgage and car loans)
f) Pay for education
g) Care for family members (e .g ., supporting dependants)
h) Other, please specify ______________
21. How many platforms do you use to sell your goods? Include both 
e-commerce and social media platforms. (Fill in the blanks)
No . of platforms: _______________________ No negative 
number
22. Please rank the top-three platforms in terms of how good you think they 
are (Rank 1 to 3, 1 being the best) 
___ Shopee 
___ Lazada 






23. Please rank the five most important criteria when considering an 
e-commerce platform on which to sell. (Rank 1 to 5, 1 being the best)
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Motivations for entering e-commerce and criteria for choosing 
e-commerce platform
Continue from Question group A + B
Questions and options Type of variable
___ Customer traffic
___ Ease of use
___ Used or recommended by peers
___ Logistics support
___ Free shipping
___ Workshops and training 
___ Chat and related social functions
___ Ability to link with Instagram/Facebook
___ Support and promotion campaigns
___ Advertising services
___ Ease of payments 
___ Financing and loan products
Rank in 
SurveyGizmo
24. Please rank the three most crucial aspects that require business support. 




___ Sales & marketing
___ Distribution channel
___ Logistics
___ Customer & business insights
___ Connection & business community
Rank in 
SurveyGizmo
Appendix 5.2 Household income brackets
Monthly household income (baht)




10,001–30,000 More than 150,000
30,001–50,000 Prefer not to say
50,001–70,000
Appendix 5.3 Thai provinces
Thai provinces
Amnat Charoen Nakhon Pathom Rayong
Ang Thong Nakhon Phanom Roi Et
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Thai provinces
Bangkok Nakhon Ratchasima Sa Kaeo
Bueng Kan Nakhon Sawan Sakon Nakhon
Buri Ram Nakhon Si Thammarat Samut Prakan
Chachoengsao Nan Samut Sakhon
Chai Nat Narathiwat Samut Songkhram
Chaiyaphum Nong Bua Lam Phu Saraburi
Chanthaburi Nong Khai Satun
Chiang Mai Nonthaburi Si Sa Ket
Chiang Rai Pathum Thani Sing Buri
Chon Buri Pattani Songkhla
Chumphon Phangnga Sukhothai
Kalasin Phatthalung Suphan Buri
Kamphaeng Phet Phayao Surat Thani
Kanchanaburi Phetchabun Surin
Khon Kaen Phetchaburi Tak
Krabi Phichit Trang
Lampang Phitsanulok Trat
Lamphun Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya Ubon Ratchathani
Loei Phrae Udon Thani
Lop Buri Phuket Uthai Thani
Mae Hong Son Prachin Buri Uttaradit
Maha Sarakham Prachuap Khiri Khan Yala
Mukdahan Ranong Yasothon
Nakhon Nayok Ratchaburi
Appendix 5.4 Thai regions
Thai regions
Province of residence Other provinces in the eastern region
Bangkok Other provinces in the western region
Other provinces in the north region Other provinces in the central region
Other provinces in the northeast region Other provinces in the southern region





Digital connectivity in 
China and Asia: The case 
of mobile payments
Yiping Huang and Xun Wang
Introduction
China seems unlikely to develop a new payment system, especially given 
its state-owned bank–dominated financial system. Many individuals 
hold at least two bank accounts (with 5.46 cards per person in 2018), 
as different banks provide differentiated services with different fees. 
Additionally, Union Pay, a bank card–based network that connects the 
accounts of different banks in China, has been functioning since 2002.
While China has the largest card system in the world, with nearly 
9  billion cards, according to the People’s Bank of China (PBC 2020), 
91 per cent of these are debit cards—indicating an underdeveloped social 
credit system. To access this card-based payment system, merchants are 
supposed to be equipped with card-reader terminals connected via the 
internet to communicate and pay the processing fee for each transaction. 
These are two main reasons many merchants show little interest in this 
payment system.
Most small businesses do not have access to the card-based payment system 
and cash remains a dominant medium of exchange. Cash has disadvantages, 
however, including losses due to theft and the fact it is cumbersome for 
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merchants to handle large amounts. In these circumstances, an alternative 
payment system that lowers the processing cost and simplifies transactions 
might become more popular in China.
Smartphones and QR-codes are vital components in the revolution 
of mobile payment systems. Smartphones provide a network of 
communication thanks to the rapid development of the internet and 
QR-codes allow small businesses that are not connected to the internet to 
access the payment system. More importantly, the adoption of QR-codes 
significantly reduces the processing fees for merchants.
In this chapter, we introduce the innovation and development of 
China’s mobile payment system, especially from the perspective of the 
development path of Alipay. We argue that the mobile payment system has 
complemented the traditional bank-based financial sector by improving 
individual and household risk-sharing and promoting entrepreneurship 
in China. We explore the prospects for cooperation in mobile payments 
between Asian and other emerging and developing economies and also 
analyse issues and challenges to be addressed to further digital connectivity 
in this region.
The rise of China’s mobile 
payment system
Alipay and WeChat Pay are now the two dominant platforms for 
payments in the Chinese market. As shown in Figure 6.1, the number of 
active users of both platforms has grown substantially since 2013. After 
the advent of the payment code in 2017, the number of Alipay’s active 
users experienced sharp growth, rising from 520 million to 900 million in 
2018. And it has been estimated that WeChat Pay, as part of the largest 
social network platform, has about 1 billion regular active users. 
Estimates suggest more than 90 per cent of residents in large cities in 
China use Alipay or WeChat Pay as their primary payment method, with 
cash second and debit/credit card third (Klein 2019). The transaction 
volume of mobile payments in China reached RMB277 trillion (more 
than US$41 trillion) in 2018 (Figure 6.2), 92.6 per cent of which were 
made via Alipay (53.8 per cent) and WeChat Pay (38.9 per cent).
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Figure 6.1 Active users of Alipay and WeChat, 2013–18 
(million persons)
Sources: Statista (www .statista .com); China .org .cn; Xinhua News Agency (www .xinhuanet .
com); Techinasia (www .techinasia .com) .
Figure 6.2 Transaction volume of mobile payments in China 
(RMB trillion)
Sources: CEIC; PBC (www .pbc .gov .cn/en/3688006/index .html) .
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONNECTIVITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
206
Making a cross-country comparison, China has ranked number one 
in mobile payment markets (for transaction volume and penetration 
rate) in the world. The proportion of adults using mobile payments in 
China was as high as 76.9 per cent, and the proportion in rural areas 
was 66.51 per  cent in 2017. The penetration rate of mobile payments 
in China was 77 per cent in 2016, while the rate was 48 per cent in 
the United States, 47  per  cent in the United Kingdom, 48 per cent 
in Germany and 38 per cent in France. The penetration rate in Japan was 
only 27 per cent—far lower than in China.
Mobile payments in China have played an increasingly important role in 
the settlement system. According to a report on the overall operation of 
the payment system, the number of mobile payment transactions grew 
at an annual rate of 61 per cent, reaching 60.5 billion, in 2018. Mobile 
payment platforms have evolved into their own ecosystems, covering 
businesses such as financing, financial management, credit references and 
big data, which will continuously reshape China’s financial structure.
Figure 6.3 Rapid regional convergence of fintech development, 2011
Note: The echelon classification rule is as follows: taking the highest-level index of the year 
as the benchmark, cities with an index higher than 80 per cent of the benchmark index are 
classified as the first echelon; 70–80 per cent are the second echelon; 60–70 per cent 
are the third echelon; and less than 60 per cent are the fourth echelon . 
Source: Institute of Digital Finance (2011–18) .
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Figure 6.4 Rapid regional convergence of fintech development, 2018
Note: The echelon classification rule is as follows: taking the highest-level index of the year 
as the benchmark, cities with an index higher than 80 per cent of the benchmark index are 
classified as the first echelon; 70–80 per cent are the second echelon; 60–70 per cent 
are the third echelon; and less than 60 per cent are the fourth echelon . 
Source: Institute of Digital Finance (2011–18) .
The rapid development of digital finance in China is uneven. The growth 
in the eastern coastal region has been fastest, with central provinces 
coming in second and the western region third. It is worth noting that the 
central and western regions have narrowed the gap with the eastern region 
very significantly. The Peking University Digital Financial Inclusion 
Index shows rapid regional convergence of fintech development in China, 
as shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 (see more in Guo et al. 2019).
How China’s mobile payment system has 
evolved: The case of Alipay
With the popularity of personal computers increasing after 2000, more 
and more individuals were able to use them to easily access the internet. 
Initially lacking a well-developed social credit system, e-commerce in 
China grew very slowly. The trade volume of online shopping website 
Taobao in 2003 was only RMB34 million. Users were concerned about the 
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security of their money. So, the biggest problem with online transactions 
was the lack of trust due to information asymmetry between the buyer 
and the seller. 
Alipay was initially developed to solve Taobao’s trust issues by providing 
secure transactions. The secured transactions work like this: the buyer 
chooses goods on Taobao and pays via Alipay; Alipay informs the seller 
to deliver the goods and sends the payment to the seller after the buyer 
confirms receipt of the goods. During this process, Taobao serves 
as a  trading intermediary that temporarily holds the money for the 
two parties. 
With more and more goods supported by secured transactions, the volume 
of bank account transfers increased the pressure on banks, so that, for 
example, the West Lake Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China once even hoped to stop cooperation with Alipay. Meanwhile, 
Taobao was required to pay expensive transfer fees to the banks. How to 
reduce the transfer costs and the pressure on the banks? If every user in the 
Alipay ecosystem has a virtual account, into which the buyer can deposit 
their money, and the seller can receive the money automatically after 
a successful transaction, the efficiency of settlement would be significantly 
improved and the transfer cost tremendously reduced.
Driven by this innovative idea, Alipay was separated from Taobao in 
December 2004 and focused mainly on development of a payment system 
and the promotion of social trust. To promote users’ confidence in Alipay, 
in February 2005, cofounder Jack Ma announced full compensation 
coverage for payments using the system. At that time, another problem 
about which users often complained was the success rate of payments, 
which ranged from a low of 40 per cent to a high of 66 per cent in 2010. 
That is, bad payment experiences were causing merchant on Taobao to 
lose roughly half of their customers.
Quick payment was the alternative solution, the basic logic of which was 
that Alipay would send the bank a deduction order on the user’s account 
on behalf of the user. This was quite hard to arrange in 2010 as this 
logic contradicted banks’ traditional risk management. Traditionally, by 
methods such as the U-Shield app, banks had to ensure a deduction order 
was issued by the user. While security was enhanced, the convenience of 
payment was greatly reduced. To complete a payment, it is necessary to 
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insert a U-Shield and then jump to the payment page provided by the 
bank. For each additional operation, the probability of payment failure 
will increase.
Alipay finally persuaded banks by paying risk-loss margins and arranging 
deposits with the branches, which greatly helped Alipay expand the coverage 
of online payments. Compared with the one-step quick payment, under 
traditional online banking services, consumers needed to jump through 
seven webpages to complete a payment. More importantly, the success 
rate with quick payments reached 95 per cent, which is 30 percentage 
points higher than that with the business-to-consumer model of online 
banking. In this sense, quick payment enhanced the convenience of online 
payments in the era of the personal computer and also paved the way for 
mobile payments.
The advent of Apple signalled the coming era of smartphones and mobile 
internet—the uptake of which accelerated after 2010. One year after the 
introduction by Tencent of WeChat, which is now the most popular social 
media platform, mobile internet users exceeded desktop users for the first 
time, in 2012. In 2013, Alipay launched its ‘All-In’ strategy and shifted its 
business focus to the area of wireless networks. 
Since restructuring in 2013, Alipay’s wallet is no longer just a simple 
payment tool, but also has been positioned as a mobile life assistant and 
financial platform. Yu’e Bao, which functions as a money market fund 
in the new version of Alipay, rapidly occupied the dominant share of the 
mobile wealth management product market due to its double function of 
allowing deposits and paying interest. As shown in Figure 6.5, the interest 
rate paid on the balance in Yu’e Bao is, on average, 2 per cent higher than 
that of term deposits in a bank. Alipay is therefore known as the only 
wallet that makes money.
The ubiquity of Alipay’s payment QR-code, which launched in 2017, 
enabled the expansion of mobile payment services to small businesses due 
to the ease of transaction and lower processing fees. Merchants are not 
required to be online or download the Alipay app. All they need are two 
numbers: one for the mobile phone and one for the bank card. Alipay 
can then help the merchants associate with the QR-code for payment. 
When the consumer scans the code for payment, the money is directly 
transferred to the merchant’s bank account.
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Figure 6.5 Return rates on term deposits and Yu’e Bao (per cent)
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from CEIC . 
Regulation of mobile payments in China
The relaxed regulations and legal guarantees provide an active institutional 
environment for China’s mobile payment system. China enacted a law 
relating to electronic signatures in 2004, which established their legal 
validity for online contracts. Since 2005, the State Council has released 
a series of policy documents to accelerate e-commerce development. Alipay 
and WeChat Pay were launched accordingly without legal risks. The PBC 
did not begin to regulate and licence mobile payments until 2010. 
The PBC released its ‘Measure for the Administration of Payment Services 
for Nonfinancial Institutions’ in June 2010, recognising the legal status of 
payment institutions. Since then, the central bank has issued nearly 270 
third-party payment licences to Alipay and other payment companies and 
adopted prudential and inclusive regulations for this industry. These have 
allowed the rapid growth of mobile payments almost without compliance 
costs, entry barriers or regulatory constraints. With the rising risks in 
the peer-to-peer lending market, regulation of digital finance, including 
mobile payments, has been strengthened since 2015.
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Table 6.1 Main policy documents on mobile payments in China
Year Policy decision Regulatory organisation
April 2009 Announcement on the registration of 
nonfinancial institutions engaged in 
payment and settlement services
PBC





Regulations on the administration 





Guidance on the supervision and 
management of payment services for 
nonfinancial institutions
PBC
May 2011 Notice on regulating management 
of commercial prepaid cards 
State Council; PBC
March 2012 Management of anti–money-laundering 
and antiterrorism financing for payment 
agencies
PBC
July 2012 Notice on establishing a regulatory 




Management methods on prepaid card 
business for payment agencies
PBC
June 2013 Deposit methods for the customer 
provisions for payment agencies
PBC





Notice on the pilot of foreign exchange 
payment services for cross-border 




April 2014 Notice on strengthening the 
management of cooperative business 
between commercial banks and third-
party payment agencies
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission; PBC
January 2015 Guidance for the pilot of cross-border 




July 2015 Guidance on promoting the healthy 
development of internet finance
PBC; Ministry of Finance; 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission; China Security 
Regulatory Commission; 




Management methods for internet 
payment services of nonbank payment 
agencies
PBC
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Year Policy decision Regulatory organisation
April 2016 Implementation plan for special 
rectification of internet financial risks
State Council
April 2016 Implementation plan for special 
rectification on financial risks of nonbank 
payment agencies
PBC; Ministry of Finance; 
National Development and 
Reform Commission




Source: PBC (www .pbc .gov .cn/) .
Improving individual and household 
risk-sharing
Informal social networks in China provide an important means by 
which households and individuals share risk, while the insurance they 
provide is often incomplete. A number of reasons for this incompleteness 
have been proposed, including moral hazard and limited commitment, 
both of which result in positive correlations between consumption and 
realised income. 
Transaction costs—the cost of transferring money or other forms of 
resources between individuals—are another source of the incompleteness. 
The rapid development and acceptance of mobile payments are a recent 
innovation in China, and have allowed individuals to transfer purchasing 
power within the ecosystems of Alipay or WeChat Pay, dramatically 
reducing the cost of sending money across large distances and between 
bank accounts.
Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), families 
and social networks in China have been dispersed over large distances due 
to internal migration, mainly from the western provinces to the eastern 
coastal areas. This migration is largely motivated by employment and 
other opportunities. By the end of 2018, there were 288 million migrant 
workers in China, of whom more than 60 per cent were intercity migrants, 
leaving their home city for another to find work. Furthermore, more than 
70 per cent of these workers did not bring their family members with 
them. In this context, lowering transaction costs could have significant 
impacts on the frequency and size of internal remittances, and hence the 
ability to smooth risk.
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One predominant use of Alipay and WeChat Pay is for person-to-
person remittances. Before mobile payment systems were available, 
most households delivered remittances through China Post or by bank 
transfer—a relatively costly and time-consuming process. Mobile 
payments require only several simple steps; not only are the actual costs 
of the transfers lower, but also the convenience and time saved mean 
substantial reductions in the total cost of sending and receiving money 
(see more detailed analysis in Wang et al. 2019).
Promoting entrepreneurship 
and innovation
Although most Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are 
privately owned, they play an important role in supporting innovation, 
creating jobs and promoting local and national economic growth in 
China. SMEs are, however, suffering from significant credit constraints. 
In China’s state-owned bank–based financial system, SMEs have to rely 
heavily on retained earnings to finance investments and operational costs. 
Mobile payment systems in China not only facilitate payments and 
transfers, but also promote entrepreneurship and innovation. Lower-cost 
transfers and real-time payments motivate the setting up and operation 
of small business activities. Before mobile payments were available, it was 
inconvenient for vendors to break up and deposit large amounts of cash 
in their bank account.
With mobile payment systems, vendors need only post a QR-code on 
the door of, or somewhere conspicuous in, their premises. The adoption 
of QR-codes allows merchants who are not connected to the phone or 
internet to still access the payment system. It is easy for consumers to scan 
the QR-code and transfer money, with payments directly deposited into 
the vendors’ bank accounts or digital wallets.
Apart from the convenience, the lower fees are a huge incentive for small 
businesses. A small business is generally charged more than 0.5 per cent 
of a payment in processing fees in the card-based system (0.5 per cent 
for debit cards and 0.6 per cent for credit cards). With mobile payments, 
processing fees vary from 0 per cent to 0.3 per cent. Some empirical 
studies have shown that the adoption of mobile payments significantly 
boosts the number of newly registered businesses (Huang et al. 2019). 
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More specifically, mobile payments promote agricultural households to 
start informal businesses and existing informal businesses to continue 
their operations or to transition to formal business (Wang 2019). 
The  impact on entrepreneurial activities is associated with significant 
increases in income.
China’s payment enterprises go global
Chinese payment technology has started to support mobile payment 
businesses in Asia, Europe and Africa. Unlike the approach to going global 
taken by the original equipment manufacturer trade and subsequent 
overseas mergers and acquisitions, Alipay’s approach seems to be more 
popular. Its unique approach is characterised by ‘local partnership plus 
knowhow output’, which has greatly facilitated the outbound travel of 
Chinese tourists and, at the same time, helped to develop the local mobile 
payment system.
According to Ant Financial, Alipay has established cooperation with more 
than 250 financial institutions around the world. On the one hand, it 
provides offline payment services for overseas merchants and users; on 
the other, Alipay provides Chinese consumers with online payment 
services in 55 countries and regions around the world, covering catering, 
supermarkets, department stores, convenience stores, duty-free shops, 
theme parks, airports, and so on. Alipay offers real-time tax rebates at 
airports and urban areas in 35 countries and access to public transport 
systems in more than 20 countries.
Alipay has helped establish local versions in nine economies in Asia: 
Thailand (TrueMoney), the Philippines (GCash), Indonesia (DANA), 
India (Paytm), Malaysia (TnGD), Pakistan (easypaisa), Bangladesh 
(bKash), South Korea and Hong Kong (AlipayHK). In Thailand, 
TrueMoney’s and Alipay’s QR-codes are often posted together for 
Thai people and Chinese tourists, respectively. The number of Paytm 
users in India has increased from 25 million before 2015 to more than 
250 million—making it the fourth-largest digital wallet in the world.
The existing international payment services are slow (with transactions 
often taking two to three days) and costly (with a processing fee of 
7.3 per cent of the total sale, on average). In 2018, cross-border remittances 
based on blockchain technology became available between AlipayHK and 
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GCash, which achieved real-time transfers with relatively lower costs. 
Advanced technology supports this rapid development—for example, 
Alipay’s recognition of risk control now occurs within 100 milliseconds 
and its asset loss rate is less than 0.5 millionth, which is far lower than 
the 0.2 per cent of other international third-party payment companies. 
Alipay and its local partners have now served more than one billion active 
users worldwide.
Comparative advantage of China’s 
fintech companies
One striking achievement in recent years has been the leapfrogging 
development of Chinese fintech. According to a report by the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, while the United States and other 
developed countries have advantages in most technological innovations, 
China has taken a leading position in mobile payments. 
China’s fintech development currently leads the world, whether in terms 
of technology or business models. From the perspective of technology, 
China’s big data analysis technology is more advanced than that of other 
Southeast Asian economies. For example, Thailand’s TrueMoney wants to 
introduce China’s risk-assessment model, while China’s Alibaba has begun 
to provide a cross-border payment system based on blockchain for Hong 
Kong and the Philippine markets. 
In terms of their business models, China’s fintech companies have 
expanded from payments to loans (microloans, Ant My Loan), insurance 
and financial management (Yu’e Bao). In contrast, the business model of 
Southeast Asia’s payment providers is still at an elementary level, focused 
mainly on payments. Chinese fintech’s business model also provides 
a reference for India and other Southeast Asian economies.
The popularity of smartphones and the internet has driven the transfer 
from online to mobile payments in China. When the volume of nonbank 
payments reached RMB9.2 trillion in 2013, Alipay surpassed PayPal 
to become the world’s largest online payment platform. One year later, 
nonbank online payments grew by nearly 170 per cent and exceeded the 
payment volume of debit cards soon after.
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How have mobile payments in China leapfrogged the card-based system? 
The simple answer is the low penetration rate of credit cards and the 
rapid growth of big tech companies, which stimulated the emergence 
and rapid development of the online payment system in China. After 
2000, China’s internet companies began to expand. Due to the backward 
payment infrastructure, low penetration rate of credit cards and low level 
of e-banking business, e-commerce companies in China were encouraged 
to develop new payment tools to expand their market. Therefore, internet 
companies, including Tencent and Alibaba, have successively established 
payment systems to solve specific problems.
Alipay, launched in 2004, was originally designed to address the issue 
of a lack of trust between e-commerce participants due to information 
asymmetry. However, early in the 1990s, credit cards were widely 
accepted and could be used to initiate a refund, which allowed holders to 
conveniently pay at home and abroad. In this context, US e-commerce 
companies such as eBay and Amazon did not need to establish new 
payment systems to solve the trust problem.
However, one thing that should be kept in mind is the leapfrogging 
development of mobile payments in China has not been accompanied by 
the establishment of a sound social credit system. Consequently, in the 
absence of effective financial supervision, regulatory arbitrage by internet 
platforms is likely to lead to rapid growth in payment and peer-to-peer 
markets, damage to the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and 
even financial risk contagion.
Insufficient supply of inclusive financial 
services in Asia
Generally, the financial systems in Southeast and South Asia are 
underdeveloped, except for Singapore’s, and there is a severe shortage 
of formal financial services. In Southeast Asia, 60 per cent of people do 
not have a bank account. Credit card penetration rates in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries are less than 2 per cent. 
In India, 60 per cent of business orders are paid in cash. Although there 
are 800 million bank accounts in India, only 250–300 million people 
use them, and the formal financial services in Bangladesh are even more 
backward. Meanwhile, these regions have large populations and a very 
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young demographic structure (70 per cent of people in Southeast Asia 
are aged under 40 years), so they have a strong ability to accept new 
technologies. Therefore, the fintech markets in Southeast and South Asia 
boast very broad prospects. In fact, the development of fintech can to 
a large extent help relieve the problem of insufficient coverage of financial 
services and improve the welfare of local residents.
Compared with China, Southeast Asia’s fintech is still in its initial stage 
and the accompanying infrastructure lags far behind. Therefore, the 
fintech business model in the region differs greatly from that in China 
and service provision is still at an elementary level, focusing mainly on 
payments. On the one hand, new regulatory licences must be acquired 
before businesses can provide high value-added services such as loans. 
On the other hand, Southeast Asia has not accumulated sufficient 
technology and data to expand other fintech services on a large scale. 
Of course, both ECP and TrueMoney, which promote e-commerce and 
e-wallets, respectively, have indicated they want to expand into the loans 
and insurance sectors. Indeed, Paytm has begun to provide financial 
services such as ‘digital gold’ for individuals and credit support for small 
businesses—on a small scale. In the future, Paytm hopes to provide credit 
assessment services for Indian residents who lack credit reporting services 
and increase their credit support on this basis. In Bangladesh, bKash has 
also expressed strong interest in Ant Financial’s successful experience of 
using payment information to grant lines of credit.
Second, poor infrastructure and poor financial literacy in Southeast and 
South Asia also restrict the development of fintech. When ECP provided 
e-commerce services, many local banking systems failed to support online 
transfers and most local residents had poor basic financial knowledge, 
hindering the promotion of fintech products. In such circumstances, 
local fintech providers were required to develop new business models. 
The ability to ‘top up’ is very important for e-wallet users. In China, 
most users top up their balance or WeChat wallet via a bank transfer. 
However, due to the lack of banking services in Southeast Asia and other 
regions, e-wallets are mainly topped up offline at retail stores and other 
places, rather than via bank transfer. For instance, TrueMoney signed 
a partnership agreement with the largest local retail store, 7-Eleven, so that 
residents can deposit money into their wallets at its stores. TrueMoney 
also provided its own ATM to allow residents to top up their accounts. 
Bangladesh faces a similar situation. Due to insufficient coverage of bank 
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outlets, it is difficult to convert money into digital currency. To solve this 
problem, bKash set up 187,000 agents nationwide. Customers can visit 
an agent to convert digital currency in the bKash system into cash.
In a word, the business models of fintech companies in Southeast and 
South Asia are still backward. Most focus on payments. Meanwhile, poor 
infrastructure restricts fintech’s expansion. At present, fintech companies 
have begun to set out plans to provide more comprehensive services with 
higher value added and have innovated according to their respective 
environment, demonstrating great potential for development.
Local examples of payment enterprises 
in Asia
With the promotion of ECP, which is headquartered in Singapore but 
serves the whole of Southeast Asia, two major problems with e-commerce 
have been solved. The first is the high cash-on-delivery rate. In the past, 
this rate reached 99 per cent of e-commerce payments in the region, 
but the cost of cash payment is very high, so e-payments can reduce this 
cost. The second problem is the low success rate of online payments in 
Southeast Asian countries, which is caused by two main factors. First, 
due to poor infrastructure, users have to spend more time making online 
payments through banks, and the success rate is low. Of course, users 
can transfer money to a bank account offline and make a payment, but 
this is inconvenient. Second, e-wallets are not widely accepted by users. 
Many users do not keep money in their e-wallets, so if they need to buy 
goods, they have to visit a nearby outlet (such as a convenience store) 
to deposit money into their wallets within 24 hours of a purchase. As a 
result, the payment success rate is low. ECP enables users time to get 
accustomed to using an e-wallet, which significantly improves the success 
rate of payments and helps enterprises expand their business in a more 
convenient and quick manner.
TrueMoney in Thailand and Paytm in India are mainly designed to 
operate in a market that has insufficient formal financial services. Bank 
cards are not widely used in either country and many payments are still 
made in cash. Using TrueMoney or Paytm to make e-payments can reduce 
the high cost of using cash. In addition, young people who do not have 
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a credit card cannot buy goods or play games online. TrueMoney can 
provide young people with these new services, while Paytm offers lower 
payment rates for businesses, as well as credit support for those small 
businesses that cannot get a bank loan.
In Bangladesh, bKash was also created against a background of inadequate 
formal financial services, including an underdeveloped system for online 
payments. Anyone wanting to buy a mobile phone or computer in 
Bangladesh must purchase it offline, which is very inconvenient. Second, 
there is a charge of $0.12 to open a bank account, which is a very high 
cost for many poor people. More importantly, banks do not provide 
free access to the internet. Young people from rural areas working in 
the cities are unable to remit their salaries back home. One of the more 
common practices is to ask a truck driver to deliver the money, but this 
practice is inefficient and very risky. To reduce the time and capital costs 
of transactions, the founder of bKash decided to create a new medium 
to solve these problems and provide low-cost services for the poor and 
small businesses. 
AlipayHK launched its cross-border e-wallet remittance service based on 
block chain to solve the pain point of cross-border transfers, which have 
always been a cumbersome procedure but are very important throughout 
Southeast Asia. For example, a large number of Filipino maids work in 
Hong Kong and need to transfer their salaries back to the Philippines. 
Currently, the methods for cross-border transfers include cash, bank 
transfers or transfer by a remittance company. These traditional cross-
border businesses involve many participants, different laws and regulations 
in each jurisdiction and exchange rate issues, so the process is very complex 
and it can take 10 minutes to several days to make a payment. AlipayHK’s 
cross-border e-wallet remittance business can achieve real-time domestic 
transfers, provides customer service around the clock and is safe and 
transparent. Bangladesh has a similar demand for such a service. There are 
10 million Bangladeshis working abroad and unofficial statistics suggest 
15 billion Bangladeshi taka (US$177 million) are remitted through 
official channels. Overseas remittances are very expensive, so bKash strives 
to use block chain technology to make such transfers much faster, cheaper 
and more convenient.
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Challenges and competition in Asia’s 
payments market
There is fierce competition in the payments market in Southeast and 
South Asia, with China’s Ant Financial and Tencent and Amazon and 
Google from the United States all actively expanding their services in 
the region. So far, however, no company has taken a dominant position. 
Driven by these multinational corporations, local fintech companies have 
also seen rapid development. 
Ant Financial has established nine e-wallets through cooperation in 
Southeast Asia and invested in Lazada, the largest e-commerce company 
in the region. Supported by Tencent, Shopee has also grown rapidly 
in Southeast Asia. In addition to financial support, Chinese fintech 
companies send technical teams to local companies to help them develop. 
Apart from Chinese enterprises, Amazon, Google, WhatsApp and other 
US companies are actively gaining market share in Southeast and South 
Asia. In some countries, there is even competition between the QR-code 
standards adopted by Chinese-funded corporations and those adopted by 
US-funded firms.
Of course, the regulatory authorities of each country are more prudent 
about the foreign enterprises that carry out financial business in their 
jurisdiction and generally do not want them to hold all the market 
shares. Institutions such as Ant Financial, Tencent and LU.com are very 
successful in China and have a good reputation in the global market. Local 
regulatory authorities and fintech companies are willing to cooperate with 
these Chinese enterprises, but of course, most such companies carry out 
business in Southeast and South Asia through strategic shareholding, 
rather than controlling as major shareholders.
Attitudes and practices of financial 
regulation in Asia
The governments of Thailand, Singapore, India and Hong Kong take 
an open and inclusive attitude towards the monitoring and regulation 
of fintech. Of course, different governments have different motives. 
Thailand and India hope fintech can improve their financial efficiency 
and support the development of inclusive finance. Hong Kong and 
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Singapore, as international financial centres, are more concerned with 
how to maintain their leading edge and pay more attention to cross-border 
payments and other business. To promote the development of fintech, the 
Thai and Singaporean governments have formulated development plans 
and designated special departments and personnel for coordination and 
implementation. Both countries have also adopted the regulatory sandbox 
approach to support fintech innovation.
An official development plan provides one of the guarantees for the orderly 
development of the fintech industry. In August 2015, the Singaporean 
Government began a six-month study of fintech to investigate key issues 
such as whether it is helpful to Singapore’s financial system and how 
much risk comes with it, after which it developed a fintech development 
program. The Government of Thailand organised the Ministry of Finance, 
its central bank and other departments to implement the multisector 
‘National Master Plan for E-Payment’, promoted the PromptPay 
payment system and used the unified Thai standard QR-code to guide 
the development of the country’s fintech industry.
To support innovation, Singapore and Thailand have introduced 
a regulatory sandbox to allow fintech companies to move beyond existing 
regulatory frameworks and conduct small-scale experiments. A regulatory 
sandbox can control major financial risks while also effectively supporting 
innovation. Of course, due to different national conditions, Singapore 
and Thailand took different approaches when implementing the 
regulatory sandbox.
Generally speaking, these governments want to create a regulatory 
environment suitable for fintech innovation, while paying attention to 
the risks fintech may bring.
Conclusion and prospects for regional 
digital connectivity
Common demand lays the basic foundation for digital connectivity 
in Asia and other regions. China has started to take the lead in mobile 
payments within the past 16 years and has made outstanding achievements 
in promoting the development of inclusive finance. However, fintech 
development in China is driven mainly by market demand and 
technological innovation. One basic fact in China is that the services 
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provided by the traditional financial sector are insufficient, especially for 
small and microenterprises and low-income groups. And the credit card 
penetration rate in China is still less than 20 per cent. 
A similar situation also exists in other developing Asian countries, where 
some problems are even more prominent—for example, before the 
availability of mobile payments, most migrant rural workers delivered 
remittances home informally though friends or bus drivers, which 
is an expensive approach and one that is fraught with delay and risk. 
The development of fintech can serve as an important complement to the 
traditional financial sector and is one that all developing countries need.
Regulatory authorities and fintech companies in Asia have shown a strong 
desire to cooperate with Chinese enterprises. The Monetary Authority 
of Singapore has welcomed China’s fintech companies, including Ant 
Financial and Tencent, which have set up branches in Singapore. In many 
ways, financial technology and its development path are most suitable for 
developing countries. The regulatory authorities and fintech companies 
in countries including Thailand, India, Malaysia and Pakistan are actively 
exploring the possibility of business cooperation with Chinese companies.
While finance is among the most strictly regulated sectors and financial 
cooperation remains a sensitive issue for every country, business 
cooperation initiated by fintech companies seems to be much more 
successful and sustainable. Alipay has kept a relatively low profile in 
cooperating with overseas partners, by providing technology support and 
holding a relatively small share in enterprises. 
More importantly, payment technology in China is relatively mature and 
is still developing rapidly. For example, Alipay’s technological capacity has 
increased from about 200 transactions per second to more than 210,000 
transactions per second. Chinese companies aim to work with local 
partners to provide payment systems that incorporate local technology, 
culture and policies. Through cooperation with Alipay, the number of 
users of Paytm in India increased dramatically, to more than 20 million 
within one year.
Moving forward, we think the following issues should be addressed 
properly: first, data. Who owns the data—individuals or big tech 
companies? Data are becoming an important resource, but the significance 
of consumer privacy should be highlighted as well.
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Second is the problem of digital inequality, as many people do not have 
access to mobile payment services. Perhaps countries should adopt wider 
coverage of digital finance, education on inclusive finance and measures 
to create greater financial openness regarding access to mobile payments.
The third issue is financial risk. What are the right strategies for dealing 
with risk, including cyberattacks and the disintermediation of financial 
services? Digital finance can raise the risk of financial contagion without 
effective financial regulation—which brings us to the final issue. As big 
tech companies expand into financial services, building on mobile 
payments, how should these companies be regulated? How can we balance 
efficiency and stability? On the one hand, regulatory authorities should 
improve efficiency by transforming from an institution-based regulatory 
framework to functional regulation and adopting more advanced 
supervision technology. On the other hand, conduct regulation should 
be emphasised and strengthened to enhance the protection of financial 
consumers in China, probably by learning from the experience of 
Australia’s ‘twin-peak’ regulatory framework (a combination of prudential 
and conduct regulation).
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the international 
investment policy regime in facilitating foreign investment in Asia-
Pacific countries, with attention to the delivery of connectivity services. 
It is argued there is a substantial agenda of work at the economy level 
but, in addition, there is a rich menu of additional options for regional 
cooperation to support these efforts. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses key aspects of 
connectivity and its various dimensions. The origins of the demand for 
connectivity and some aspects of performance in the region are reviewed 
in the Introduction to this volume. The focus of this chapter is the supply 
side with respect to the provision of infrastructure. Various estimates are 
made of the difference, or gap, between the quantity demanded and that 
supplied. Some estimates of the scale of the ‘gaps’ are presented in the 
next section. The main interest here is the scope to mobilise private-sector 
investment to help fill these gaps.
To identify the impediments to private participation, the chapter 
concentrates on three sets of drivers of these gaps. One is the policy 
environment in which foreign investment decisions are made and, related 
to that, the processes of its implementation. The second set of drivers 
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relates to risks in infrastructure projects. The third set are factors that, 
if attended to, have been demonstrated to raise the rate of return on 
infrastructure projects. 
The first of the drivers of this apparent gap are the policy barriers to 
investment in infrastructure. This includes the policy regime affecting 
foreign investment, which is outlined in section three, with attention 
to its elements, which contribute to connectivity. There is in addition 
a discussion of the nature of investment facilitation and the contribution 
it can make, including the priorities for attention in the course of regional 
cooperation. 
There are also substantial risks involved in the relevant projects, which 
add to the actual cost of finance and help explain the reticence of investors 
to participate. This, too, contributes to the apparent gap between 
projected investment demand and current levels of investment. Section 
four contains some talking points about these risks that are specific to 
investments related to connectivity, including the cooperation of private 
and public-sector investors, the treatment of security issues and the 
political economy of success. 
The third set of factors are those that might raise the returns on investment. 
Topics of attention in this chapter in that respect are the importance of 
coordinating network designs and the role of complementary services-
sector policies.
The conclusion of the chapter discusses the consequences for regional 
cooperation. 
Spending and gaps
Closing the gaps identified in the Introduction chapter concerning 
connectivity performance in the region translates into large absolute 
amounts of investment. Elek and Findlay (2019) review the methodologies 
involved in estimating the scale of these gaps in investment. An example 
of this work is that of the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2017b), 
which includes estimates of the demand for infrastructure according 
to projections of various macroeconomic indicators. The result is a gap 
between likely demand and current spending levels, across the period 
2016–20, of 2.4 per cent of GDP for all members (the value of the gap 
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is US$459 billion per year). This is higher than earlier estimates because 
of an adjustment for climate change. When China is excluded from the 
country list, the gap rises to 5 per cent of GDP. The bulk of this relates to 
transport and telecommunications as well as power (ADB 2017a).1 
The ADB (2017b) reports that currently 90 per cent of this investment is 
undertaken by the public sector. It also estimates that, with fiscal reforms, 
the member economies might close half the estimated gap, but the balance 
would have to be found by the private sector. Over the period 2016–20, 
a  response by the private sector would involve an increase in spending 
from $63 billion a year to $250 billion a year.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 
2018: Ch. 3) examines the financing of transport infrastructure for 
connectivity. Its estimate is that, worldwide, US$315 billion a year is spent 
on this infrastructure in developing countries. Of that, governments 
finance about 80 per cent, the private sector 15 per cent and overseas 
development funding (ODF) about 5 per cent. The OECD estimate is that, 
to meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, this spending 
on transport must increase by US$440 billion a year. In 2014–15, most 
private-sector investment was in roads in upper middle-income countries 
and in Latin America. The OECD attributes the private sector’s interest 
in roads to the capacity to earn revenue via toll fees. ODF is also spent on 
roads, but more so in lower-income economies. Airports are popular with 
private investors and railways and ports less so, so those activities have 
a  higher share in ODF spending (OECD 2018: Fig. 3.2). A  relatively 
small share of private-sector investment occurs in Asia. A small proportion 
(5 per cent) of ODF is applied directly to mobilise investment from the 
private sector (this does not include the provision of guarantees) but 
the amount mobilised is a tiny share of total expenditure. 
Governments are already financing a high share of spending on 
infrastructure assets that support connectivity. The question is how private-
sector funds, internally and from the rest of the world,2 can be mobilised 
to fund socially valuable projects. There are examples of economies, such 
as Australia’s, where such funds (for example, accumulated for retirement 
incomes) have been mobilised for long-term investment in infrastructure, 
1  A small proportion applies to water and sanitation. 
2  These might include funds publicly managed, such as public-sector retirement funds in high-
income countries. 
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such as airports, ports and roads (Bowditch and Noble 2018). There 
appears to be space for the private sector to make this contribution, 
since the amount likely to be involved is small relative to the current 
and prospective volumes of funds under management.3 There also appears 
to be an incentive to participate, given the rates of return on alternative 
investments and the prospective value in connectivity projects, according 
to the benefits identified earlier in this volume. 
Investment policy and facilitation
Barriers to private-sector participation in infrastructure projects include 
matters of both policy on investment in relevant connectivity projects and 
the management of those policies. Reform of the former is a matter of 
the liberalisation of investment policy and the latter refers to investment 
facilitation. These are now discussed in that order.
Investment liberalisation
Investment in infrastructure, whether from foreign or domestic sources, 
tends to be regulated because of the concern that investors will accrue 
a significant degree of monopoly power if their project proceeds. There 
have also been concerns about access to the services of infrastructure, 
especially among residents in less densely settled areas or those with lower 
incomes. These efficiency and equity objectives have driven the forms of 
intervention, such as public provision. There are new approaches to these 
problems, which are discussed below. 
Meanwhile, there are additional concerns in host economies about foreign 
investment in these sectors, including the transfer of profits offshore, the 
security of access to infrastructure at times of national emergency and 
protection of domestic providers of construction, management and 
operation services. These concerns have led to the imposition of a variety 
of specific policy measures related to foreign investors, such as: 
• foreign equity limitations
• screening or approval mechanisms
3  Berger et al. (2019) quote an estimate of PWC that ‘funds under management’ will rise from 
US$100 trillion to US$145 trillion by 2025. 
229
7. THE INVESTMENT AGENDA
• restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel
• operational restrictions—for example, restrictions on capital repatriation 
or landownership.
These are the elements of the OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, and values of this index are reported 
in Table 7.1 for Asia-Pacific economies in the sectors of transport, 
communications and electricity. Scores range from zero to one, with 
higher scores indicating a more restrictive regime. The OECD average 
score is also shown and cells are shaded when the score exceeds the OECD 
average. The majority of cells are shaded—that is, these economies operate 
relatively restrictive regimes in these sectors. The main contributors 
to these scores are equity limitations and, in some cases, screening or 
approval systems. The first step in seeking to mobilise private funding—
particularly now in communications—is to review these impediments. 
There is further discussion of this question in later sections.
Table 7.1 OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index
Sector Electricity Transport Communications
OECD members
Australia 0 .20 0 .27 0 .40 
Canada 0 .10 0 .25 0 .56 
Japan 0 .03 0 .28 0 .27 
South Korea 0 .42 0 .51 0 .33 
Mexico 0 .10 0 .51 0 .10 
New Zealand 0 .19 0 .27 0 .39 
United States 0 .20 0 .55 0 .11 
OECD average 0.12 0.21 0.08 
OECD non-members
Cambodia 0 .01 0 .04 0 .01 
China 0 .09 0 .41 0 .75 
India 0 .06 0 .09 0 .18 
Indonesia 0 .11 0 .43 0 .26 
Lao PDR 0 .16 0 .23 0 .08 
Malaysia 0 .50 0 .30 0 .38 
Myanmar 0 .01 0 .01 0 .01 
Philippines 0 .37 0 .66 0 .65 
Vietnam 0 .01 0 .53 0 .58 
Source: OECD (n .d .) .
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Investment facilitation
Hamdani (2018: 1) says investment facilitation 
concerns the application of investment policy. It is not about 
the right to regulate or to formulate investment law. It is not 
about investment protection, policy liberalization or even 
investment promotion. Rather, it is a downstream activity that 
involves engagement with investors and other stakeholders in the 
application of policies in practice. Such interaction improves the 
efficiency and efficacy of the overall investment process. (p. 1)
Novik and de Crombrugghe (2018) explain that the notion of investment 
facilitation is related to that of trade facilitation, which concerns the 
design of procedures for trade. They also stress that investment facilitation 
(making it easier for investors to establish and operate) is a broader notion 
than investment promotion (which is about marketing an economy as an 
investment destination). Berger et al. (2019) say investment facilitation 
should concentrate on practical aspects and technical measures, such 
as improving transparency and predictability, streamlining procedures 
and enhancing coordination between agencies. It should not include 
‘controversial and polarizing areas of market access, investment protection 
and investor–state dispute settlement’. They say it ‘should not be conceived 
in such a way that it restricts the policy space of national governments’. 
They also observe that the design of investment facilitation measures can 
draw on the experience of the development of ideas about and the success 
in developing agreements with respect to trade facilitation (Berger et al. 
2019; see also Wu 2018).
The OECD says investment facilitation provides ‘investors with 
a  transparent, predictable and efficient regulatory and administrative 
framework’ (Novik 2017). Examples of measures listed by the OECD 
include tools, policies and processes. 
Tools:
• one-stop shop or single window for incoming investors
• online business registration system
• information portal on legal and administrative procedures to start 
a business
• client service charters for all authorities dealing with investors
• systematic ‘aftercare’ services for existing investors.
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Policies:
• sound, transparent and consistent legal framework for investment
• regulatory measures to simplify/streamline administrative procedures 
• policy measures to ensure investments are responsible and sustainable 




• capacity-building for public officials
• monitoring and evaluation of existing tools, mechanisms and policies.
The OECD also points out that investment facilitation can be considered 
at several levels. First, there are actions that can be implemented by 
national governments; second, there are measures that can be included 
in trade and investment agreements; and third, there is scope to develop 
a multilateral agreement. There is an argument that the application of 
investment facilitation measures will improve the business environment 
for domestic investors as well (Berger et al. 2019). Japan is a leader in this 
respect, both in terms of inward FDI flows to Japan (JETRO 2018b) and 
in the treatment of the topic in regional trade agreements (METI 2010). 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been working on investment 
facilitation in general, following the endorsement of that work program 
at its ministerial meeting in December 2017 by 70 members. Meetings 
of the ‘Structured Discussions on Investment for Facilitation for 
Development’ followed (from March 2018), to develop a multilateral 
framework on investment facilitation, involving about 100 members.4 
Berger et al. (2019) argue that middle-income countries are relatively 
more important in this work than in the overall WTO membership, with 
4  Brazil has offered a draft of an agreement (accessed from: www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/
news/brazil-circulates-proposal-for-wto-investment-facilitation-deal [page discontinued]). This includes 
clauses on national focal points, the use of a single electronic window for the submission of documents 
by foreign investors, establishing criteria and performance indicators for the processing of applications, 
setting up an appeal process and publishing all documents relevant to FDI projects. The draft reiterates 
the importance of the most-favoured nation application of the elements of the agreement and the ‘right 
to regulate’. 
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fewer developing countries participating.5 Opening a session in March 
2019, then WTO director-general Roberto Azevêdo summarised progress 
to date by reporting that the focus was now on: 
1. improving the transparency and predictability of investment measures
2. streamlining and speeding up administrative procedures and 
requirements
3. enhancing international cooperation, information-sharing and the 
exchange of best practices
4. exploring technical assistance and capacity-building support
5. looking at how this topic relates to other issues in the global economy—
including, for example, the challenges faced by smaller businesses.
Work was to proceed by sharing examples in all these areas. 
With respect to the WTO work program, Berger et al. (2019) call for more 
attention to the scope of investment facilitation and more empirical work 
on its impact (following the model of the approach to making the case 
for an agreement on trade facilitation). They suggest mapping domestic 
policies and procedures affecting facilitation. They also discuss how to 
engage more WTO members in the discussion (through the provision 
of capacity-building, adoption of the principle of special and differential 
treatment and confirmation of the right to regulate and pursue their own 
public policy goals) and how to make the discussions more transparent 
(by involving other stakeholders). 
Berger et al. (2019) identify several actions that would facilitate 
investment, including a focus not just on the entry phase but also on the 
conditions after establishment. They argue that a good facilitation system 
will anticipate issues and thereby reduce the number of disputes. Other 
principles they endorse include the adoption of a whole-of-government 
approach in the host country, the engagement of source countries of 
FDI flows (noting those governments are beginning to issue guidelines 
for offshore investment), the application of any systems on a multilateral 
and most-favoured nation basis and the development of processes 
of capacity-building.
5  The United States is not a signatory, nor are India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam.
233
7. THE INVESTMENT AGENDA
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum also has a program 
of work related to investment facilitation (originally adopted by leaders 
in 2008). Its areas of focus are e-transparency, reducing investor  risk 
and  simplifying business regulation. Provisions related to investor risk 
include the opportunity for public comments on proposed changes 
to laws and regulations and establishing effective formal mechanisms 
for resolving disputes, while work on business regulation involves the 
use of  single windows for investment matters (Bayhaqi and Crisologo-
Hernando 2017).
Though strenuous efforts are made in these sorts of commentaries to 
separate facilitation and liberalisation, they are in fact connected. The 
complexities of the policies managing the processes of entry and operation 
determine the scope of the work on facilitation. Countries with screening 
processes, for example, will have more facilitation issues than those 
which do not. Investment liberalisation is a valuable complement to the 
facilitation of investment flows. 
Risks in infrastructure projects
In this section, special features of investments associated with the provision 
of connectivity services are explored. These features, it will be argued, are 
linked to the perception of risk by investors in infrastructure projects, and 
these perceptions help explain the presence of an apparent gap between 
the expected and the actual investment flows in the sector.
Cooperation of public and private-sector investors
There are various ways in which private-sector6 engagement can be 
arranged—one as a source of funding and the other in combinations 
of project design, building and operations. The latter is also linked to 
the former. Some forms are simple versions of public procurement—for 
example, a construction contract. Of more interest here are those that 
involve investment by the private sector in the larger, longer-lived and 
more complex projects related to the provision of connectivity services. 
6  ‘Private’ here means investors other than the government of the host country of the project, 
which could include sovereign wealth funds. 
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Infrastructure projects are complex and involve a series of stages (design, 
construction, ramping-up, operations), each of which entails a different 
type of risk. No one investor may be prepared to manage all those risks, 
and the participation of others creates the opportunity to allocate risk 
more efficiently. Investors may cover some risks related to decision-
making outside their control only at a high cost, unless government 
provides some assurances. In this case, Arezki et al. (2016) suggest, 
for example, that risks associated with construction would sit with the 
private sector, risks associated with politics and regulation would sit with 
governments and demand risks might be shared. Private-sector firms 
might specialise in managing risks at different stages (for example, design 
versus construction). This allocation would translate into the forms of 
funding provided and the guarantees offered (for a discussion of the 
complexities involved in designing this allocation, see Arezki et al. 2016). 
The structure of funding would also account for the public good elements 
of a project. The allocations of responsibilities, financing and risks are the 
elements of public–private partnerships (P3s).7 
Gurara et al. (2017) report that P3s in developing countries and emerging 
markets surged in the early 2010s but have since declined. They amount 
to about 0.4 per cent of GDP in both low-income developing countries 
and emerging market economies. Leading participants in Asia are 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Bangladesh. In earlier periods, most P3s were in 
telecommunications, whereas that sector has generally moved to purely 
private provision. More popular now for P3s are electricity projects, and 
sometimes roads. Overall, the assessment of Arezki et al. (2016) is that 
the outcomes in terms of the use of P3s have been disappointing: the cost 
of capital has proved to be higher than expected relative to public funds, 
the public sector has borne more risk than expected and service quality 
expectations have not always been met. As noted earlier, the private 
sector (in all its forms of investment) contributes a minor share of total 
investment. 
7  The World Bank (n.d.) provides information on options for P3s. Provision of funding for 
maintenance is often reported to be an issue in connectivity-related projects; when the constructor is 
the operator in the longer term, the P3 approach also helps manage the trade-offs between investment 
in better construction and later lower costs of maintenance.
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The first suggestion by Gurara et al. (2017) to make progress on 
closing ‘the investment gap’ is to increase the productivity of public-
sector management of infrastructure projects. They report considerable 
differences in ‘investment efficiency’ between countries, which they 
attribute to weaknesses in the institutions that manage public investment. 
They also report research that says that project productivity falls quickly 
with the number of projects under management, especially when that 
number accelerates above historical levels. They suggest, therefore, to not 
only look at the institutions involved in project management, but also 
schedule projects carefully. But, overall, Gurara et al. (2017: 18) say that, 
given its scale, ‘tackling the infrastructure challenge [is] inconceivable 
without a significant increase in private sector participation’.
Gurara et al. (2017) go on to argue that critical to private-sector 
participation is the development of the regulatory and institutional 
framework. One measure of the quality of this framework, and of the 
capacity to deliver infrastructure projects, is the Infrascope Index 
developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).8 Table 7.2 shows 
the overall score for this index and those for two components: regulations 
and institutions. Other elements considered in the construction of the 
index are the extent of experience in engaging with the private sector, the 
business climate and the depth of local capital markets. The EIU (2018) 
concludes:
• Overall conditions are positive in the Asia-Pacific, with a high level 
of general interest in P3s, and with provisions available on selection 
criteria, conciliation and arbitration methods, and environmental 
assessments.
• Many economies have central government agencies for the purpose of 
engaging with the private sector but some could benefit from support 
in the design of systems and structures (based on the experience of 
others) to maintain the independence of those agencies and for the 
preparation of project proposals. 
• There could also be improvements in transparency, arrangements 
for renegotiations and the treatment of unsolicited proposals, and 
interagency coordination.
8  The index is a ‘benchmarking tool that evaluates the capacity of countries to implement 
sustainable and efficient public–private partnerships … in key infrastructure sectors’. The method 
involves scoring responses to a series of questions in different policy areas relevant to P3s (EIU 2019).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7. THE INVESTMENT AGENDA
The top performers according to this index are Thailand, the Philippines, 
China and India.9 Below them, Vietnam and Bangladesh are ranked 
together, and Indonesia follows that group, ranked equally with Pakistan. 
Performance by area varies by country, to which the EIU draws attention. 
The overall score is highly correlated with the national P3 amount (Gurara 
et al. 2017: Fig. 14) and with a measure of the quality of trade-related and 
transport-related infrastructure. 
The OECD (2015) has produced a checklist for success in the application 
of P3s that includes:
• An investment regime that is clear and predictable.
• A good process for selecting projects eligible for private participation.
• Access to a wide set of sources of finance.
• Transparency and competition in the procurement regime.
• Better governance of state-owned enterprise partners in projects.
• Unbundling infrastructure systems to carve out those that are 
competitive and maintaining regulation of those that are not.
Infrastructure projects supporting connectivity could be funded out of 
current government spending or over time through payments by future 
taxpayers. They can also be funded by user charges, which are always 
controversial since there are arguments about whether all consumers 
will have access to services.10 Historically, the response to this issue has 
been to maintain the service provision within the hands of a state-owned 
monopolist who cross-subsidises services. More efficient, however, is 
to split out the community service obligations (and other public good 
elements) as separate contracts, open markets to private providers and 
deal with any market power issues following unbundling through the 
operations of a regulator. The OECD (2015) therefore adds to its list:
• establishing an independent regulator 
• aligning prices with costs 
• identifying dedicated funds to finance universal service requirements. 
9  See Llanto (2016) for discussion of the development of the P3 framework in the Philippines 
and the scope to improve by taking actions of the type listed by the EIU and from an OECD report 
referred to below. 
10  As Arezki et al. (2016) point out, toll revenues are not always well accepted and, as the project 
proceeds, may reinforce the risk of a ‘holdup’ by government. 
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There will be challenges in moving towards this model of unbundling 
and private (including international) provision, even in monopolised 
components, combined with regulation and community service 
obligation funding. Political resistance to change in this direction will be 
one element—for example, based on the concern among citizens about 
the motivation of the service provider and a perception of their lack of 
attention to the interests of consumers. 
Bowditch and Noble (2018) suggest that a complement to a reform program 
of this type is to adopt a set of principles related to ‘customer stewardship’. 
This involves a deeper, more structured and continuing interaction with 
users of services. The outcome, they argue, will be a greater willingness 
to pay for services because of a better appreciation of the value being 
created. There should also be greater trust that funds raised in this way are 
invested in the social interest. This way of thinking also allows providers 
to ‘go beyond the contract’ and to design and offer innovative solutions 
to shifts in user demands, whereas static performance indicators will not 
produce this outcome. As noted earlier, over the lifespan of assets involved 
in the provision of connectivity services, the mix of services in demand 
in the full-cost framework is highly likely to change. The application of 
5G technology creates an opportunity to renovate roads to make them 
‘smarter’ (HighwaysIndustry 2019). Bowditch and Noble (2018) argue 
that infrastructure ‘done well should be constantly evolving’. 
Bowditch and Noble (2018) offer examples of mechanisms by which 
a commitment to customer stewardship could be implemented. One takes 
the form of a price regulator asking the regulated firm in its submission on 
pricing to explain how it has delivered value to its customers, the answer 
to which depends on the quality and depth of the interaction the firm 
has with its clients. Another is an ‘app’ provided by a toll-road business to 
allow clients to compare the options of using their services or not using 
them (via off-tollway roads), and hence the savings in full-cost terms from 
paying the toll. New reporting systems will be required for other forms 
of infrastructure that do not involve regular transactions related to their 
use, and where the value includes providing an option to the consumer or 
a contribution to a desirable attribute of the community. Bowditch and 
Noble (2018) propose that customer stewardship involves a commitment 
to connectedness (across services, discussed further in the next section), 
providing information to consumers to assist the revelation of their 
preferences (ideally involving schedules of prices and options of quality 
mixes), an ability to adapt over time and transparency. Operating in 
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this manner, they reiterate, provides more business opportunities for the 
service provider than does retaining a fixed list of performance indicators 
for which boxes are ticked (or not). 
Security issues
Given the scale of projects, the extent of their use and their longevity, 
there has always been a link between the provision of connectivity services 
and the security of the host economy. These services are critical to the 
continued operation of the economy when there is a conflict. They will 
also be elements of delivering support for the operations of defence forces 
around any conflict. Access to those services is therefore regarded as 
critical. This translates into a discussion about hosting relevant capacity—
for example, cases in various economies have been made for the presence 
of an international airline ideally based in the home country, which at 
least can be commandeered if not also owned and operated by its citizens 
(Findlay 1985). Systems of protection of a ‘national carrier’ during normal 
circumstances were then justified to achieve that purpose.
The more modern version of this issue arises in the digital sector (Findlay 
2019). For example, Chinese firm Huawei has high market shares in 
components of 5G telecommunications networks. While the firm is well 
regarded in its sector for its management and innovation, policy views 
differ, since Huawei has been involved in intellectual property disputes, 
allegations of breaking sanctions and of military associations, and of 
benefiting from government support. There is also concern about China’s 
National Intelligence Law, which says: ‘Any organisation and citizen shall, 
in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate 
in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national 
intelligence work that they are aware of.’
Many have therefore questioned the prudence of allowing Huawei 
to be involved in building 5G infrastructure. These commentators see 
risks of disruption, the consequences of which would be high given the 
likely ubiquity of the technology, or costs of abuse, such as siphoning 
off data. The United States has responded with bans related to imports 
of technology, which block the use of equipment from an adversary 
government. It also has added Huawei to its ‘Entity List’, which has the 
effect of banning exports to it and its affiliates.
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At the time of writing, the outcome is not clear. This response could 
be a tactic by the United States to drive other outcomes, in which case 
the main consequence is the impact of uncertainty on the shape of 
supply chains. These will be chains linked to equipment, devices and 
services that are critical to connectivity. In a worst-case outcome, the 
world would divide into spheres of influence associated with different 
telecommunications standards. Connectivity would be high within but 
not between these spheres. 
The most efficient solution, on the other hand, is to identify the risks and 
to cooperate on the design of regulatory or business responses to those 
risks. At the same time, it will be important to align those responses across 
economies to facilitate investment and trade (including data) flows. This 
is a matter for at least regional cooperation, the outcome of which can 
feed into global strategy. 
Political economy of success
Large-scale provision of connectivity services is significant in the economy 
and, because of their scale, they can have important effects on its structure 
and on the location of activities. One effect is the diffusion of economic 
activity—that is, in the presence of ‘fixed factor endowments, the 
increased access to markets and ideas should benefit all regions’ (Banerjee 
et al. 2012). But, as Banerjee et al. (2012: 2) also explain, the fall in trade 
costs can have consequences in the opposite direction:
[T]ransportation infrastructure increases the access of rural regions 
to cities, and the well-known agglomeration effects of cities may 
cause productive capital and skilled labor to move from rural 
regions to cities over time, with the result that those who remain 
in rural areas receive very limited benefits from urbanization or 
even become impoverished. Along similar lines, it has been argued 
that the expansion of motor road networks in the United States 
promoted large-scale suburbanization and left many cities without 
a viable economic model. (p. 2)
The importance of these effects has been examined in a series of papers 
about the impact of high-speed rail in China (which is mainly applied to the 
movement of people). Ke et al. (2017) find that the gains are concentrated 
in existing transport hubs that are connected to the new network. Yu et al. 
(2019) find that high-speed rail connections to metropolitan centres 
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lead to reductions in GDP in peripheral but also connected prefectures, 
compared with unconnected prefectures, as a result of reductions in both 
productivity and capital inputs. This result is interesting in the context 
of neighbouring prefectures ‘fighting one another for a station along the 
HSR [high-speed rail] line’ in the design phase (Yu et al. 2019: 18). Other 
studies, in Japan, find different effects of high-speed rail by sector, with 
the service sector concentrated in urban areas and manufacturing moved 
to nearby areas (within 150 kilometres) where employment increased, 
while those areas further out declined in terms of employment (Li and 
Xu 2018). 
Connectivity projects, given their scale, also face constraints on their 
location. For example, in China, most high-speed rail stations are built in 
suburbs, given the costs of land and of disruption in downtown areas. The 
consequences of their establishment on local economies and therefore the 
value of local fixed inputs like land can be significant. These effects then 
offer opportunities for the financing of the provision of these services, 
since their value is capitalised into the value of land in the vicinity of the 
major nodes in the network. When the service provider can capture that 
increment in value, they can finance the project (raise and repay debt, for 
example, or earn a return on their own equity) and do so much sooner 
than via a long stream of ticket revenue. Arezki et al. (2016) point to the 
example of the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR), which is run 
by the MTR Corporation and is partly publicly owned. The corporation 
is also a landowner and the value of its landholdings appreciates as the 
network extends. The change in value that is captured by the corporation 
helps fund the extension of the system (Kembrey 2015).11 Success here, 
however, depends on the competitiveness of the corporation as a land 
developer and access to land at the ‘pre-rail’ price. 
Yet, as explained, the completion of connectivity projects also has the 
effect of shifting economic activity and most likely diminishing the 
value of assets held elsewhere and/or imposing costs of adjustment on 
members of the peripheral community who relocate. The response could 
be a political one, anticipating and resisting change in the first place or 
demanding other forms of compensation later. 
11  The value increment can be captured in other ways. See City of Chicago (2010–21) for 
a discussion of tax increment financing, based on increases in property values. 
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Raising the returns on infrastructure 
investment
Some activities can be undertaken that, when successful, will add to 
the returns on infrastructure investment, thereby increasing the interest 
of private investors in such projects. 
Coordinating network design
Connectivity involves a bundle of services. Consider the output of a factory 
moving goods to a customer at some distance. Mostly likely this will 
involve a road journey at each end as well as a longer journey by another 
mode in between. The physical movement will also be complemented 
by flows of data and finance, and possibly also by the movement of 
people (either during the setup of the transactions or in servicing them). 
As Bowditch and Noble (2018: 52) say:
Infrastructure is part of a system, and should be managed to give 
maximum efficacy to that system. Having a great airport or even 
a very fast rail corridor means little if the adjacent road and rail 
systems fail to connect with and work coherently with it. To have 
quality infrastructure, its connectedness is much more than just 
being physical, but also coordinated and integrated in its functions 
and values. 
Those involved in managing connectivity will certainly take this multipart 
view: they will examine the full cost of the movement. They will not look 
at the road segment separately from others. They will also consider the 
coordination of the data flow with the movement of goods; indeed, they 
will expect to be able to monitor the good and its condition as it moves 
within the physical infrastructure. The adoption of standards that facilitate 
interoperability (from data devices to container sizes) is also important. 
In the private sector, the boundaries of the connectivity services business 
(or the alliances it creates), and what packages to put together to provide 
a perspective that the consumer values, will have to be considered. 
The value of connectivity across systems has implications for the public 
and private sectors. A considerable amount of planning is valuable to 
produce the right project portfolio. No one person will be able to imagine 
all these options and there is value in using a market process in this 
context. This would involve a mechanism to accept unsolicited proposals 
from the market, not just as a result of tenders or requests for proposals. 
243
7. THE INVESTMENT AGENDA
Arezki et al. (2016) observe that the ability to raise finance for any one 
project depends on a whole network and the connectivity between its 
elements, as well as its density. They also argue that it would be valuable to 
bring in private investors who have a bundle of infrastructure assets at an 
early stage in the planning process. This is because they have a better idea 
of what a whole infrastructure network should look like. Furthermore, 
they argue that most P3s are now conceived at the national level, which 
does not take account of the externalities involved across borders. They 
argue that a role for the development banks is to facilitate the cooperation 
across governments and the participation of private investors in this way. 
An example is the work of the ADB in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(ADB 2018).
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) illustrates the orders of magnitude 
involved. De Soyres et al. (2018) report that, within the BRI, trade costs 
will fall by an average of 3.5 per cent across bilateral pairs among the 
71 members. But costs will also fall by 2.8 per cent, on average, in their 
trade with the rest of the world. Third parties also benefit from access to 
BRI infrastructure in their own bilateral transactions not involving BRI 
members. The average decrease worldwide (191 countries) in trade costs 
is 2.2 per cent. These are significant impacts, which is not unexpected 
given the number of members of the BRI and its geographic coverage. 
But de Soyres et al. (2018) also make the point of the significance of the 
spillovers involved in connectivity projects and the value of working to 
internalise them. 
Complementary services
As is already evident, the successful operation of a network of providers 
of connectivity services will depend on access to such services. The 
performance of both public (for example, movements across borders) 
and private (for example, competition in the transport sector) providers 
matters. Several papers observe that not only the physical infrastructure, 
but also the quality of institutions matter. An example is the result of 
Francois and Manchin (2007)—who measure institutional quality by 
various characteristics of governance—that these variables affect both the 
levels of exports and the participation in exporting. Brooks (2016) stresses 
the importance of access to world-class logistics services, especially as the 
composition of trade changes. 
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The World Bank makes this point in relation to the BRI. De Soyres et al. 
(2018) argue that the benefits in terms of transit times and trade costs 
will only be captured if policy issues are also tackled—for example, border 
crossing and trade facilitation, logistics services (‘weak links’) as well as 
FDI regimes.12 Baniya et al. (2019) examine the effects of a series of 
interventions proposed in the BRI on 71 participating economies. They 
find that these projects reduce trade times by up to 4.4 per cent. When in 
addition there are improvements in trade facilitation, trade times fall by 
up to 10.9 per cent. The positive effects of the BRI projects, they say, are 
magnified by the trade facilitation reforms. The effect on trade is growth 
of more than 7 per cent, which rises to 13 per cent when these changes are 
complemented by trade agreements that improve market access. 
The provision of competitive complementary services therefore leverages 
the benefits created by good connectivity projects. Another way of saying 
this is to observe the fact that failure to liberalise these complementary 
services would allow the benefits created to be captured by service 
providers or wasted by inefficient government processes. 
Conclusion
Projects designed to deliver connectivity services are highly prospective, 
since they offer significant reductions in the costs of the movement of 
goods, people and data, with subsequent benefits in terms of the costs 
of movements, trade flows, investment flows, productivity, growth 
and equity. Governments have been the major providers of funds for 
connectivity investment (of the order of 85 per cent); however, they face 
financial and human resource constraints on making further investments. 
Instead, the question is asked: what greater role can the private sector play 
in connectivity projects in the economies of the Asia-Pacific, including 
investors from offshore? If at least some part of the likely significant 
benefits can be captured, the projects become more ‘bankable’ and of 
more interest to the private sector. However, these sorts of projects are not 
easy to implement because of three sets of factors identified here: 1) policy 
barriers to investment, 2) risks associated with infrastructure projects 
because they are big, specific and long lived, and 3) loss of the opportunity 
to capture extra benefits through the management of networks or the 
12  For further commentary on these policy issues, see the discussion in World Bank (2018). 
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provision of complementary policy change. Barriers to investment flows 
in general are an important element to consider, along with action to 
facilitate those flows. But of more interest here are the special conditions 
related to investment projects in infrastructure that facilitate connectivity.
With respect to the risks involved, the interest is not just in the scale of 
investment likely to be involved in providing connectivity services, but also 
in the lumpiness of these projects (such as a highway, a port, an airport). 
This situation incurs the risk of the abuse of monopoly power, which 
also draws the attention of governments and their regulators. Projects will 
in that case involve the interaction of investors with regulators, whose 
decisions have a significant effect on profitability. Technological change 
can, however, shift the significance of this aspect, as has occurred in the 
case of telecommunications. 
There are also concerns about the consequences of connectivity projects 
for various user groups. The traditional concern was the provision of 
services to low-income or isolated areas. In addition, since these projects 
are large in scale, they can shift the location of economic activity and 
change values of assets such as land in participating locations, which offer 
financing opportunities. They also have significant redistributive effects 
within economies, which can trigger political reactions in anticipation of 
(thereby retarding), or because of, projects. The latter becomes of source 
of risk from the investor’s point of view, depending on the government 
response to that reaction, including the scope to renege on previous 
commitments related to pricing, for example. 
The scale of connectivity projects offers access to significant benefits, 
but it also exposes the host community to new risks. The impact of 
a disruption of a facility once constructed would have significant impacts 
on the economy. This is the security risk. This concern was always present, 
especially when the provision of services involved cross-border operations 
(as in aviation). With technological change and access to digital technology, 
it is becoming more evident in relation to modern telecommunications 
infrastructure. The concern is that foreign governments not only can ‘cut 
off ’ services, but also can now ‘reach in’ to disrupt or capture them. 
These projects are specific, since a facility built in one location need not 
be suitable for another. Consequently, implementation involves upfront 
work, conceiving of the project and then developing details, even before 
the case for execution can be made clear and finance is arranged. This early 
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stage demands significant human capital but also involves significant risks, 
which crystallise when a project does not proceed. Private-sector firms 
may have the capacity for project planning and access to international 
providers will offer a wider range of experiences, but the allocation of the 
risks involved will have to be clear if they are to participate. 
Connectivity projects are long lived and, across the course of their lives, 
many conditions may change. Technology may change, shifting the way 
an existing facility might be managed (for example, the application of 
the Internet of Things to roads). Technological change can also shift the 
demand for connectivity services (for example, the growth of air freight 
relative to road or sea). The distribution of the costs and benefits of 
adjustment will affect the initial willingness of various parties to invest or, 
in other words, the efficiency of the distribution of risks associated with 
these changes should be considered upfront. A long-lived project is open 
to the risk of a government ‘holdup’ (driven perhaps by the consequences 
of projects for different interest groups), the risk of which will also deter 
private investors.
Finally, greater benefits are achieved when the complementarity between 
projects is recognised (such as data flow alongside goods movements) 
and the value of networking within and across countries is appreciated. 
Projects created in isolation of these considerations are likely to incur later 
add-on costs to capture the opportunities from better networking that 
become clear in hindsight. Failure to introduce reforms that facilitate the 
use of the infrastructure also involves lost opportunities and lesser returns 
than others to investment. 
This is a significant bundle of issues for any national government to resolve 
to attract private investment. It is not surprising, then, that assessments by 
bodies like the OECD, the ADB and the International Monetary Fund 
indicate a big gap between the number of projects in the region that are 
likely to be socially valuable and those that are implemented. This draws 
attention to the ways in which investment flows might be facilitated.
There is a substantial conversation in progress about international 
investment facilitation in general. That conversation, including efforts 
in the WTO and APEC, as well as coverage of these issues in trade 
agreements, is relevant to projects related to connectivity. These include 
efforts to add to the transparency and consistency of policymaking in 
relation to international investment. But the characteristics just listed 
demand an additional layer of effort to deal with the issues that arise in 
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connectivity projects. The issues to be managed include the following, 
which comprise the ‘investment facilitation plus’ agenda for connectivity 
projects—that is: 
• Organising the funding of work on and access to human capital for the 
development phase of projects, including attention to the productivity 
of government agencies involved in this work and the scope to engage 
the private sector.
• Paying strict attention to the economic benefits of projects and thereby 
the ability to repay borrowed or invested funds, and to good practice 
in procurement that produces projects at least cost.
• Building consensus on the value of projects to user communities 
(for example, adopting the ‘customer stewardship’ model), enhancing 
their willingness to pay for projects and hence their ‘bankability’.
• Achieving consistency over time in the operations of regulatory 
systems and giving attention to efforts to unbundle elements of the 
services chain that are competitive, especially as technology changes.
• Meeting obligations for universal services but also funding them 
directly and transparently. 
• Recognising the risks of government holdup on long-lived projects 
and making commitments to manage that risk.
• Anticipating a distribution of the costs and benefits of adjusting to 
technological change, not only with respect to the facility itself, but 
also to its users, and how that changes their demands for services.
• Realising an efficient (least trade-distorting) approach to the treatment 
of security issues and the participation of foreign input providers.
• Maintaining a diverse set of sources of finance for projects, being clear 
about risks borne by the holders of different securities and checking 
the efficiency of the distribution of those risks among the parties.
• Paying attention to policy applying to complementary service 
providers, ensuring that restrictions in those policy regimes are not 
limiting the benefits created from connectivity projects or diverting 
those benefits to specific service providers. 
Cooperation across borders is valuable in this context. In the first instance, 
there is value in learning from the experience of others in responding to 
these issues,13 but there are aspects in which additional and more specific 
13  APEC (2018) has produced a guidebook on infrastructure investment that is an example of this 
level of capacity-building. 
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cooperation is useful. For example, cooperation—between agencies with 
economies and across borders—that introduces the perspective of global 
and regional networks in project design and selection, and which drives 
an outcome to capture its benefits, will be valuable. The ADB provides 
examples of this form of cooperation. 
New models of cooperation have been suggested. For example, Arezki 
et al. (2016) discuss the role of an international platform that would 
facilitate private-sector investment. The managers of this platform are 
acting as an intermediary (or ‘making the market’) between governments 
and investors. A third party in the form of a development bank could play 
that key role in this platform.14 The services provided might be project 
design. Development banks can also contribute to the enforcement of 
contracts—for example, using their leverage to ‘tame opportunistic’ 
governments. Governments could also bring to the table their interest 
in greenfield projects; according to recent history, there has been a lack 
of interest by private investors in these compared with already operating 
projects, yet they are the projects ‘at the margin’ where significant benefits 
are to be captured. Allowing many projects to compete on a single platform 
reduces the risk that governments will ‘pick winners’ and make the wrong 
selection.15 Private investors would bring to the market a requirement for 
projects to be economically sound, access to funds and their various forms 
of expertise. The key feature of these platforms is the engagement of the 
private sector at their foundation. 
A further development on these platforms might be greater consistency 
among or standardisation of projects, which would aid the application of 
securitisation methods to raise funding. Arezki et al. (2016) argue that 
progress in this respect provides advantages of diversification for investors, 
a lower cost of capital and higher liquidity. 
This is an interesting suggestion for a mode of cooperation and the chapter 
concludes with observations about a number of questions that it prompts. 
14  Arezki et al. (2016) observe that an advantage of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
is that it is a specialist infrastructure bank that could play the role of a development bank on the sort 
of platform they envisage. This includes the ability to fund larger projects and to coordinate across 
networks, adding to the ‘bankability’ of individual projects. It is a topic for further work of how much 
the AIIB is contributing or could contribute to the other items on the checklist of the ‘investment 
facilitation plus’ agenda. 
15  An often-cited example is the government-promoted investment in railroads in the United States 
and the assessment by Fogel (1962) of the small increment in GDP compared with an extension of 
the canal system that might otherwise have occurred. 
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The first set concerns its direction and management. First, what is the 
ultimate goal—or vision of the outcome—of this cooperation? Some 
guidance might be, for example, taken from the goals of the ASEAN 
Master Plan on Connectivity (see Box 1 in the Introduction to this 
volume) to achieve a ‘seamlessly and comprehensively connected and 
integrated region’. Were this platform to be built in the East Asian region, 
its success is more likely when it has a clear set of ‘owners’—that is, those 
creating the expectations of outcomes, setting targets, receiving reports 
of progress and then responding. An obvious set of owners meeting these 
capacities are ministers from regional economies, involving ASEAN at 
least, with relevant responsibilities. 
Second, further work would also be required on how this platform 
interacted with other forms of cooperation. There would be interaction 
with the BRI (see Chapter 2 in this volume) to consider, as well as the 
work in ASEAN on connectivity, as already mentioned. Other forms 
include the work by China and Japan to promote their cooperation in 
third countries, according to the principles of openness, transparency, 
economic viability and fiscal sustainability.16 The United States and 
partners Japan and Australia, building on cooperation among development 
banks including those of Singapore, Canada and the European Union, 
have formed the Blue Dot Network (US Department of State 2019: 16). 
Its purpose appears to be to facilitate investment via the certification that 
best practices have been adopted in particular infrastructure projects.17 
Third, there is a concern that the platform model may be difficult to scale 
up, which is important given the orders of magnitude involved in the 
investment ‘gap’. Access to human capital is one issue, and Arezki et al. 
(2016) discuss how the private sector might also contribute to resolving 
that constraint. Compensation for inputs to the design of projects that do 
not proceed has to be considered; Elek (2018) points to a private-sector 
organisation that provides these services.18 
16  See, for example, JETRO (2018a) and MOFCOM (2018).
17  McCawley (2019) provides a commentary on this initiative, including questions about the 
manner of its operation.
18  See InfraCo Asia’s website at: infracoasia.com. 
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